Rückschau

2023

21.-23.9.2023 10 Years of Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Conference)

26.6.2023 Vulnerability and the State – The Case of Children

Workshop: A Philosophical History of the Concept, 7–9 June

31.05/01.06.2023: The Role of Knowledge for Responsible Decision Making in Organizations

31 May-1 June 2023, Gästehaus der Universität Hamburg, Rothenbaumchaussee 34, 20148 Hamburg

This conference seeks to explore the role of knowledge in enabling organizations to make responsible decisions. Various disciplines investigate the qualities organizations and their members need to generate, share, and store information for decision-making often in isolation from each other. We aim to bridge these disciplinary boundaries by bringing together fifteen scholars working across philosophy, organizational studies, psychology, sociology, and law. Talks explore foundational topics such as whether responsibility for actions based on group beliefs transmits to the members of the organization; psychological issues such as what we can learn from research on conspiracy theories about organizational decision making; as well as applied issues such as platform surveillance, corporate bullshit, and the impact of workplace democracy on corporate decision making.

The programme is available here.

Registration required:
There is a limited number of places available for participants.
Please send an email to Lily Tappe to register for the conference lily.tappe"AT"uni-hamburg.de
until 30 April and we try to accommodate you.

The conference is organized by the research group “Culpable Ignorance, Moral Knowledge in Organizations” and funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

Agenda
Wednesday, 31 May 2023

Boudewijn de Bruin, University of Groningen
Epistemic virtues and organizational knowledge
Joseph Uscinski,University of Miami
What Can the Dynamics of Conspiracy Theories Tell us about Organizational Decision-making?
Santiago Mejia, Fordham University
Individual Character and Organizational Culture: the `Person-in-Organization’ as the Locus of Virtue and Vice
Rafael Wittek, University of Groningen
Context or Consonance? A Cause-Mapping Analysis of Cognitive Reactions to Organizational Change
Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
Group Belief and Responsibility Transmission
Lily Tappe, University of Hamburg
Wilfully ignorant and equally culpable? - Testing the equal culpability assumption for assigning moral blame in cases of culpable ignorance
Alexander Sarch, University of Surrey
Why We Need the Collective Knowledge Doctrine: The View from England
Marco Meyer, University of Hamburg
The Knowledge-Based Firm: Implications for Ethical Decision-Making

Thursday, 1 June 2023

Steven Bland, Huron University
Bounded Rationality and Epistemic Virtues
Mark Alfano, Macquarie University
Trust from mistrust
Tong Li, University of Hamburg
Shaping Organisational Epistemic Infrastructure With Epistemic Virtues for Digital Responsibility: The Role of Ethics Professionals
Säde Hormio, University of Helsinki
Workplace democracy and deliberation in decision making
Mandi Astola, Delft University of Technology
When is corporate bullshit wrong?
Erwan Lamy, ESCP Business School Paris
NEVA model and epistemic responsibility: a proposal to make people more epistemically virtuous in organizations
Christopher Baird, Glasgow Caledonian University
Prying platforms: an interactivist account of collective epistemic vice

11./12.05.2023: 4th Berlin-Hamburg Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy

24./25.03.2023: Higher-Order Metaphysics of Ground

2022

Feminist Political Philosophy Speaker Series 18.10.21-21.02.22

Nobody's free until everybody's free! (PDF)

A speaker series on feminist approaches to urgent contemporary political questions. This series takes its title from the words of US civil rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer— words that demand accountability from any society calling itself a liberal democracy.

To take those words seriously, a society must not only stamp out prejudice and discrimination, but must rethink basic institutions of education, policing, criminal justice, and national borders, as well as social and cultural norms of family and community life. This speaker series brings together feminist political philosophers who respond to this challenge and map paths to a freer and more livable society.

Organizer: Dr. Caleb Ward, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, caleb.ward"AT"uni-hamburg.de

Here you can register for the speaker series.

Datum	Sprecher	Thema
18.10.21	Quill Kukla (Georgetown University)	Spatial Agency, Territory, and the Right to the City Überseering 35, Hörsaal B 14.00-16.00
	Abstract The idea that the city should be for everyone and made by everyone is often known as the right to the city. Kukla explores this idea and then thinks about how cities are marked by spatial injustice—that is, our unequal access to and control over city space. Kukla asks, how are people unequally situated so as to access a right to the city—how do they have unequal spatial agency, or an unequal ability to inhabit the spaces that make up a city? Kukla will analyze the concept of 'public space' and ask what sorts of public and non-public spaces people need in order to flourish in a city. What is involved in building cities that afford all residents the right to the city, enabling city dwellers of all sorts to exercise spatial agency in shared space?
22.11.21	Alexis Shotwell (Carleton University)	Solidarity Against Straightness 18.15-20.00 (Zoom)
	Abstract Shotwell argues that we should be in solidarity against straightness: On the side of straight people, against straightness as norm, institution, and system. Straightness as a social relation of oppression and benefit weaves its way into our lives, a coproduction of eugenics, medicalisation, and neoliberal social structures organized around the monogamous, dyadic, reproductive family unit. Can we challenge it without expecting every straight person to turn queer? Shotwell lays out some diagnostic criteria for straightness and considers what it would mean to betray straightness, personally, politically, and as a stabilizing social relation of oppression and benefit. The affect, practice, and fantasy of solidarity can offer something helpful to our work for collective liberation across and with difference.
7.12.21	Tanu Biswas (University of Stavanger)	Childist Discomfort with Pedagogy: Aren't we schooling towards intergenerational injustice? 18.15-20.00 (Zoom)
	Abstract The speaker reflects on the role of schooling and pedagogy in ensuring intergenerational climate justice as a response to contemporary children and youth's climate activism. The goal driving rapid global developments in the schooling sector is not intergenerational sustainability. On the contrary, misopedy (adultism) seems foundational to accelerated industrial growth, requiring standardized schooling to produce 'future human capital'. Therefore, the question arises: Aren't we schooling towards intergenerational injustice?
24.1.22	Lisa Guenther (Queen's University)	Abolish the World As We Know It: Notes for a Praxis of Phenomenology Beyond Critique 18.15-20.00 (Zoom)
	Abstract The world as we know it is structured by intersecting forms of systemic violence. It might seem obvious that this violence calls for critique. But Guenther experiments with another, more radical possibility inspired by Denise Ferreira da Silva’s Black feminist poethics and by abolitionist refusals of critique as an end in itself and a substitute for collective action. To what extent might phenomenology, even in its most critical form, be so deeply invested in the Kantian tradition of transcendental critique that it confirms the logic of the world as we know it? And how, if at all, might a praxis of phenomenology beyond critique imagine and affirm a poethical world in which entanglement, indeterminacy, and simultaneity generate virtual possibilities for being, knowing, and doing beyond and against racial violence?
7.2.22	Andrea J. Pitts (University of North Carolina, Charlotte)	*U.S. Latina/x Abolitionist Feminism: Nuevos y viejos caminos/New and Old Pathways* 18.15-20.00 (Zoom)
	Abstract In this presentation, Pitts turns to sources within Chicana/x and Latina/x feminisms to develop a framing of prison abolitionism from within these feminist trajectories. In particular, Pitts examines archival sources that demonstrate Chicana feminist involvement in prisoners’ rights organizing during the 1970s and 1980s, with such work foregrounding activist and scholarly contributions in later decades among Latina/x and Chicana/x feminists. Regarding the continued relevance of such a critical praxis, the second half of the presentation poses the early 2000s writings of transnational Argentine feminist María Lugones, and specifically her conceptions of active subjectivity and streetwalker theorizing as providing a novel Latina/x feminist framing of agency that supports prison abolitionist efforts today.
21.2.22	Serena Parekh (Northeastern University)	Book Talk: *No Refuge: Ethics and the Global Refugee Crisis* commentary by Christine Straehle, Universität Hamburg 16.15-19.00 (Zoom)
	Abstract In this talk, I show why it’s important to understand that there is not one but two global refugee crises. The first is the more well-known crisis faced by Western states who are asked to take in refugees and asylum seekers; they must balance their commitments to human rights with what they see as a need to protect their borders and sovereign right to decide who enters. The second crisis is the crisis faced by refugees themselves who are unable to find refuge anywhere in the world, that is, they are unable to access the minimum conditions of human dignity. Formulating a morally adequate refugee policy will require understanding both crises, especially the second, lesser-known crisis. I show why we should understand the global refugee crisis as a structural injustice and why this gives rise to a responsibility to address the crisis for refugees.

2021

"What is a Woman?" SWIP (Society for Woman in Philosophy)-Hamburg Workshop zu Feministischer Philosophie (21./22..01.2021)

SWIP (Society for Woman in Philosophy) Jahrestagung 2021 (05./06.11.2021)

International Workshop: Orders of Being (11.12.2021)

Orders of Being (International Workshop)

Event Date:
11.12.2021 (10:00 - 19:00)

Event Description:

To be – W.V.O. Quine famously told us – is to be the value of a variable. Importantly, there are two strands to the Quinean paradigm. First, it connects metaphysics (in particular: ontology) to quantification. Second, it takes a stance on the type of quantification at issue. For Quine was convinced that the only legitimate type of quantification is first-order quantification, i.e. quantification into the syntactic position of singular terms. Taking this into account, the Quinean paradigm can be expressed more precisely as follows: for Quineans, to be is to be the value of a first-order variable.

In recent years, we have seen a shift away from this Quinean paradigm: there is a growing consensus that higher-order quantifiers, in particular quantifiers binding variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences, are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico-philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in first-order terms. This anti-Quinean, positive attitude towards self-standing higher-order quantification has a historical pedigree too: it can be seen as following a Fregean paradigm, since it is rooted in Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879). Adapting a famous dictum by Boolos, we can contrast it with the Quinean paradigm as follows: for Fregeans, to be is to be the value of a first-order variable or the value of a higher-order variable.

This paradigm-shift is of great importance for many fundamental questions in metaphysics, concerning e.g. the reality and nature of properties, propositions and numbers as well as our notions of existence, being and ontological commitment. The aim of this workshop is to bring together philosophers from different theoretical backgrounds to present their latest research on these and related topics.

The speakers at this workshop include:

- Fiona Doherty (University of Notre Dame - London Campus)

- Berta Grimau (Czech Academy of Sciences)

- Tobias Rosefeldt (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

- Lukas Skiba (Universität Hamburg)

Logistics and Registration:

Health and Safety regulations permitting, the plan is to conduct this workshop in person. The event will be subject to a 3G policy (i.e. only those vaccinated, recovered, or tested will be admitted). Attendance is free, but prior registration is necessary, and the number of attendees is limited.

If you would like to attend, please send an email to: lukas.skiba@uni-hamburg.de(lukas.skiba"AT"uni-hamburg.de).

--
Dr. Lukas Skiba

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Philosophisches Seminar
Überseering 35, #4 Postfach
22297 Hamburg
Raum: 03014
Tel.: +49 40 42838-3543
Fax: +49 40 42838 - 3983

Web: www.skibalukas.wordpress.com
Email: lukas.skiba"AT"uni-hamburg.de

Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance (12.07. - 16.07.2021)

2020

2019

7.-9. Febr. 2019 - Belief in Context

27.-28. Febr. 2019 - Early Modern Conceptions of Freedom, Rationality and Practical Reasons

Workshop

Early Modern Conceptions of Freedom, Rationality and Practical Reasons

Wann: Mi, 27.02.19, 14: 00 Uhr bis Do, 28.02.19, 15: 00 Uhr
Wo: Universität Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 8, 20146 Hamburg, Raum 08.

It is essential for our self-understanding to conceive of ourselves not only as rational, but also as free agents. As a matter of fact, it is far more controversial what “free” exactly means in this context than what it means to act “rationally”. According to the voluntarist (the predecessor of the libertarian), the possibility of acting freely presupposes a “real” choice between alternative ways of acting in every situation, whereas for the rationalist such as Leibniz, acting freely just means to act free from non-rational factors and on the sole basis of insight into the best reason. If acting for a reason is a minimal condition for acting rationally, then questions such as the following arise: What makes a reason a good one? What kinds of practical reasons (moral, rational) are to be distinguished? And how are free, rational and moral action compatible after all? The goal of the workshop is to investigate some of the central early modern positions with respect to how they conceive of the relation between freedom, rationality and morality of actions, focusing on conceptions of obligation, the (morally) right and good and others.

Programme:

February 27th
• 13:30 coffee
• 14:00 Ariane Schneck (Bielefeld): The Two-Component Model of Cartesian Freedom
• 15:30 Ulrich Steinvorth (Hamburg): The Working of the Brain and Free Will in Descartes and Later Authors
• 17:00 Katerina Deligiorgi (Sussex): Best of All Possible Worlds, Modality, Freedom
• 19:00 dinner
February 28th
• 09:00 Katerina Mihaylova (Halle): Physical vs. Moral Affection of the Free Will: Pufendorf on Rationality as an Essential Condition for Intersubjectivity
• 10:30 Sonja Schierbaum (Hamburg): How Many Kinds? – Wolff and Crusius on Practical Reasons
• 12:00 lunch break
• 13:30 Fiorella Tommasini (Halle/Erfurt): Kant and the natural law tradition
• 15:00 end of workshop

Kontakt: Sonja.Schierbaum"AT"uni-hamburg.de

Organisation: DFG-Projekt “Handeln: Zwischen Freiheit und Rationalität – Leibniz, Crusius und der Satz vom zureichenden Grund”
(PI: Sonja Schierbaum)

15. März 2019 - Der Mensch und das Absolute bei Spinoza

12.-14. März 2019-The Principle of Sufficient Reason in the History of Philosophy

Internationale Konferenz:

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in the History of Philosophy

Wann: Di, 12.03.19 – Do, 14.03.19

Wo: Universität Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 8, 20146 Hamburg, Raum 106

According to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR for short), or at least to one version of it, everything must have a reason. Depending on the interpretation of each of the principle’s essential components, this is a bold and controversial claim. In the history of philosophy, the PSR has its friends and foes. For rationalists such as Leibniz, it guarantees the intelligibility of the world, whereas for voluntarists, it poses a threat to the possibility of acting with free will.

The conference aims at discussing a wide range of topics related to the foundation, justification, scope and applications of the PSR (or kindred principles) in the history of philosophy, that is, in the ancient, medieval and early modern period – and beyond.

Dem Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes zufolge muß alles einen Grund haben. Dies ist eine kontroverse Behauptung, auch wenn jedes der wesentlichen Bestandteile des Prinzips der Interpretation bedarf. In der Geschichte der Philosophie hat das Prinzip seine Gegner und Befürworter. Für Rationalisten wie Leibniz garantiert es die Intelligibilität der Welt, für Voluntaristen hingegen stellt es eine Bedrohung für die Möglichkeit dar, mit freiem Willen zu handeln. Die Konferenz zielt auf eine Vielfalt von Themen zu Begründung, Rechtfertigung, Reichweite und Anwendungen des Prinzips (und damit verwandter Prinzipien) in der Geschichte der Philosophie von der Antike bis zur frühen Neuzeit und darüber hinaus.

Speakers:

Sebastian Bender (Berlin)
Omri Boehm (New York)
Richard Cross (Notre Dame)
Michael della Rocca (Yale, New Haven)
Jari Kaukua (Jyväskylä)
Robert Hanna (Boulder, Independent Scholar)
John Marenbon (Cambridge)
Yitzak Melamed (Baltimore)
JT Paasch (Washington)
Stephan Schmid (Hamburg)
Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg)
Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Jyväsklyä)

Organisation:
DFG-Projekt "Fundierung und ontologische Abhängigkeit in der spätmittelalterlichen Philosophie" (PI: Magali Roques)

DFG-Projekt “Handeln: Zwischen Freiheit und Rationalität – Leibniz, Crusius und der Satz vom zureichenden Grund” (PI: Sonja Schierbaum)

Kontakt:
magali.roques@uni-hamburg.de

Sonja.Schierbaum@uni-hamburg.de

Mitglieder des Philosophischen Seminars sind herzlich willkommen teilzunehmen. Bitte senden Sie in diesem Fall eine Nachricht an eine der Kontaktpersonen.

18.-20. Juli 2019 - Agency, Past and Future

2018

12.10.2018 - Varieties of Relevance

24.+25.08.2018 - 2nd Hamburg-Japan Workshop

30.07.2018-01.08.2018 - Normativity in Philosophy

25.- 27.05.2018 - Metaphysical Grounding

22./23.03.2018 - Fictionalism

16./17.03.2018 - Testing Linguistic Intuitions

2017

17./18.11.2017 - Philosophy meets Literary Studies IV

Zeit	Sprecher
13:00	Tilmann Köppe (Göttingen)
14:45	Kathleen Stock (Sussex)
16:30	Mark Currie (London)

Zeit	Sprecher
10:00	Richard Woodward (Hamburg)
11:45	Saskia Brockmann & Susanne Rieker (Tübingen)
14:30	Cain Todd (Lancaster)

27./28.10.2017 - 2. Fudan-trifft-Hamburg Workshop

2. Fudan-trifft Hamburg Workshop

Zeit: 27. und 28. Oktober 2017
Ort: Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal), Hauptgebäude der UHH (Edmund-Siemers-Allee 1).
Lageplan AS-Saal
Organisatoren: Dr. Sonja Schierbaum, Prof. Dr. Stephan Schmid, Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder
Sprecher: Dr. Ana Laura Edelhoff (University of Hamburg), Prof. Malcom Forster (Shanghai), Prof. Eberhard Guhe (Fudan University), Prof. Stephan Schmid (University of Hamburg), Dr. Sonja Schierbaum (University of Hamburg), Prof. Benjamin Schnieder (University of Hamburg), Dr. Ju Wang (Fudan University)

Programm

Freitag, 27.10.2017

Zeit	Sprecher	Titel
09.30	Coffee
10:15	Eberhard Guhe (Shanghai)	An Indian Quasi-Fregean Theory of Number
	The theory of number in classical Indian philosophy is basically a theory concerning the reference of number words associated with mental acts of counting. Thus, it takes its cue from the analysis of natural language (i.e., Sanskrit), but it has also important logical, ontological and epistemological implications. Two schools were mainly involved in fabricating an Indian theory of number, namely Vaiśes.ika and Ny ̄aya (early Ny ̄aya and Navya-Ny ̄aya). In Sanskrit as in English number words can be used adjectivally. In “There are nine planets” and “The planets are nine”, e.g., “nine” is used attributively or predicatively, respectively, and it has the same function as an adjective. However, in Sanskrit words for cardinal numbers are used adjectivally as well as substantivally. The ontological account of numbers in Vaiśes.ika, early Ny ̄aya and Navya-Ny ̄aya is closer to the substantival use of number words, which is especially relevant to mathematics. Mathematicians talk about num- bers as individuals and they commonly identify them with certain sets. In classical Indian philosophy numbers have not been reduced to sets. They were rather regarded as properties. Their reified character is reflected in ab- stract nouns like ekatva (“oneness”), dvitva (“twoness”), tritva (“threeness”) etc., which were used to denote the ontological correlates of number words. A very interesting account of the reference of number words in Navya- Ny ̄aya was given by Maheśa Chandra (1836 – 1906), principal of the Sanskrit College in Kolkata between 1876 and 1895. In 1891 he published his Brief Notes on the Modern Ny ̄aya System of Philosophy and its Technical Terms (hereafter abbreviated as BN), a manual on Navya-Nya ̄ya terminology. De- spite its English title BN is a Sanskrit work. In the section on “number” (sam. khy ̄a) Maheśa Chandra presents a theory of number which can account for both, the adjectival and the substantival use of number words in Sanskrit. Daniel H. H. Ingalls once noted that Maheśa Chandra’s ideas about the reference of number words are close to Frege’s theory of natural number, although there is no theory of sets in Navya-Ny ̄aya. However, the Navya- Naiy ̄ayikas do have a realist theory of properties (dharma) and their theory of number is a theory of properties as constituents of empirical reality, anchored to their system of ontological categories. As shown by George Bealer, properties can serve the same purpose as sets in Frege’s theory of natural number. In the present paper we will explore the momentousness of Maheśa Chandra’s approach, especially with regard to the possibility to derive a ma- thematically precise definition of natural number, which is close to Bealer’s neo-Fregean analysis.
11:45	Ju Wang (Shanghai)	Scepticism, intellectual consciences, and the Nature of Rational Inquiry
	Scepticism is intellectually worrying. In its Agrippa’s form, the possibility of justified belief is questioned. In its contemporary Cartesian form, the possibility of external knowledge is challenged. In both forms, the sceptic poses the challenge by implicitly invoking the notion ‘epistemic responsibility’. It is assumed that we cannot truly be epistemically responsible unless we continue to do what we ordinarily do, albeit in a philosophically purified way. In this sense, sceptics are said to live with our intellectual consciences. Although prima facie admirable, sceptics misunderstand, I shall argue, the nature of rational inquiry. There is a difference in kind between ordinary epistemic evaluations and sceptical evaluations. A Wittgensteinian approach vividly illustrates what the nature of rational inquiry is. We are therefore shown the necessary conditions for rational evaluations. By doing so, a diagnosis as to why scepticism appears admirable and tempting but turns out to be wrong can be provided.
13.00	Lunch Break
14.30	Stephan Schmid (Hamburg)	Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism
	Richard Popkin famously argued that early modern scepticism was due to a “Pyrrhonian crisis”, which lead to a “nouveau pyrrhonisme”. Against this, I contend that the most famous examples of early modern scepticism – Descartes’s doubts about the external world and Hume’s doubts about causality – are crucially different from the project described in Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and thus decisively non-Pyrrhonian varieties of scepticism. What is more, Hume’s and Descartes’s varieties of scepticism also differ among themselves insofar as Hume’s scepticism, unlike Descartes’s, calls into doubt the possibility to have meaningful thoughts in the first place.
16.15	Malcom Forster (Shanghai)	Towards a Unified Metaphysics of Causation
	The structural theory of causation (a.k.a. Bayes causal nets) has been sweeping the sciences during the past few years, and it’s beginning the dominate discussions of causation amongst philosophers as well. It posits causal relations between variables (in a causal diagram called a Directed Acyclic Graph or DAG), where a variable is (roughly) a set of possible events described by a logical partition of propositions (a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of propositions). Causal relata are not actual events on the structural view, but variables, which have a modal character (exactly one event in a partition is actual, and the rest are counterfactual). Surprisingly, questions about the metaphysics of variables and causal relations (so construed) have not yet been widely discussed. The aim of the talk is to show how causal relations between variables supervene on causal relations between events. This will allow me to explain the central axiom of the structural theory, the Causal Markov Condition, and explain what it implies, and does not imply, about the relationship between event causation and counterfactual dependence. This is a small step towards a unified metaphysics of causation.
20.00	Dinner

Samstag, 28.10.2017

Zeit	Sprecher	Titel
09.30	Coffee
10.15	Ana Laura Edelhoff (Hamburg)	Aristotle on Ontological Priority
	Aristotle thinks that reality has an ordered structure with entities belonging to different categories and standing in different dependence relations. In his metaphysical works, most importantly the Categories and the Metaphysics, he aims to account for this structure by providing criteria for ontological priority (in his terminology: “priority in substance” [proteron kata ousian] or “priority in nature” [proteron tēi phusei ]). The notion of ontological priority is, accordingly, central forunderstanding Aristotle’s metaphysics, and is closely linked many other important notions, such as “substance” (ousia ) and “separation” (chōrismos ). According to the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s account of ontological priority, he uses a so-called modal-existential account of priority, according to which A is ontologically prior to B, iff necessarily, B’s existence implies A’s existence, but not necessarily, A’s existence implies B’s existence. In light of various criticisms levelled against the modal-existential account of ontological priority, a new so-called essentialist reading of ontological priority has been proposed, according to which A is ontologically prior to B, iff “B makes A what it is”, but not conversely. In this paper I argue that both readings share a problematic presupposition, namely that Aristotle uses “einai” (being) univocally in statements about priority. I show that there are cases where Aristotle uses different meanings of “einai” even within the same statement about priority. I argue that, in most passages, priority is best understood as asymmetric existential dependence. However, there are some passages that are more plausibly read as expressing what I will call “asymmetric predicative dependence”.
11.45	Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg)	tbd
	tbd
13.00	Lunch Break
14.30	Sonja Schierbaum (Hamburg)	What Kinds of Reasons? – An Early Modern Conception
	My modest, interpretative aim in this talk is to make sense of Christian August Crusius’s (1715-1775) distinction of kinds of reasons, especially the – curious – distinction between what he calls reasons of “physical existence” and of “moral existence” in the light of his overall, voluntaristic project: Crusius holds that the possibility of acting morally good (or bad) presupposes the freedom of will, that is, the possible choice of alternative actions in one and the same situation. This implies, however, that morally binding or obligational reasons – reasons why one should do something – are not determinant. Thus one Crusius’s central concerns is to answer the question of what the „strength“ of a morally binding reason cosnsits in. His point is that morally binding reasons get their „strength“ only in relation to ends of actions, that is, in relation to what an agent wills. I want to show that ultimately – although somewhat unfortunate in his terminology – Crusius attempts to account for the obligational force of moral reasons in a way compatible with his voluntaristic stance. The question is whether he succeeds or not.
20.00	Dinner

Time	Speaker	Topic
11:00 - 12:30	John Divers (Leeds)	Lewis on the Analysis of Modality
14:30 - 16:00	Daniel Deasy (UCD)	Advanced Temporalizing
16:30 - 18:00	Thomas Krödel (HU-Berlin).	A New Future Similarity Objection

Time	Speaker	Topic
11:00 - 12:30	Ralf Busse (Mainz)	TBA
14:30 - 16:00	Neil McDonnell (Hamburg)	Causation’s Non-Occurence Problem
16:30 - 18:00	Maya Eddon (UMass)	TBA

Time	Speaker	Topic
11:00 - 12:30	Magdalena Kauffmann (U. Connecticut)	Embedded imperatives
14:00 - 15:30	Paul Portner (Georgetown)	Imperatives, infinitives and subjunctives
16:00 - 17:30	Peter Vranas (U. Wisconsin)	New foundations for imperative logic

Time	Speaker	Topic
10:00 - 11:30	Werner Stelzner (Wiesbaden/Bremen)	Derived imperatives and the guidance of behaviour
13:00 - 14:30	Maria Aloni & Ivano Ciardelli (Amsterdam)	Choice offering imperatives in inquisitive and truthmaker semantics
15:00 - 16:30	Kit Fine (NYU)	Imperatives: a truthmaker approach

Time	Speaker	Topic
11:00 - 12:30	Robert Schwartzkopff (Hamburg)	Number(word)s as Object(word)s?
14:00 - 15:30	Bob Hale (Sheffield)	Fregean categories, expressibility, and nominalization
16:00 - 17:30	David Liebesman (Calgary)	Sodium-Free semantics: the continuing relevance of the concept horse

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
13:00	Benjamin Gittel (Berlin)
14:45	Nathan Wildman (Glasgow)
16:30	NIels Klenner

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
10:00	Christian Folde (Hamburg)
11:45	Eva-Maria Konrad (Frankruft/Main)
14:30	Lee Walters (Southampton)

Time	Speaker	Topic
11:00 - 12:30	Hanjo Glock (Zürich)	Beasts & Propositions: noun-clause reference and intentional states in animals
14:00 - 15:30	Giulia Felappi (Southampton)	That-clauses, propositions and sentences
16:00 - 17:30	Louise McNally (U. Pompeu Fabra)	Nominalization, types, and tokens in natural language ontology

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
13:00	Julia Langkau (Konstanz)	Imagining Fictional Worlds
14:45	Tom Kindt (Fribourg)	Rules, Norms, and Principles of Interpretation?
16:30	Derek Matravers (Open University)	Reading as Fiction and Reading as Non-Fiction: Is there a Difference?

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
10:00	Janina Jacke (Hamburg)	The Narrator's Interpreting and Unreliability
11:45	Matthias Aumüller (Wuppertal)	Nabokov's Eyes. I-Narration and the Problem of Aesthetic Attribution
14:30	Gregory Currie (York)	The Philosophy, and the Experimental Science, of Fiction

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
14:00 - 15:15	Tilmann Köppe (Göttingen)	Narrative Closure
15:45 - 17:00	Christiana Werner (Göttingen)	The Problem with The Purple Rose of Cairo: Fictional Characters as Intentional Objects of Emotions

Zeit	Sprecher	Thema
10:00 - 11:15	Stacie Friend (London)	Realism and Reality
11:45 - 13:00	Thomas Petraschka (Regensburg)	On Categorial and Semantic Intentions and on Their Relevance for Interpretation, Theory of Fiction and Narratology
14:30 - 15:45	Peter Lamarque (York)	Interpretation and the Opacity of Narrative

Rückschau

2023

21.-23.9.2023 10 Years of Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Conference)

26.6.2023 Vulnerability and the State – The Case of Children

Workshop: A Philosophical History of the Concept, 7–9 June

31.05/01.06.2023: The Role of Knowledge for Responsible Decision Making in Organizations

11./12.05.2023: 4th Berlin-Hamburg Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy

Program-Poster (PDF)

24./25.03.2023: Higher-Order Metaphysics of Ground

2022

Feminist Political Philosophy Speaker Series 18.10.21-21.02.22

Nobody's free until everybody's free! (PDF)

2021

"What is a Woman?" SWIP (Society for Woman in Philosophy)-Hamburg Workshop zu Feministischer Philosophie (21./22..01.2021)

SWIP (Society for Woman in Philosophy) Jahrestagung 2021 (05./06.11.2021)

SWIP-Jahrestagung 2021

International Workshop: Orders of Being (11.12.2021)

Orders of Being (International Workshop)

Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance (12.07. - 16.07.2021)

2020

2019

7.-9. Febr. 2019 - Belief in Context

7. – 9. Februar; ESA W 221

Belief in Context

27.-28. Febr. 2019 - Early Modern Conceptions of Freedom, Rationality and Practical Reasons

Workshop

Early Modern Conceptions of Freedom, Rationality and Practical Reasons

15. März 2019 - Der Mensch und das Absolute bei Spinoza

Der Mensch und das Absolute bei Spinoza Eine Tagung in Anknüpfung an Wolfgang Bartuschats Spinoza-Lektüren

12.-14. März 2019-The Principle of Sufficient Reason in the History of Philosophy

Internationale Konferenz:

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in the History of Philosophy

18.-20. Juli 2019 - Agency, Past and Future

18.-20. Juli 2019

Agency, Past and Future

2018

12.10.2018 - Varieties of Relevance

24.+25.08.2018 - 2nd Hamburg-Japan Workshop

2nd Hamburg-Japan Workshop

30.07.2018-01.08.2018 - Normativity in Philosophy

Workshop: Normativity in Philosophy

25.- 27.05.2018 - Metaphysical Grounding

22./23.03.2018 - Fictionalism

16./17.03.2018 - Testing Linguistic Intuitions

2017

17./18.11.2017 - Philosophy meets Literary Studies IV

27./28.10.2017 - 2. Fudan-trifft-Hamburg Workshop

2. Fudan-trifft Hamburg Workshop

Programm

20./21.10.2017 - Biscuit Conditionals

05.-07.10.2017 - New Trends in Epistemology

04.10.2017 - Perspectives of integrated Austrian Theory

22./23.09.2017 - Figurative and Fictional Speech

06.-09.08.2017 - Grounding & Consciousness

28./29.07.2017 - Modality and Truthmaking

24./25.07.2017 - Metaphysical Laws

07./08.04.2017 - What Contexts Can and Cannot Do

2016

25./26.11.2016 - Philosophy meets Literary Studies III

09./10.+12./13.09.2016 - Konferenz: What is Said - What ist Meant

19./20.09.2016 - Workshop: Lewisian Variations II

12./13.06.2016 - Workshop: Imperatives - Worlds and Beyond

20./21.05.2016 - Workshop: Nominalizations II

18.03.2016 - Book Symposium on David Miller's "Strangers in our Midst"

15./16.03.2016 - Workshop on the Philosophy of Disagreement

22.01.2016 - The Metaphysical 'Because' and the Foundations of Mathematics

15./16.01.2016 - Philosophy meets Literary Studies II

2015

09.11.2015 - Feminism and Basic Income

17.-20.02.2015 - Techne - Poiesis - Aisthesis Technik und Techniken in Kunst und ästhetischer Praxis

2014

12./13.12.2014 - Philosophy meets Literary Studies

11.11.2014 - Tagung der Ernst-Cassirer-Gesellschaft: Rekonstruktion kulturphilosophischer Traditionen

Aktuelle Veranstaltungen

Kontakt

Der Mensch und das Absolute bei Spinoza
Eine Tagung in Anknüpfung an Wolfgang Bartuschats Spinoza-Lektüren