Philosophisches Seminar
PhilosophischesSeminar
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Institutskolloquium
Programm SoSe 2019 (Poster)
Bitte beachten: Im SoSe 2019 findet das Institutskolloquium im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäude der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Allee 1 statt (Lagebeschreibung des AS-Saals) und am 8.5., 5.6., 10.7. im Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097.
| Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
|---|---|---|
| 03.04.19 | Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt University Berlin) |
Zur Theorie und Ethik des Lügens AS-Saal |
| Was ist eine Lüge? Wie unterscheiden sich Lügen von Irreführungen? In der philosophischen Debatte zum Lügen ist ein Ansatz populär, der beide Fragen mithilfe des Begriffs des Gesagten beantwortet: Um zu lügen, muss man etwas sagen, das man für falsch hält. Und der Hauptunterschied zwischen Lügen und Irreführungen liegt eben im Gesagten. Ich werde diesen Ansatz kritisieren und dafür argumentieren, dass es stattdessen darauf ankommt, worauf man sich mit einer Äußerung festlegt. Mit einer Lüge, nicht aber mit einer irreführenden Äußerung, legt man sich auf etwas fest, das man für falsch hält. Ich werde zeigen, dass dieser Ansatz der Vielfalt des Lügens besser gerecht wird. Und ich werde auf die Auswirkungen für die ethische Debatte zum Lügen eingehen, etwa für die Frage, ob es moralisch relevante Unterschiede zwischen Lügen und Irreführungen gibt | ||
| 17.04.19 | Norbert Paulo (University of Salzburg) |
Intuition-driven Romanticism? X-Phi’s Unreliable Intuitions Objection Against Reflective Equilibrium AS-Saal |
| Reflective equilibrium (RE) has been criticized for various reasons ever since the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Recent empirical research into moral decision-making poses new challenges to RE because it questions the reliability of moral intuitions. This research might discredit moral intuitionism in general and RE in particular insofar as it ascribes epistemic value to moral intuitions. If it could be shown that all or certain kinds of moral intuitions are unreliable, this would diminish the plausibility of the claim that they provide good reasons to believe in the truth of their content, especially given the growing evidence that professional philosophers are just as biased and susceptible to distorting factors as lay people. In this paper I discuss, and ultimately reject, recent defenses of RE against the unreliable intuitions objection. I conclude with a discussion of the broader philosophical implications of this objection, specifically whether or not accepting it would warrant skepticism regarding moral knowledge. | ||
| 08.05.19 | Andrew Brenner (Gothenburg) |
Conditional Probabilities and Symmetric Grounding Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097 |
| Some facts obtain in virtue of other facts. In these cases we might say that the former fact(s) is grounded in the latter fact(s). In recent metaphysics grounding has received a great deal of attention. One dispute regarding grounding concerns grounding's logical properties. While grounding is generally characterized as being transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric, each of these alleged properties of grounding has come under attack. In this paper I will present what I take to be a new counterexample to the asymmetry of grounding. The basic idea is that there are at least some cases in which the conditional probability of some proposition (i.e., P(A/B)) is partially grounded in the inverse conditional probability (i.e., P(B/A)), while the inverse conditional probability is in turn partially grounded in the original conditional probability. | ||
| 22.05.19 | Joshua Preiss (Mankato) |
Equality and Opportunity in Winner-Take-All Societies AS-Saal |
| This paper considers alternative understandings of equality and opportunity: fair race and honest good work. In addition to their political salience, these principles capture the normative core of much contemporary theorizing on economic justice. Rather than providing an abstract, de-contextualized argument for one them, this paper proceeds by reference to changes in contemporary political economy. In a Smithian Well-Ordered Society (SWO) of rapid, broad-based gains from economic growth, it makes sense for both political actors and political philosophers to give normative and policy priority to fair race, including anti-discrimination and educational policies aimed at providing a more level playing field. As we move toward a Winner-Take-All Society (WTA) of slower growth and declining absolute mobility, where the fruits of that growth are increasingly concentrated among a relatively small number of “winners” in the economy, the concerns reflected in honest good work become more pressing, while the idea of a fair race increasingly fails to capture what most matters to citizens. In addition, when we take seriously the politics of WTA, rather than bracketing politics to focus on normative or economic analysis, it becomes clear that even those who believe that the fairness of competition is all that matters for justice need to address trends toward WTA. While separable in theory, the politics and policy of fair race cannot be maintained in a political economy where the promise of honest good work regularly goes unfulfilled. | ||
| 05.06.19 | Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (University of Reykjavik) |
Can the Reality of Money be Doubted? |
|
The focus of this talk is to consider what kind of answer can be given to the question “What is money?” from a metaphysical perspective. Relevant questions are: “What does it take for something to qualify as money?” and “In what does monetary value consist?”. When money is considered from this point of view, it becomes clear that it is very much defined by its value and also that it is a social object or a social kind. For various reasons, people often wonder whether social objects should be considered real and there may be further reasons to doubt the reality of monetary value. At least it is often said that the value of money is not “real” as opposed to other kinds of value that is then considered more “real”. On the other hand, this stance may appear strange, given that people strive hard to earn money, and striving for something that is not real might seem puzzling. I introduce some theories that have been held about money and monetary value and connect them to a discussion of whether and in what sense the reality of money or monetary value could plausibly be doubted. Among other things, I discuss different senses of ‘real’ and argue that money is the type of social kind that is sensitive to the so-called ‘looping effect’. |
||
| 26.06.19 |
Lee Walters |
The Linguistic Approach to Meta-Ontology |
| The Fregean thinks that all serious true discourse consisting of subject-predicate sentences commits us to objects corresponding to the discourse’s singular terms. Similarly, serious first order quantification commits us to a domain of objects. Thomas Hofweber rejects these two elements of Fregeanism by focusing on the various roles that singular terms and quantifiers play. Regardless of whether Hofweber is correct, we should reject the Fregean picture by focussing on the various roles predicates can play. This in turn has implications for second-order ontology. | ||
| 10.07.19 | Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (University of Aarhus) |
Epistemic Akrasia and Doxastic Resilience Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097 |
| Could it be rational to at once believe that p, and believe that believing p is irrational? That is, could epistemic akrasia ever be rational? Common sense speaks against this possibility. But several authors have argued that some cases of misleading higher-order evidence in fact require one to be akratic. If I have sufficient evidence that p, and sufficient albeit misleading higher-order evidence that my evidence does not support believing p, it seems that I would believe against my evidence if I didn’t both believe that p, and believe that believing p is irrational. Yet, a feeling of irrationality remains. In this talk, I explore an explanation of such cases in terms of doxastic resilience. I have recently argued that higher-order evidence can undermine the resilience of a credence, without undermining its level. Since categorical belief involves not only a high level of credence, but also high resilience, this means that higher-order evidence can undermine belief without undermining a high level of credence. This offers a way of respecting both one’s first- and higher-order evidence, without being akratic. The first-order evidence should be reflected in a high credence, while the higher-order evidence should be reflected in a low resilience, and hence the absence of categorical belief. | ||
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2019 wird organisiert von Julian Müller
Kontakt
Philosophisches Seminar
Überseering 35, Postfach #4
22297 Hamburg
Tel: +49 40 42838-4714
Fax: +49 40 42838-3983
E-Mail: philosophie"AT"uni-hamburg.de
