Institutskolloquium

Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 22-23 (PDF)

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Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Caleb Ward.

Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 17 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein.
Achtung:
Am 19. Okt. 22 findet die Veranstaltung erst 18-19:30 s.t. statt.
Am 30. Nov. 22 findet die Veranstaltung im Mittelweg 177, Raum N0008, um 17 c.t. statt.
Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen:

Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: 17-19 Uhr c.t.. Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting.

Zoom-Meeting beitreten
https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/63753187555?pwd=a0dkR0wrcE1xK2YzaCtVdzNMQWJyUT09
Meeting ID: 637 5318 7555
Passcode: 85603102

Datum	Sprecher	Thema
19. Oct. 22	Matthias Schemmel (Universität Hamburg)	Everyday Language and Theoretical Terms: Reflective Abstraction in the Long-term History of the Exact Sciences Achtung Zeit:18:00 - 19:30 Uhr
	Abstract In this talk I want to discuss the origin of theoretical terms in everyday language by outlining stages in a long-term history of technical terminology marked by increasing degrees of reflexivity. I will use examples of theoretical terminology from three historical episodes that are widely considered turning points in the history of the exact sciences: the origins of theoretical science in antiquity; the emergence of classical mechanics in early modern times; and the transformation of physics in the early twentieth century. I will argue that the increasing distance of the meanings of theoretical terms from their everyday counterparts can be explained by relating it to historical processes of knowledge integration.
2. Nov. 22	Deborah Mühlebach (Freie Universität Berlin)	Criticising Language – Discursive Resistance in a Non-Ideal World 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr
	Abstract Social movements keep reminding us of the importance of language for their struggles. It is thus worth asking what political language critique is and should be. I critically examine strategies of criticising language based on two assumptions. First, words get their meaning through social practices. If we want to understand their meaning and explore possible ways of criticising their use, we must examine what function they have in these practices. Second, simply turning to politically relevant linguistic issues without theorising their political aspects is futile. In order to engage in what has been called non-ideal theorising, we need to pay attention to how power relations and categories shape the morally and politically relevant discursive practices as well as the possibilities of critique thereof. Sensible political language critique, so I shall argue, requires us to attentively choose between different strategies in each situation, often combine them, and, consequently, neither under- nor overestimate the linguistic dimension of our social practices.
16. Nov. 22	Eraldo Souza dos Santos (Panthéon-Sorbonne University)	What Is Complete Civil Disobedience? 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr
	Abstract An unexpected yet readily identifiable common theme binds Egyptian activists together in their call for Mohammed Morsi and his government to step down in 2013, Sudanese protesters in the aftermath of the 2019 Khartoum massacre and the 2021 coup d’état, members of the ‘yellow vest’ movement in France, and supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Despite evincing utter disparate political stances, all four movements appear to rally under an ostensibly new watchword: “complete civil disobedience.” Yet, complete civil disobedience has an extensive history. It is an idea that Mohandas Gandhi developed early on to conceptualize nonviolent resistance. In his words, “Complete civil disobedience is a state of peaceful rebellion—a refusal to obey every single State-made law. It is certainly more dangerous than an armed rebellion.” I explore in this paper the moral, legal, and political challenges that arise from this form of disobedience.
30. Nov. 22	Esther Neuhann (Universität Hamburg)	Fichte on Human Rights 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr Achtung Ort: Mittelweg 177, Raum N0008
	Abstract In the talk, I present my reconstruction of Fichte’s conception of human rights in the Foundations of Natural Right (1796/7). First, I argue that Fichte has a complex understanding of human rights: He defends “one true human right” (das eigentliche Menschenrecht) to be part of a legal community in which “original rights” (Urrechte) are secured. Although Fichte does not refer to them as such, I maintain that “original rights” are human rights in a derivative sense, because they are rights one has qua human. Second, I put forward the claim that, for Fichte, the substantive aim of human rights is to establish and secure a specific kind of non-violent intersubjective relation called “free reciprocal efficacy” (freie Wechselwirkung). In contemporary terms, he therefore holds a relational position in the debate on human rights. I defend this claim with regard to one of two “original rights”: the right to bodily inviolability. In this context, it is crucial to appreciate Fichte’s understanding of the human body as a medium of free action and interaction (Leib) rather than a biological organism (Körper). Third, I elaborate on the peculiar normative status of human rights in Fichte, in particular as non-positive and non-moral. Throughout the talk, I point to ways in which Fichte’s thus far underappreciated account provides valuable insights for the contemporary debate on the philosophy of human rights.
14. Dez. 22	Shiloh Whitney (Fordham University)	Anger Gaslighting and Affective Injustice 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr
	Abstract If gaslighting makes its target doubt herself, anger gaslighting makes its target doubt herself about the aptness of her anger. In this paper, I analyze the case of anger gaslighting, demonstrating what’s unjust about it and why it matters. Scholarship on gaslighting in feminist philosophy has tended to analyze gaslighting as an epistemic injustice (an injustice that concerns knowledge and credibility). Focusing on anger gaslighting as a paradigm case, I argue that gaslighting can be an affective injustice (an injustice that concerns emotions and affective influence). But my study of anger gaslighting also produces concepts for studying affective injustices beyond gaslighting, that concern emotions beyond anger. I’ll apply these Kate Manne’s notion of “himpathy” and a few other examples as proof of concept, creating conceptual tools to enable discussion of this important and under-theorized uniquely affective dimension of injustice.
11. Jan. 23	Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford)	*De Re* Modality without Counterparts 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr
	Abstract TBD
25. Jan. 22	Clara Carus (Universität Paderborn)	Die Rolle der Monaden oder 'Êtres simples' bei Leibniz und Émilie Du Châtelet im Vergleich 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr
	Abstract Du Châtelet referenziert Leibniz' Theorie der Monaden und Wolffs Interpretation derselben im siebten und achten Kapitel der Institutions de Physiques, in denen sie die Elemente der Materie und die Natur der Körper behandelt. Auf den ersten Blick scheint sie sich einfach Leibniz' Monadentheorie anzuschließen, insofern sie alle anderen vorhergehenden Theorien über den Ursprung der Materie ablehnt und anschließend Leibniz' Monaden als überzeugende Theorie vorstellt. Diese deutliche Rezeption von Leibniz hat entscheidend zu der Auffassung in der Forschungsliteratur beigetragen, dass Du Châtelet's 'Metaphysik' oder 'Ontologie' prinzipiell leibnizisch sei. In diesem Vortrag werfe ich zunächst einen genaueren Blick auf den Kontext der Monadentheorie bei Leibniz und Du Châtelet und stelle die Frage, ob der Begriff der Monade bei den beiden Autoren dieselben Dinge klären soll oder ob die Monade bei Leibniz in einem anderen Erklärungszusammenhang steht als bei Du Châtelet. In einem zweiten Schritt weise ich auf einige bedeutende Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Autoren in der Monadentheorie selbst hin. In der Konklusion zeige ich auf, dass Du Châtelet Leibniz' Monadentheorie zwar zentral aufnimmt, diese aber bei Du Châtelet durch ihre Kontextualisierung und durch inhaltliche Unterschiede entscheidend abgeändert ist, sodass aus der Leibnizrezeption nicht die Konklusion zu ziehen ist, dass Du Châtelets 'Metaphysik' oder 'Ontologie' mit der Leibniz' prinzipiell in eins zu setzen ist.

Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 22-23 wird organisiert von Dr. Caleb Ward
Email: caleb.ward@uni-hamburg.de(caleb.ward"AT"uni-hamburg.de)

Institutskolloquium

Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 22-23 (PDF)

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