Institutskolloquium
Das Institutskolloquium Sommersemester 23 Poster
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Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Marie Wuth.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 17 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein. Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen: https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/69466512113?pwd=TkFnVTRvNDRId3JkRkpQK1VFdndyZz09
Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: 17-19 Uhr c.t.. Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting.
| Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
|---|---|---|
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05.04.2023 |
Pieter Sjoerd Hasper |
Aristotle’s Constructionist Ontology of Mathematical Objects |
| Abstract Aristotle’s ontology of mathematical objects is clearly anti-Platonist, in that he denies that mathematical objects exist independently from physical objects. Mathematical objects, he claims, are physical objects qua mathematical. Ever since Jonathan Lear’s paper on ‘Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics’, this claim has been understood in the context of mathematical proofs: in a proof the mathematician abstracts from the physical features of the particular physical object of the proof, and only considers the (relevant) mathematical features. In order to deal with cases in which the required objects rarely, if at all, exist in physical reality (e.g. polyhedrons), scholars from Lear onwards have tinkered with the notion of abstraction and inserted an element of idealisation in it. There are, however, cases involving infinities, which cannot be thus accommodated within Aristotle’s finitist physics. Moreover, it rests upon an incorrect understanding of Aristotle’s argument in Metaphysics M.3, the chapter in which he lays out his ontology of mathematical objects. By way of a careful analysis of this argument, I will show that for Aristotle mathematical objects as considered in mathematics only exist in thought, and thus in a way do not exist as real objects, but are constructed in thought from primary objects which are present in physical objects, and are also known from them. The realist claim that mathematical objects are physical objects qua mathematical must be understood at the type level, ensuring that mathematical theorems are applicable to physical reality and that there is no harm in this constructionism. |
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| 19.04.2023 | Tobias Rosefeldt (Humbold Universität Berlin) |
Kants hylomorphistische Konzeption von Autonomie |
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Abstract |
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| 03.05.2023 | Eline Gerritsen (Universität Hamburg) |
Questioning the normative status of conventional norms 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
| Abstract Conventional norms regulate many aspects of our behaviour, from how we dress and what we talk about with guests to when and how we queue. We feel pressure to comply with these unwritten rules and judge others who violate them. In addition, conventional norms seem to have an important role in enabling cooperation and upholding a stable society. With this in mind, it is striking that, in metanormative debates, these norms are set aside as lacking a significant normative status. What is behind this common view, which seems directly at odds with our everyday experience? And is it correct? In this talk, I will argue that it is an open question whether conventional norms are normative in a significant sense. I will explain the distinction between formal and authoritative normativity and examine different reasons for conceiving of authoritative normativity as incompatible with conventional norms, rejecting each. Despite being mundane and artificial, it is possible – if not plausible – that some conventional norms have a normative force that not all norms have. After establishing this, I will raise some issues to consider in developing a positive account of the normative status of conventional norms |
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| 24.05.2023 |
Franziska Dübgen
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Testimoniale Ungerechtigkeiten im deutschen Kontext: Die NSU-Prozesse |
| Abstract Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit befasst sich als Konzept mit der Art und Weise, wie sich Machtverhältnisse in der Wissensformation, der Glaubwürdigkeit von Personen (testimonial injustice) und der Repräsentation der sozialen Wirklichkeit manifestieren. Der Begriff entstand innerhalb von anglophonen Debatten der feministischen sozialen Erkenntnistheorie und fand von Anfang an auch im Kontext rassistischer Diskriminierungen Verwendung. Bisher wurde er noch wenig genutzt, um rechtliche Prozesse zu analysieren. In diesen Vortrag werde ich ausloten, inwiefern der Fokus auf epistemische Ungerechtigkeit hilfreich sein könnte, um Unzulänglichkeiten und Machtdynamiken in den polizeilichen Ermittlungen und den juristischen Verfahren im Rahmen der NSU-Prozesse sozialdiagnostisch zu erfassen und normativ zu evaluieren. Umgekehrt werde ich den Aktivismus der Freunde und Verwandten der Opfer sowie die künstlerische Intervention der Gruppe „Forensic Architecture“ auf der Documenta 14 (2017) als Formen des epistemischen Widerstands erforschen, die hegemoniale Machtstrukturen entgegenwirkten und die öffentliche Aufarbeitung beeinflussten, indem sie alternativen Erzählungen der Ereignisse Sichtbarkeit verschafften. |
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| 07.06.2023 | Gerhard Thonhauser (Technische Universität Darmstadt) |
Politische Phänomenologie: Zur Politisierung der Phänomenologie im Nachkriegsfrankreich |
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Abstract |
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| 21.06.2023 | Michael Della Rocca (Yale University) |
TBA 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
| Abstract TBA |
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| 05.07.2023 | Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) |
Can There Be Time Travel Without Brute Facts? |
| Abstract Many philosophers believe that time travel is possible. But I will argue that time travel—particularly travel into the past—opens up the possibility of unacceptably brute facts to do with the existence of artifacts. More specifically, the possibility of time travel seems to entail that for any artifact, whether it is Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata or an instruction manual on how to build a time machine, it is possible that that artifact was neither created nor constructed. But artifacts, if they exist at all, cannot simply pop into existence. I will argue that we can avoid this unacceptable consequence of time travel, but only at a high price: we must endorse either the view that contingent entities can be self-generated, or the view that the world in which there is time travel has an extramundane cause. |
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Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2023 wird organisiert von Dr. Marie Wuth.
Email: marie.wuth"AT"uni-hamburg.de
