Institutskolloquium
Das Institutskolloquium Sommersemester 2022 (PDF)
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Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Stefan Rinner.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen:
Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting Jederzeit treffen
Zoom-Meeting beitreten
https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/65635301817?pwd=NWMvOTU3amlqN3FDT3RUUkJRdStzZz09
Meeting-ID: 656 3530 1817
Kenncode: 28031684
Schnelleinwahl mobil
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Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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6. April 22 | Stefan Rinner (Universität Hamburg) |
The Causal Theory of Slurs 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Language can be used in highly destructive ways. One such way is the usage of slurs. These are expressions that are used to refer to the members of a given group, the target group, in a derogatory, pejorative or otherwise insulting way because of their race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation etc. As a consequence, slurs primarily have two functions. First, they can be used to offend or psychologically harm the members of the target group. Second, slurs can be used to create or reinforce negative attitudes towards them. For example, most uses of slurs for Jewish people in Nazi propaganda had mainly the purpose to create and reinforce anti-Semitic attitudes that would lead to increasing discrimination and violence against Jews, to their expulsion or incarceration in concentration camps, and, ultimately, to genocide. Similarly, Tirrell argues that the massive use of the slur ''Iyenzi'' (cockroaches) for Tutsis in broadcasts from a Hutu radio station played a crucial role in inciting the genocide of Tutsis. As Tirrell points out, slurs ''regularly enact power, incite crimes, and rationalize cruelty'' (Tirrell 2012, 192). In the philosophy of language, the question then arises how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished. A satisfactory answer to this question should explain both the offensiveness of slurs and the fact that slurs can be used to create and reinforce negative attitudes. As Caroline West and others point out, answering the question how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished may have implications for the legal question of whether there should be restrictions on hate speech involving slurs. Furthermore, the question is also of particular interest for philosophy of language in general, since it puts our existing tools of understanding language to the test. In this talk, I put forward and systematically develop a new explanation of the derogatory force of slurs, taking as a starting point a causal account of their referential properties. On the view on offer, slurs are derogatory because, unlike their neutral counterparts, they have been grounded in the target group by speakers who have negative attitudes towards its members. I will argue that such a causal theory of slurs does better than virtually any of its competitors and that, for the first time, it offers a complete account of the referential properties of slurs, i.e. of the fact that slurs can be used to refer to the target group. By extending the causal theory to other referring pejoratives, the proposed explanation promises not only a better understanding of slurs, but of pejorative language in general, opening up new ways of investigating evaluative terms. |
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20. April 22 | Mathias Frisch (Universität Hannover) |
Uses and Misuses of Scientific Models in Pandemic Policy Advice |
Abstract Some philosophers have criticized government decisions early in the pandemic to implement lockdown measures to control the spread of COVID-19 by arguing that these decisions were made on the basis of deeply uncertain evidence, even though restrictions of personal liberty would have required especially strong justification. In this talk I offer a two-pronged defense of these decisions: (1) In circumstances of extreme urgency, when there is an imminent risk of harm, the high evidentiary bar we might normally require to justify policies involving restrictions of liberties needs to be relaxed. And (2) When close attention is paid to the fact that models can be put to a wide variety of context-dependent purposes the case can be made that epidemiological models provided sufficiently good evidence to clear the lowered evidentiary bar. |
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4. Mai 22 | Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen) |
Varieties of Competition 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Competition as a principle of social organization is seen very differently in different academic disciplines: While economists often praise its efficiency-enhancing features, philosophers tend to worry about negative effects on solidarity, fairness, and the equal moral standing of all human beings. But are they actually talking about the same thing? In this paper, I suggest thinking about competition from a functional perspective and distinguishing different purposes of competition. I show that they have different implications for the institutional requirements of competition (such as starting conditions, competence of evaluators, or openness of entry) and that they lead to different notions of what can be counted as a failure of competition. Distinguishing different types of competition matters for several reasons. First, it allows a more nuanced discussion about what kinds of competitions are normative desirable and for what reasons. Second, it helps us better understand potential unintended side-effects of competition (which might be intended for one purpose but end up achieving a different purpose, e.g. because the institutional requirement were not in place). Third, it helps us diagnose cases in which arguments about competition are misapplied, often for ideological purposes: these are often cases in which it is claimed that one type of competition is given, while this is in fact not what the institutional requirements suggest and how participants experience the situation. By taking the varieties of competition seriously, we can better understand what forms of competition (if any) are worth having, while rejecting overarching claims that assume that competition will always be beneficial without acknowledging its harmful forms. |
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18. Mai 22 |
Luise Müller |
Democratic Equality, Social Asymmetries, and Algorithmic Decisionmaking 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract One fundamental puzzle in the philosophical study of authority is to explain why one person may make a decision over another even though persons are moral equals to one another in democratic societies. If it is the case that as citizens, we are all free and equal, how is it possible that others can make decisions over us that deeply influence, and often stifle, our autonomy, wellbeing and life plans? Why are we – as moral equals – dependent on other people’s decisions and control when it comes to, for example, school and university admission, grades, job applications, pay rises, criminal sentencing, or academic funding decisions? Many of those relations of authority are constituted by social asymmetries: between teacher and student, employer and employee, judge and defendant, administrator and petitioner, and so on. On the face of it, these social asymmetries – in power, status, or knowledge – seem incompatible with our equal moral status, because they enable some to control, or dominate, others. In the paper, I first explore what, if anything, makes these asymmetric relations morally problematic. I argue that we should be fundamentally concerned about the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within these relationships, instead of others metrics like contestability, accountability, transparency, or consent. Second, I ask whether substituting human judgement and decisionmaking with algorithmic decision-making – ‚rule by automation‘ (Sparks & Jayaram) – can alleviate the normatively problematic nature of some of these social asymmetries. Can algorithms free us from morally problematic relationships of control and authority? I argue that merely substituting human decisionmaking with algorithmic decisionmaking cannot free us, as long as it reproduces the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. Instead, we need to think about in which contexts deploying algorithmic decisionmaking can equalize the distribution of benefits and burdens (or advantages and disadvantages) within socially asymmetric relations. As an example, I discuss the relationship between physician and patient, which is traditionally characterised by an asymmetry of knowledge between both parties that potentially translates into a morally problematic asymmetry: physicians are able to influence, manipulate, and effectively control patients in virtue of their expert knowledge. Importantly, while consent is an important precondition of physician intervention, its capacity to ameliorate what is morally problematic about the asymmetry is limited. In such cases, algorithms can potentially free us if (and only if) they are deployed with the aim of balancing the distribution of burdens and benefits to the advantage of the patient. However, where this is not the case, algorithmic decisionmaking is no improvement on the status quo – in fact, it often leaves those disadvantaged in social asymmetries worse off. |
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1. Juni 22 | Hilkje C. Hänel (Universität Potsdam) |
Vulnerable Epistemic Identities |
Abstract Building on the idea of epistemic subjects as “individuals-in-communities” (Grasswick 2004) and knowledge as relational (cf. Pohlhaus 2012), the paper develops a theory of vulnerability as well as agency of fragile epistemic subjects. Feminist epistemologists have convincingly argued that the atomistic and self-sufficient view of knowers of much of classical epistemology is inadequate and have instead argued for knowers as being relationally situated within communities and social structures. Furthermore, standpoint epistemologists have found that an argument can be made for the epistemic privilege of marginalized knowers; yet, such privilege is not given necessarily qua social position or social identity but has to be acquired as a critical standpoint in communities. This paper takes these cues and argues for a theory of fragile epistemic subjects, showing that fragile epistemic subjects are positioned both advantageously as well as disadvantageously in epistemically charged situations. The paper aims to show the dialectical relationship between vulnerability and agency by drawing on examples from philosophy of disability, philosophy of children, and philosophy of migration. Finally, the paper argues that the dialectical relationship which fragile epistemic subjects have to navigate can be best explained by lessons from recognition theory. |
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15. Juni 22 | Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin) |
The Epistemology of Agentive Modality 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Agentive modality is the modality that is directly relevant for our actions, and expressed with what is sometimes called “agentive modals”: abilities, options, affordances, and so on. Our knowledge of agentive modality provides a plausible starting point for a naturalized modal epistemology, but there has been little discussion of it. I argue that agentive modality is not accounted for by extant approaches in modal epistemology, and provide the beginnings of a more promising approach based in the experience of our own agency. |
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29. Juni 22 | Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford) |
Mere Permutations of Individuals |
Abstract Anti-haecceitism is the thesis that every truth is necessitated by the qualitative truths, and haecceitism is its denial. I shall present a new framework for theorising about the many forms of haecceitism. This framework, I shall argue, allows one to identify key commitments of haecceitists which are obscured by viewing them as mere common deniers of a single supervenience thesis. I will then use these observations to advance a novel argument about the connection between haecceitism and supervenience. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommeremester 2022 wird organisiert von Stefan Rinner
Email: stefan.rinner(at)uni-hamburg.de(stefan.rinner"AT"uni-hamburg.de)