Institutskolloquium

15.10.2025

Máté Veres
(Genf)

  Trust in Stoicism

Abstract: 

In this paper, we argue that trust is an important component of the Stoic theory of knowledge. We reconstruct core components of the Stoic theory of trust across Stoic discussions of ethics and epistemology. On the view that emerges, trust involves cases in which a trusting agent assents to p on the grounds that the testimonial source asserts that p and that the trusting agent judges the testimonial source trustworthy. We argue that trust for the Stoics is, under the right circumstances, an appropriate action, that the resulting mental state is a forceful belief, and that forceful belief is in principle acceptable to the optimally rational person, i.e., the sage. We conclude that interpretations of Stoicism that focus strictly on the epistemic autonomy and autarchy of the sage fail to account for important aspects of the Stoic life, such as the sage teaching the fool as well as the division of labour among sages in a Stoic utopia, made necessary by the inherent limitations of human life.

On Knowledge as Ability

Abstract:

I revisit the ancient idea that knowledge is a kind of power or capacity, focusing on the contemporary view that knowing a fact consists in the ability to act, think, or feel for reasons that are facts. Against proponents of this view, I argue that the “ability view” does not directly dissolve familiar epistemological puzzles, though it does offer a distinctive way of reframing them. Conceiving of knowledge in dispositional terms helps illuminate the perspectival features of knowledge-ascriptions and allows us to refine standard functionalist accounts of knowledge—thereby offering new leverage on longstanding epistemological problems.

Abstract: TBA

Stephan Schmid
(Hamburg)

The Metaphysical Significance of Early Modern Scepticism

Abstract: TBA