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12.04.23
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Madhulika Banerjee
(Universität Dehli)
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Understanding the Epistemology of 'Other' Knowledges: Preliminary Explorations
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About the Lecture
One of the urgent questions of our time is to find knowledges of production that can help us respond to the climate crisis created using modern technology. Climate policy recommendations have, for some time, identified that a range of ‘other’ knowledges can offer solutions. The critical question in discussions on alternatives is that of epistemology. A ‘theory of knowledge’ that is credible and valid is ascribed to what has now become conventional and the hegemonic knowledge, that is Science. The superior epistemic claims of Science are based on a method of observation of phenomenon, repeated experimentation, which can lead to theorisation and arrive at the ‘general laws’ that are claimed to be universal. Knowledges that do not follow this method are considered beliefs, or at best interesting practices, but not ‘knowledge’.
This paper will argue that we can possibly begin to understand the nature of the epistemology of a range of other knowledges that are available in many parts of the world. In a very preliminary exploration, it will approach what I call ‘already existing knowledge systems’, (rather than ‘traditional knowledge’) both in terms of their patterns of practice and their textual basis, wherever available. These show that they are clearly informed by a larger theory of –nature, human beings and their relationship, both in the present and the future. The question that we need to ask then is: does it build up to a theory of the knowledge as a whole? In other words, do already existing knowledges have an epistemology?
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26.04.23
online |
Charlotte Werndl
(Universität Salzburg)
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ONLINE
On Defining Climate and Climate Change
Zoom-Meeting beitreten
https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/65542228445?pwd=b1grZDhaV1BHL09ySXFONmsrRVQ1dz09
Meeting-ID: 655 4222 8445
Kenncode: 37541518
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About the Lecture
The aim of the is talk is to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically applicable; it should correctly classify different climates; it should not depend on our knowledge; it should be applicable to the past, present, and future; and it should be mathematically well-defined. Then several definitions are discussed: in particular, two classes of definitions, namely climate as distribution over time and climate as an ensemble distribution providing likelihoods fur the future values of climate variables. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems and that the definition of climate as the distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions seems most promising.
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10.05.23
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Paul Silva
(Universität zu Köln)
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The Structure of Factive States
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About the Lecture
Natural languages contain a range of epistemic factive verbs. Verbs like ‘knows that’, ‘realizes that’, ‘recognizes that’, ‘notices that’, ‘understands that’, ‘sees that’, and ‘remembers that’ are but some of these verbs. Unger (1972) argued that this class of factive verbs is knowledge-entailing. Decades later, Williamson (2000) argued that these factive terms are knowledge-entailing and that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. However, natural language also contains factive adjectives. These include ‘is aware of the fact that’, ‘is conscious of the fact that’, ‘is obvious that’, and ‘is clear that’. Interestingly, the states referred to by factive adjectives cannot quickly and easily be identified with or reduced to the states referred to by factive verbs. In part, this is because the factive adjectives refer to states that can come in degrees while the factive verbs do not seem to refer to states that can come in degrees. This paper makes two new contributions to the state of the art on factives. First, it provides new and previously unexplored motivation for thinking that we should understand knowledge in terms of awareness by reflecting on the degreed/comparative character of 'is aware of the fact that'. The second contribution is an exploration of how we can gradually exit states of ignorance, by becoming gradually increasingly aware of facts. It will be suggested that knowledge of general scientific hypotheses is sometimes best understood as reaching an endpoint on a graded scale of awareness.
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31.05.23
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Dana Jalobeanu
(HIAS & Universität Bukarest)
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What are the experiments for? Cartesian Baconians and the construction of hypotheses in mid-seventeenth century
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About the Lecture
Current histories of early modern philosophy have replaced the empirist vs. rationalist divide with a “speculative philosophy” vs. “experimental philosophy” distinction. The latter, although more context-sensitive, still places early modern philosophers in two camps. One is either a Baconian, experimental philosopher or a Cartesian speculative one. In this paper I show, on a handful of particular examples, that things are never so clear cut, and that mid-seventeenth century natural philosophers, in England and France, did not see any problem in being both Cartesians and Baconians. Many saw themselves as Cartesians insofar they worked with some of Descartes’ hypotheses (mainly taken from Descartes’ “scientific” works, i.e., Dioptrics and Meteorology). But they adopted a Baconian epistemology concerning these hypotheses, seeing them as provisional and subject to correction. The focus of this paper is on how experiments and instrumental trials were often constructed with this aim in mind: to better understand, judge and evaluate Cartesian hypotheses in order to adjust and correct them in light of the new findings. The structure of my paper is the following. First, I explain what I call Bacon’s corrective epistemology, i.e., the complex interplay between hypothesizing and the various organons proposed to correct and direct the speculative activity of the mind. Then, I show how the new science of dioptrics was used, in the mid seventeenth century, to investigate and amend Cartesian hypotheses. In the last part of my paper I argue for the need of a finer-grained vocabulary pertaining to early modern experimentation, in particular for the need to distinguish between “tests”, “trials”, observations, experiments, and other actors’ categories who were often conflated by modern historiography under the umbrella-term experiment. It is only by reconstructing the complex vocabulary of seventeenth-century experimental trails that we can hope to begin to understand the intricate interplay between the “experimental” and the “speculative” parts of the early modern philosophy.
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| 14.06.23 |
Lara Keuck
(Universität Bielefeld)
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Was ist die Alzheimer-Krankheit? Historische und philosophische Reflexionen auf eine ungelöste Frage
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About the Lecture
Seit über einem Jahrhundert wird die medizinische Diagnose der Alzheimer-Krankheit verwendet. Ebenso lange gibt es Forschungen dazu, was diese Krankheit verursacht und wie sie sich charakterisieren bzw. unterscheiden lässt von anderen Formen der Demenz oder von altersabhängigen Veränderungen. Dieser Vortrag verfolgt in drei Etappen die Forschungsfrage „Was ist die Alzheimer-Krankheit?“ durch den Lauf der Zeit und zeigt auf, wie sich sowohl die Ausrichtung der Frage als auch die Bedingungen ihrer Beantwortung verändert haben. Kombiniert wird dieser historische Ansatz mit einer philosophischen Reflexion auf gegenwärtige Krisenklagen und Heilsversprechen der Alzheimer-Forschung.
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| 12.07.23 |
Rodolfo Garau
(Universität Hamburg)
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From Science to Pseudoscience: Gassendi, Morin, and the Marginalization of Astrology
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About the Lecture
In contemporary times, astrology is generally considered to be the paragon of pseudoscience or (more benevolently) a product of popular superstition or fad. However, during the Middle Ages and the early modern period, astrology was an integral aspect of the astronomical and medical curricula of most European universities. Despite being a subject of debate, astrology was widely acknowledged as a scholarly discipline. Sometime between the 16th and the end of the 17th century, however, astrology lost its position as a recognized scholarly pursuit. How, and why, did this happen? Scholars of early modern science have put forth various explanations to account for this phenomenon. Some argue that astrology was incompatible with the new science, while others propose that the introduction of heliocentric cosmology undermined the foundational framework of astrology; others assert that the increasing restrictions on astrological prognostication brought about by religious reformations contributed to the marginalization of astrology. Despite the compelling nature of these claims, each presents relevant counterexamples and exceptions that make it difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation for the decline of astrology. In this presentation, I draw on a case study of early modern science and philosophy, namely the clash between the philosophers Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Jean-Baptiste Morin (1583-1656), to offer insights into the historical marginalization of astrology. I suggest that the emphasis on the method of knowing, which was a central tenet of early modern philosophy, played a crucial role in the demise of astrology and its relegation to the status of pseudoscience. Simultaneously, I underscore the importance of social structures and patronage relations in determining the continuing relevance of astrology throughout mid-17th century France—and, conversely, its demise. I conclude by claiming that the intersection of these two aspects—theoretical and socio-political—can provide a fertile scheme to account for such an intricate historical phenomenon.
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