Hedda Hassel Mørch
(University of Oslo )

About the Lecture
Panpsychism is the view that all physical things are associated with consciousness or subjective experience, or in other words, that there is something that it is like to be even an electron or other fundamental physical entity. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that panpsychism may offer a solution to the mind–body problem, which avoids the main difficulties of both physicalism and dualism, the two traditional main theories of consciousness in philosophy. In this talk, I will present the main arguments for this claim and then discuss some important challenges to it.

About the Lecture
Perception can be unreliable – as shown by famous illusions as well as numerous experimental studies. But are we aware of how reliable or unreliable our perception is – in any given case? Here I will suggest that we have indeed an access to the reliability of our various senses, and discuss what we may mean by "trusting our eyes". I will argue however that this sense of trust is does more for us that telling us whether what we perceive is true, or accurate, and is key to our epistemic autonomy.

About the Lecture
WHow does a subject have to relate to her body so as to constitute paradigmatic embodiment? What makes it the case that a subject is aware of some material object as its body? Ways of 'losing one's body' – such as locked-in syndrome, anarchic hand syndrome, deafferentation, or out-of-body experiences – come from disruptions to the normal functional relation between a subject and her body. This suggests that at the heart of embodiment is a certain functional structure between a subject and her body. What is required for this functional structure? I argue that an account of core normal human embodiment requires that we consider different aspects of how subjects are aware of their bodies. I will consider the consequences of this for our understanding of subjects and also pathologies of embodiment.

Die Paradoxie des erweiterten Geistes  ORT AUSNAHMSWEISE ÜBERSEERING 35, HÖRSAAL C

About the Lecture
Die These des erweiterten Geistes (engl. extended mind) besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Die These wird seit zwanzig Jahren von Philosophen, Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. In diesem Vortrag soll gezeigt werden, dass die Debatte um die These des erweiterten Geistes ein erkenntnistheoretisches Paradoxon aufwirft. Sofern es sich bei der Debatte um eine substantielle Meinungsverschiedenheit handelt, verfügen wir bestenfalls über ein oberflächliches Verständnis der These. Und sofern wir die These gründlich verstehen, handelt es sich bei der Debatte lediglich um eine Wortstreitigkeit.

About the Lecture
Perceptual experiences provide us with a fundamental form of consciousness: In perceptual experience we are conscious of our own current environment. But then, what does it take to be perceptually aware of the world around us? What is the nature of perceptual experience, and how could we possibly be conscious of our environment when we perceive it? In recent (and not so recent) debates, philosophers have often attempted to answer these questions by offering one of two competing accounts of perceptual experience: Some defend a 'direct realist' account, others argue that we should accept a 'representationalist' account of perceptual experience. Various arguments for and against both positions have been developed; but the relevant arguments in favour and against both positions are rather well-balanced, and so the debate currently seems to have reached some sort of stand-off. The present paper aims to offer a new vantage point from which to consider these issues afresh. We will reach this new vantage point by exploring a new (and maybe surprising) question about perceptual awareness, namely the question whether, and if so in which respects, perceptual experience might have 'eudaimonic' value, that is, value with respect to a subject's well-being.

About the Lecture
Den Begriff des Unbewussten verbinden wahrscheinlich die meisten Menschen mit Sigmund Freud und seiner psychoanalytischen Lehre. In der gegenwärtigen akademischen Psychologie spielt der psychoanalytische Begriff jedoch kaum eine Rolle. Gerade in Abgrenzung zum Freud'schen Begriff erforschen Kognitions- und Sozialpsychologen unter dem Label „das neue Unbewusste“ oder „das kognitiv Unbewusste“ Phänomene, wie implizites Lernen, subliminales Priming und unbewusste Vorurteile (engl. implicit biases). Erstaunlicherweise erfährt der Freud'sche Begriff des Unbewussten in der Neurowissenschaft jedoch eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Wiederbelebung. Die so-genannte Neuropsychoanalyse erforscht psychoanalytische Phänomene, wie das der Verdrängung, mit neurowissenschaftlichen Methoden. Das Ziel meines Vortrags ist es zu zeigen, dass der Begriff des verdrängten Unbewussten in die kognitions- und sozialpsychologische Erklärungspraxis integriert werden sollte. Dies erlaubt einen neuen Blick auf unbewusste Vorurteile, was sie genau sind und inwiefern sie unbewusste mentale Phänomene sind.