One-day conference / Wednesday, October 4th 2017

In cooperation with the University of Applied Sciences Europe (formerly BiTS),
M.Sc. in Entrepreneurial Economics

 

The year 1871 saw the birth of Austrian School of economics with the publication of Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics, in which book he presents a formal analysis of the means-ends relations of economizing individuals. Three years later another Austrian contribution, Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, re-introduced the medieval concept of intentionality into philosophical discussion and thus paved its way into action theory. At first blush, these developments appear unconnected but they have an interesting deeper structure:

The methodological individualism and subjectivism Austrian economics embraces can be seen as essentially grounded in the intentionality of propositional attitudes. Thus, it is not surprising that the economic perspective on human action necessarily has an underlying attitudinal base: Talk of the purposiveness, goal directedness or efficiency of human action ultimately refers back to ends, to what people want; talk of adequacy, aptness and sufficiency ultimately relates to means, to what people believe they have to employ in order to get what they want.

So an integrated view of economics and action theory appears fruitful and even called for but it never really got off the ground. Two factors were detrimental to its gaining mainstream acceptance: First, an overemphasis of the epistemological on part of Austrian economists; secondly an overly dogmatic empiricism on part of philosophers of science and mainstream economists. The first led Austrian economists to willingly seize the poisoned chalice of Kantianism (or wilfully infighting about it). The second led positivists to unlearn Fregean lessons and misconceive the very business of science. So paradise was lost and houses were built on sand.

Arguably, with Paul Samuelson (Foundations of Economic Analysis, 1947) economists forgot that just because you can use the mathematical tools of classical thermodynamics to describe market and competition that does not make them mathematical in nature: That I can use my car key to open a beer does not make the beer an automobile. Also, it seems that with Milton Friedman (Essays in Positive Economics, 1953) they forgot that the plausibility of the premises is far from negligible if what you aim at is (scientific) explanation: There are plenty of bad arguments (or for that matter: forecasts) with true conclusions which are bad precisely because of their weak or even absurd premises. But instead of joining the economic mainstream in relinquishing economics proper and trading it for political economy we should not forget:

There are deep insights awaiting us when we turn to the deep structure that unifies economics and action theory. For example, the nature of socialist calculation may be seen in trying to find out as a planner what your very planning made impossible to find out. Also, the nature of competition may be seen in (business) rivalry, driven by fear (of losing profits) and hope (for still securing business), both of which are real but cannot be objectively measured. Finally, time-preference may be understood as originating in the fact that present goods are objects of action (hence wanted) whereas remote goods are either only temporally remote or not essentially wanted (but only more or less urgently wished for).

Against the background of such considerations, the conference is intended to encourage the exploration of Austrian thought both from the perspective of Austrian economics and philosophy. The connecting link is seen in a thorough commitment to both subjectivism and methodological individualism. Whether and to what extent the integration this allows for is attractive to both parties shall, we hope, emerge from the lively discussions ahead of us.

The conference is open to the academic public. Admission is free of charge.

 

Agenda

10:00	Welcome Address
10:10	Michael Oliva Córdoba (Hamburg), On the philosophy and logic of human action 10:40 Stefan Kooths (Kiel), Comment on Oliva Córdoba 10:50 Coffee break
11:00	Jeffrey Giliam (Berlin), Equilibrium and Process: The Praxeology of Theory 11:30 Jörg Winter (Hamburg), Comment on Giliam 11:40 Discussion 11:50 Coffee break
12:00	Rolf W. Puster (Hamburg), An der Schwelle zu einem umfassenden Subjektivismus. Lockes Lehre von den gemischten Modi 12:30 Eduard Braun (Clausthal-Zellerfeld), Kommentar zu Rolf W. Puster 12:40 Discussion 12:50 Coffee break
13:00	Stefan Kooths (Kiel), Towards a Coordinationist Paradigm of Macroeconomics 13:30 Rolf W. Puster (Hamburg), Kommentar zu Kooths 13:40 Discussion 13:50 Coffee break
14:00	Conference lunch
15:00	Hendrik Hagedorn (Berlin), A theory of interest rates 15:30 Michael Oliva Córdoba (Hamburg), Comment on Hagedorn 15:40 Discussion 15:50 Coffee break
16:00	Edith Puster (Hamburg), Wert für mich und Wert an sich: Das Scheitern aller objektivistischen Moral 16:30 Hendrik Hagedorn (Berlin), Kommentar zu Edith Puster 16:40 Discussion 16:50 Coffee break
17:00	Eduard Braun (Clausthal-Zellerfeld), Die Vereinheitlichung des Kapitalbegriffs als notwendige Aufgabe 17:30 Edith Puster (Hamburg), Kommentar zu Braun 17:40 Discussion 17:50 Coffe break
18:00	Closing discussion
19:00	Conference dinner