


GROUNDING & CONSCIOUSNESS

August 6th – 9th 2017 | La Pietra *



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SCHEDULE

August 6th

3.40 pm

Bus: Hotel St. Gallo Palace ⇒ La Pietra

4.00 – 4.30 pm

Welcome & Coffee

4.30 – 6.30 pm

Talk #1 | Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)

Functionalism as a Grounding Principle

Chair: David Chalmers (NYU)

6.40 – 9.50 pm

Guided tour of Villa La Pietra | Reception & Dinner

10 pm

Bus: La Pietra ⇒ Hotel St. Gallo Palace

August 7th

8.40 am

Bus: Hotel St. Gallo Palace ⇒ La Pietra

9.00 – 11.00 am

Talk #2 | Geoff Lee (Berkeley)

Consciousness, Grounding and Natural Properties

Chair: Naomi Thompson (Southampton)

11.00 – 11.15 pm

Coffee Break

11.15 – 1.15 pm

Talk #3 | Kati Balog (Rutgers)

Physicalism, dualism, and metaphysical gridlock

Response: Tobias Wilsch (Tübingen)

Chair: Christopher Peacocke (Columbia)

1.15 – 2.15 pm

Lunch

2.15 – 4.15 pm

Talk #4 | Ralf Bader (Oxford)

Grounding, reduction and consciousness

Chair: Ruth Chang (Rutgers)

4.15 – 4.30 pm

Coffee Break

4.30 – 6.30 pm

Talk #5 | Benj Hellie & Jessica Wilson (Toronto)

The semantic defectiveness of 'Grounding' and 'Consciousness'

Response: Catharine Diehl (Berlin) & Lisa Vogt (Barcelona)

Chair: Robert Schwartzkopff (Hamburg)

7 pm

Bus: La Pietra ⇒ Hotel St. Gallo Palace

August 8th

8.40 am

Bus: Hotel St. Gallo Palace ⇒ La Pietra

9.00 – 11.00 am

Talk #6 | Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow)

Inscrutable cross-family sentences

Response: Jon Simon (NYU)

Chair: Gabriel Rabin (NYU/NYUAD)

11.00 – 11.15 pm

Coffee Break

11.15 – 1.15 pm

Talk #7 | Hedda Hassel Mørch (NYU/Oslo)

Russellian panpsychism and phenomenal powers

Response: Martin Glazier (North Carolina)

Chair: Catharine Diehl (Berlin)

1.15 – 2.15 pm

Lunch

2.30 pm

Bus: La Pietra ⇒ Hotel St. Gallo Palace

4.30 – 7.30 pm

Guided tour of Florence

Bus will pick up La Pietra residents at 4.30 pm and then make a stop at Hotel St. Gallo Palace on its way into town.

7.30 pm

Dinner at Ristorante Academia, Piazza San Marco 7, 50121 Florence

August 9th

8.25 am

Bus: Hotel St. Gallo Palace ⇒ La Pietra

8.45 – 10.45 am

Talk #8 | Giovanni Merlo (Stirling)

Russellian monism and two varieties of grounding

Chair: Darragh Byrne (Birmingham)

10.45 – 11.00 pm

Coffee Break

11.15 – 1.15 pm

Talk #9 | Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg)

Can a proponent of dualist emergentism accept that the physical grounds consciousness?

Chair: Kit Fine (NYU)

1.00 – 2.00 pm

Lunch & Farewell

PARTICIPANTS

Ralf Bader (Oxford)	Annina Loets (Oxford)
Kati Balog (Rutgers)	Barry Loewer (Rutgers)
Paul Boghossian (NYU)	Robert Long (NYU)
Darragh Byrne (Birmingham)	Roberto Loss (Hamburg)
David Chalmers (NYU)	Adam Lovett (NYU)
Ruth Chang (Rutgers)	Giovanni Merlo (Stirling)
Julio de Rizzo (Hamburg)	Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg)
Catharine Diehl (Berlin)	Claudia Passos (NYU)
Andreas Ditter (NYU)	Christopher Peacocke (Columbia)
Kit Fine (NYU)	Gabriel Rabin (NYU/NYUAD)
Martin Glazier (North Caroline)	Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)
Hedda Hassel Mørch (NYU/Oslo)	Robert Schwartzkopff (Hamburg)
Benj Hellie (Toronto)	Erica Shumener (Pittsburgh)
Jenny Judge (NYU)	Jon Simon (NYU)
Yannic Kappes (Hamburg)	Naomi Thompson (Southampton)
Andrew Lee (NYU)	Lisa Vogt (Barcelona)
Geoff Lee (Berkeley)	Jonas Werner (Hamburg)
Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow)	Tobias Wilsch (Tübingen)
Martin Lipman (Amsterdam)	Jessica Wilson (Toronto)

ABSTRACTS

Ralf Bader

Grounding, reduction and consciousness

This paper is concerned with establishing the precise relationships between grounding, reduction and analysis. It identifies the conditions under which a grounding connection implies a corresponding reductive identity and distinguishes different notions of irreducibility, showing which kinds of irreducibility imply that a property is unanalysable or indefinable. It then evaluates what implications follow for reductionist approaches in the philosophy of mind when considering consciousness to be grounded in the physical.

Kati Balog

Zombies, Illuminati and Metaphysical Gridlock

This paper is an examination of the mind's relationship to the physical world, in light of the dialectic between anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses. Having developed a master argument against the anti-physicalist, I then notice that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks on physicalism and physicalist replies. Each position can be developed in a way to defend itself from attacks from the other position. My suggestion is that we might want to look more seriously at the view that the reason for the seeming unresolvability of the problem is that there is no determinate fact about the metaphysical grounding of mind.

Benj Hellie & Jessica Wilson

The semantic defectiveness of 'Grounding' and 'Consciousness'

Light is shed on features of recent literature in philosophy of mind and metaphysics if central terminology is understood as 'semantically defective' – governed by conventions of appropriate use which overconstrain candidate meanings, yielding a familiar syndrome of inconsistency/triviality/fragmentation. Philosophy of mind stipulates of (big-'C') 'Consciousness' that it inherits the meaning of ordinary discourse about 'what it is like'; the literature also implicitly treats 'Consciousness' as having a 'descriptive' semantics; but the ordinary-discourse basis has an 'expressive' semantics. Metaphysics requires of (big-'G') 'Grounding' that it inherit the 'unity' of our practice of 'ground-giving', stating 'ground-relations' joining 'levels of reality'; and it also requires 'Grounding' to be a ground-relation; but the ground-relations are legitimately thought of as disunified.

Geoffrey Lee

Consciousness, Grounding and Natural Properties

How should our thinking about consciousness be informed by the view we take of high-level structure (i.e non-fundamental objects, properties and relations)? I will focus in particular on two different orientations in thinking about consciousness, which I call inflationism and deflationism. Inflationists see consciousness as a deep, significant divide in nature, a kind "inner light" that provides the ground for

the appropriateness of empathy, and which has great moral and epistemic importance. Deflationism is a family of related positions that clash with inflationist picture thinking. Roughly, I think certain Deflationary views can be supported by taking the reductionist view that consciousness is just one among many similar complex high-level physical/functional properties. Viewed from a 3rd personal perspective, it therefore won't seem particularly special. It's natural to try to defend Inflationism by appealing to a view of high-level properties on which high-level structure isn't necessarily scrutable from fundamental physics, and so important distinctions aren't necessarily accessible to an impartial observer who has access only to the facts about the more fundamental physical description of a system, including in particular the conscious / not conscious distinction. I'll look at some different positions on the grounding of high-level properties and argue for a position that is more congenial to the deflationary outlook.

Stephan Leuenberger

Inscrutable cross-family sentences

In *Constructing the World*, David J. Chalmers presents an updated version of Carnap's Aufbau. One key difference is that while Carnap aims to show that all terms are definable from a small class of base terms, Chalmers aims to make it plausible that all truths are a priori entailed - "scrutable" - from base truths. He first divides up the total vocabulary of our language into different families, and then argues, for each family separately, that truths involving expressions in that family are scrutable from the putative base. He does not systematically address the question whether "cross-family sentences" - sentences involving expressions from more than one family - are scrutable. I shall argue that this lacuna is not easily filled, and suggest that we should consider cross-family sentences to be the most likely source of inscrutability. It may well turn out that the only feasible way to establish a Chalmers-style scrutability claim might be to derive it as a corollary from a Carnap-style definability claim.

Giovanni Merlo

Russellian monism and two varieties of grounding

This paper explores an alternative to constitutive versions of Russellian Monism (RM). I will begin by arguing that, when it comes to explaining the relationship between macrophenomenal properties and macrophysical roles, russellian monists face a dilemma. If that relationship is the same as the one that RM posits between microphenomenal properties and microphysical roles, facts involving macrophysical roles turn out to be metaphysically overdetermined. If it's not, it's not clear that RM can secure the causal relevance of facts involving macrophenomenal properties. The view I will put forward escapes the dilemma by introducing a distinction between two varieties of grounding - one connecting facts involving microphysical roles to facts involving macrophysical roles, the other connecting facts involving (micro- and macro-) physical roles to facts involving their intrinsic realizers. One key advantage of this view is that it obviates any need to ground the macrointrinsic in the microintrinsic, thereby avoiding the so-called 'combination problem'.

Hedda Hassel Mørch

Phenomenal powers panpsychism

Russellian panpsychism is the view that physical dispositions are categorically grounded in phenomenal properties. This view arguably avoids the main problems of physicalism and dualism at once, the problems of the epistemic gap from physical to phenomenal properties and of explanatory exclusion, but it faces its own epistemic gap from phenomenal properties to physical dispositions. This gap can be closed by positing fundamental non-phenomenal relations, such as causal laws or regularities, but this leads to a new problem of structural exclusion—according to which physical dispositions are mainly grounded in the structure of these relations, and not in the phenomenal character of their relata. I offer a new version of panpsychism that avoids these problems, according to which physical dispositions are grounded in phenomenal powers. Phenomenal powers are non-Humean causal powers that are fully grounded in phenomenal properties. I argue that the epistemic gap from phenomenal properties to causal powers can be closed without appeal to fundamental causal laws or regularities that lead to structural exclusion. Phenomenal powers panpsychism therefore seems to be the form of Russellian panpsychism that is most capable of avoiding the problems of physicalism and dualism. It is also a purer, more parsimonious version of panpsychism, and may have the potential to contribute to a solution to the combination problem.

Martine Nida-Rümelin

Can a proponent of dualist emergentism accept that the physical grounds consciousness?

The answer to the title question depends on the notion of grounding at issue. I am going to sketch a view about consciousness, dualist emergentism, which is clearly non-materialist and yet includes the claim that consciousness is – in a sense to be explained - grounded in the physical. However, on a different notion of grounding, which is present in the literature, a proponent of dualist emergentism is committed to denying that consciousness is grounded in the physical. - The facts about consciousness I will consider in that discussion include facts about the phenomenal character of experience, about the existence, identity and individuality of conscious beings and about being genuinely active in one's behavior.

Jonathan Schaffer

Functionalism as a Grounding Principle

I discuss the prospects for conceiving of physicalism in ground-theoretic terms, and for invoking a functionalist account of the grounding map from the physical to the phenomenal. On the view floated, a given subject can count as being in this phenomenal state because she is in that physical state, where the physical state occupies a corresponding functional role in the life of the organism. I'll claim that this way of conceiving of physicalism and invoking functionalism preserves their core insights while avoiding their worst problems.