Rückschau
Hier finden Sie die Programme der Institutskolloquien aus den vergangenen Semestern.
Sommersemester 2024
Das Fachbereichskolloquium Sommersemester 24
(Poster)
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen.
Das Fachbereichskolloquium wird organisiert von Prof. Dr. Jozef Müller und findet i. d. R. 14-tägig dienstags, 12:15-13:45 Uhr (außer 14.Juni) in Präsenz im Raum: Phil B 5002 statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein. Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Datum | Person | Thema |
09.04.2024 | Klaus Corcilius (Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen) |
Practical Truth |
14.05.2024 | Naly Thaler (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) |
Value and Rationality in Aristotle's Theory of Akrasia |
28.05.2024 | Matthias Armgardt (Universität Hamburg) |
Leibniz’s Legal Philosophy |
04.06.2024 | Maria Paola Ferretti (Goethe- Universität Frankfurt) |
Responsibility for Political Corruption |
14.06.2024 | Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) |
Intelligent Aliens Would Be Conscious; N.B. This talk is on Friday! |
25.06.2024 | Rodolfo Garau (Universität Hamburg) | Title to be determined |
02.07.2024 | Andreja Novaković (UC Berkeley) | The Feeling Soul in Hegel's Family |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2024 wird organisiert von Prof. Dr. Jozef Müller.
Email: jozef.mueller@uni-hamburg.de
Wintersemester 2023/24
Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 23/24
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Eline Gerritsen.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig dienstags um 12:15-13:45 Uhr in Präsenz im Seminarraum A 12006 im Philturm statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein. Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Programm:
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
07.11.2023 | Maximilian Kiener (Technische Universität Hamburg) | Strict Moral Answerability |
21.11.2023 | Marie Wuth (Universität Hamburg) | Prisms of Power: Spinoza and the Question of the Political |
28.11.2023 | David Plunkett (Dartmouth College) | Conceptional Ethics, Naturalism, and The Foundations of Epistemology |
05.12.2023 | Leda Berio (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) | How Our Norms Guide Our Actions |
19.12.2023 | Ilaria Cozzaglio (Universität Hamburg) | Trust and the Justifiability of Hope: The Case of Climate Activism |
16.01.2024 | Mirjam Müller (Humboldt Universität Berlin) | A Labour of Love? Self-Realization and Alienation in Modern Work |
30.01.2024 | Justin Vlasits (University of Illinois, Chicago) | A New Fragment of Aristotle's On Ideas |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester wird organisiert von Dr. Eline Gerritsen.
Email: eline.gerritsen"AT"uni-hamburg.de
Sommersemester 2023
Das Institutskolloquium Sommersemester 23 Poster
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Marie Wuth.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 17 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein. Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen: https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/69466512113?pwd=TkFnVTRvNDRId3JkRkpQK1VFdndyZz09
Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: 17-19 Uhr c.t.. Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting.
Programm:
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
05.04.2023 | Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (Universität Hamburg) |
Aristotle’s Constructionist Ontology of Mathematical Objects |
Abstract Aristotle’s ontology of mathematical objects is clearly anti-Platonist, in that he denies that mathematical objects exist independently from physical objects. Mathematical objects, he claims, are physical objects qua mathematical. Ever since Jonathan Lear’s paper on ‘Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics’, this claim has been understood in the context of mathematical proofs: in a proof the mathematician abstracts from the physical features of the particular physical object of the proof, and only considers the (relevant) mathematical features. In order to deal with cases in which the required objects rarely, if at all, exist in physical reality (e.g. polyhedrons), scholars from Lear onwards have tinkered with the notion of abstraction and inserted an element of idealisation in it. There are, however, cases involving infinities, which cannot be thus accommodated within Aristotle’s finitist physics. Moreover, it rests upon an incorrect understanding of Aristotle’s argument in Metaphysics M.3, the chapter in which he lays out his ontology of mathematical objects. By way of a careful analysis of this argument, I will show that for Aristotle mathematical objects as considered in mathematics only exist in thought, and thus in a way do not exist as real objects, but are constructed in thought from primary objects which are present in physical objects, and are also known from them. The realist claim that mathematical objects are physical objects qua mathematical must be understood at the type level, ensuring that mathematical theorems are applicable to physical reality and that there is no harm in this constructionism. |
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19.04.2023 | Tobias Rosefeldt (Humbold Universität Berlin) |
Kants hylomorphistische Konzeption von Autonomie 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract Kants Ethik der Autonomie scheint die These zu beinhalten, dass nur solche praktischen Regeln unbedingte Geltung für uns haben können, die in irgendeiner Weise unserem eigenen Willen entspringen. Diese These wirft eine Reihe von Fragen auf: Ist die These nicht paradox? Wie begründet Kant sie? Und vertritt er sie überhaupt? In dem Vortrag soll es darum gehen, diese Fragen auf der Grundlage eines neues Verständnisses davon zu beantworten, was es heißt, dass ein Gesetz selbstgegeben ist und unserem eigenen Willen entspringt. Dieses Verständnis begreift Autonomie nicht primär als Eigenschaft menschlicher Akteure, sondern als solche menschlicher Vermögen, und sie nimmt Kants hylomorphistische Konzeption dieser Vermögen ernst. Menschliche Vermögen wie der Wille sind autonom, wenn sie Inhalte generieren können, die ihrer eigenen essentiellen Form entspringen. |
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03.05.2023 | Eline Gerritsen (Universität Hamburg) |
Questioning the normative status of conventional norms 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract Conventional norms regulate many aspects of our behaviour, from how we dress and what we talk about with guests to when and how we queue. We feel pressure to comply with these unwritten rules and judge others who violate them. In addition, conventional norms seem to have an important role in enabling cooperation and upholding a stable society. With this in mind, it is striking that, in metanormative debates, these norms are set aside as lacking a significant normative status. What is behind this common view, which seems directly at odds with our everyday experience? And is it correct? In this talk, I will argue that it is an open question whether conventional norms are normative in a significant sense. I will explain the distinction between formal and authoritative normativity and examine different reasons for conceiving of authoritative normativity as incompatible with conventional norms, rejecting each. Despite being mundane and artificial, it is possible – if not plausible – that some conventional norms have a normative force that not all norms have. After establishing this, I will raise some issues to consider in developing a positive account of the normative status of conventional norms |
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24.05.2023 | Franziska Dübgen (Universität Münster) AUSFALL |
Testimoniale Ungerechtigkeiten im deutschen Kontext: Die NSU-Prozesse 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit befasst sich als Konzept mit der Art und Weise, wie sich Machtverhältnisse in der Wissensformation, der Glaubwürdigkeit von Personen (testimonial injustice) und der Repräsentation der sozialen Wirklichkeit manifestieren. Der Begriff entstand innerhalb von anglophonen Debatten der feministischen sozialen Erkenntnistheorie und fand von Anfang an auch im Kontext rassistischer Diskriminierungen Verwendung. Bisher wurde er noch wenig genutzt, um rechtliche Prozesse zu analysieren. In diesen Vortrag werde ich ausloten, inwiefern der Fokus auf epistemische Ungerechtigkeit hilfreich sein könnte, um Unzulänglichkeiten und Machtdynamiken in den polizeilichen Ermittlungen und den juristischen Verfahren im Rahmen der NSU-Prozesse sozialdiagnostisch zu erfassen und normativ zu evaluieren. Umgekehrt werde ich den Aktivismus der Freunde und Verwandten der Opfer sowie die künstlerische Intervention der Gruppe „Forensic Architecture“ auf der Documenta 14 (2017) als Formen des epistemischen Widerstands erforschen, die hegemoniale Machtstrukturen entgegenwirkten und die öffentliche Aufarbeitung beeinflussten, indem sie alternativen Erzählungen der Ereignisse Sichtbarkeit verschafften. |
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07.06.2023 | Gerhard Thonhauser (Technische Universität Darmstadt) |
Politische Phänomenologie: Zur Politisierung der Phänomenologie im Nachkriegsfrankreich 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract Aktuell finden zahlreiche Theorieentwicklungen unter dem Schlagwort einer kritischen oder politischen Phänomenologie statt. Der Vortrag präsentiert Teile eines größeren Projekts, das sich mit der Geschichte der Politisierung der Phänomenologie auseinandersetzt. Im Fokus des Vortrags steht der Kern der Gruppe von Les Temps Modernes: Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty und Sartre. Nach einer einleitenden Kontextualisierung der Gruppe anhand einer Nachzeichnung der zentralen Faktoren ihrer Politisierung und einer Rekonstruktion des intellektuellen Kontextes, der sich insbesondere um die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Marxismus dreht, konzentriert sich der Vortrag auf die Konzeptualisierung sozialer Identität bei Merleau-Ponty und Beauvoir und deren darauf aufbauendes Instrumentarium für die Analyse und Kritik von Unterdrückung. |
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21.06.2023 | Michael Della Rocca (Yale University) |
TBA 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract TBA |
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05.07.2023 | Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) |
Can There Be Time Travel Without Brute Facts? 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2023 wird organisiert von Dr. Marie Wuth.
Email: marie.wuth"AT"uni-hamburg.de
Wintersemester 2022/23
Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 22-23 (PDF)
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Caleb Ward.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 17 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Alle Redner*innen werden vor Ort sein.
Achtung:
Am 19. Okt. 22 findet die Veranstaltung erst 18-19:30 s.t. statt.
Am 30. Nov. 22 findet die Veranstaltung im Mittelweg 177, Raum N0008, um 17 c.t. statt.
Wir empfehlen für alle die Vorort-Teilnahme, damit rege Diskussionen entstehen können.
Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen:
Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: 17-19 Uhr c.t.. Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting.
Zoom-Meeting beitreten
https://uni-hamburg.zoom.us/j/63753187555?pwd=a0dkR0wrcE1xK2YzaCtVdzNMQWJyUT09
Meeting ID: 637 5318 7555
Passcode: 85603102
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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19. Oct. 22 | Matthias Schemmel (Universität Hamburg) |
Everyday Language and Theoretical Terms: Reflective Abstraction in the Long-term History of the Exact Sciences Achtung Zeit:18:00 - 19:30 Uhr |
Abstract In this talk I want to discuss the origin of theoretical terms in everyday language by outlining stages in a long-term history of technical terminology marked by increasing degrees of reflexivity. I will use examples of theoretical terminology from three historical episodes that are widely considered turning points in the history of the exact sciences: the origins of theoretical science in antiquity; the emergence of classical mechanics in early modern times; and the transformation of physics in the early twentieth century. I will argue that the increasing distance of the meanings of theoretical terms from their everyday counterparts can be explained by relating it to historical processes of knowledge integration. |
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2. Nov. 22 | Deborah Mühlebach (Freie Universität Berlin) |
Criticising Language – Discursive Resistance in a Non-Ideal World |
Abstract |
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16. Nov. 22 | Eraldo Souza dos Santos (Panthéon-Sorbonne University) |
What Is Complete Civil Disobedience? 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract An unexpected yet readily identifiable common theme binds Egyptian activists together in their call for Mohammed Morsi and his government to step down in 2013, Sudanese protesters in the aftermath of the 2019 Khartoum massacre and the 2021 coup d’état, members of the ‘yellow vest’ movement in France, and supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Despite evincing utter disparate political stances, all four movements appear to rally under an ostensibly new watchword: “complete civil disobedience.” Yet, complete civil disobedience has an extensive history. It is an idea that Mohandas Gandhi developed early on to conceptualize nonviolent resistance. In his words, “Complete civil disobedience is a state of peaceful rebellion—a refusal to obey every single State-made law. It is certainly more dangerous than an armed rebellion.” I explore in this paper the moral, legal, and political challenges that arise from this form of disobedience. |
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30. Nov. 22 |
Esther Neuhann |
Fichte on Human Rights |
Abstract In the talk, I present my reconstruction of Fichte’s conception of human rights in the Foundations of Natural Right (1796/7). First, I argue that Fichte has a complex understanding of human rights: He defends “one true human right” (das eigentliche Menschenrecht) to be part of a legal community in which “original rights” (Urrechte) are secured. Although Fichte does not refer to them as such, I maintain that “original rights” are human rights in a derivative sense, because they are rights one has qua human. Second, I put forward the claim that, for Fichte, the substantive aim of human rights is to establish and secure a specific kind of non-violent intersubjective relation called “free reciprocal efficacy” (freie Wechselwirkung). In contemporary terms, he therefore holds a relational position in the debate on human rights. I defend this claim with regard to one of two “original rights”: the right to bodily inviolability. In this context, it is crucial to appreciate Fichte’s understanding of the human body as a medium of free action and interaction (Leib) rather than a biological organism (Körper). Third, I elaborate on the peculiar normative status of human rights in Fichte, in particular as non-positive and non-moral. Throughout the talk, I point to ways in which Fichte’s thus far underappreciated account provides valuable insights for the contemporary debate on the philosophy of human rights. |
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14. Dez. 22 | Shiloh Whitney (Fordham University) |
Anger Gaslighting and Affective Injustice |
Abstract |
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11. Jan. 23 | Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford) |
De Re Modality without Counterparts 17:15 - 18:45 Uhr |
Abstract Famously, David Lewis developed a counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modality. Throughout his work, Lewis used counterpart theory to solve various puzzles in metaphysics, especially in the metaphysics of material objects. I shall explore whether an alternative treatment of de re modality can accommodate key benefits of the counterpart-theoretic approach whilst avoiding its drawbacks. This alternative treatment is situated within the context of primitivism about modality, and it draws on various resources from higher-order metaphysics. |
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25. Jan. 22 | Clara Carus (Universität Paderborn) |
Die Rolle der Monaden oder 'Êtres simples' bei Leibniz und Émilie Du Châtelet im Vergleich |
Abstract Du Châtelet referenziert Leibniz' Theorie der Monaden und Wolffs Interpretation derselben im siebten und achten Kapitel der Institutions de Physiques, in denen sie die Elemente der Materie und die Natur der Körper behandelt. Auf den ersten Blick scheint sie sich einfach Leibniz' Monadentheorie anzuschließen, insofern sie alle anderen vorhergehenden Theorien über den Ursprung der Materie ablehnt und anschließend Leibniz' Monaden als überzeugende Theorie vorstellt. Diese deutliche Rezeption von Leibniz hat entscheidend zu der Auffassung in der Forschungsliteratur beigetragen, dass Du Châtelet's 'Metaphysik' oder 'Ontologie' prinzipiell leibnizisch sei. In diesem Vortrag werfe ich zunächst einen genaueren Blick auf den Kontext der Monadentheorie bei Leibniz und Du Châtelet und stelle die Frage, ob der Begriff der Monade bei den beiden Autoren dieselben Dinge klären soll oder ob die Monade bei Leibniz in einem anderen Erklärungszusammenhang steht als bei Du Châtelet. In einem zweiten Schritt weise ich auf einige bedeutende Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Autoren in der Monadentheorie selbst hin. In der Konklusion zeige ich auf, dass Du Châtelet Leibniz' Monadentheorie zwar zentral aufnimmt, diese aber bei Du Châtelet durch ihre Kontextualisierung und durch inhaltliche Unterschiede entscheidend abgeändert ist, sodass aus der Leibnizrezeption nicht die Konklusion zu ziehen ist, dass Du Châtelets 'Metaphysik' oder 'Ontologie' mit der Leibniz' prinzipiell in eins zu setzen ist. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 22-23 wird organisiert von Dr. Caleb Ward
Email: caleb.ward@uni-hamburg.de(caleb.ward"AT"uni-hamburg.de)
Sommersemester 2022
Das Institutskolloquium Sommersemester 2022 (PDF)
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Stefan Rinner.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Präsenz im ESA AS Saal statt. Darüber hinaus gibt es die Möglichkeit, über Zoom an den Sitzungen teilzunehmen:
Thema: Institutskolloquium
Uhrzeit: Dies ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Meeting
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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6. April 22 | Stefan Rinner (Universität Hamburg) |
The Causal Theory of Slurs 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Language can be used in highly destructive ways. One such way is the usage of slurs. These are expressions that are used to refer to the members of a given group, the target group, in a derogatory, pejorative or otherwise insulting way because of their race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation etc. As a consequence, slurs primarily have two functions. First, they can be used to offend or psychologically harm the members of the target group. Second, slurs can be used to create or reinforce negative attitudes towards them. For example, most uses of slurs for Jewish people in Nazi propaganda had mainly the purpose to create and reinforce anti-Semitic attitudes that would lead to increasing discrimination and violence against Jews, to their expulsion or incarceration in concentration camps, and, ultimately, to genocide. Similarly, Tirrell argues that the massive use of the slur ''Iyenzi'' (cockroaches) for Tutsis in broadcasts from a Hutu radio station played a crucial role in inciting the genocide of Tutsis. As Tirrell points out, slurs ''regularly enact power, incite crimes, and rationalize cruelty'' (Tirrell 2012, 192). In the philosophy of language, the question then arises how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished. A satisfactory answer to this question should explain both the offensiveness of slurs and the fact that slurs can be used to create and reinforce negative attitudes. As Caroline West and others point out, answering the question how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished may have implications for the legal question of whether there should be restrictions on hate speech involving slurs. Furthermore, the question is also of particular interest for philosophy of language in general, since it puts our existing tools of understanding language to the test. In this talk, I put forward and systematically develop a new explanation of the derogatory force of slurs, taking as a starting point a causal account of their referential properties. On the view on offer, slurs are derogatory because, unlike their neutral counterparts, they have been grounded in the target group by speakers who have negative attitudes towards its members. I will argue that such a causal theory of slurs does better than virtually any of its competitors and that, for the first time, it offers a complete account of the referential properties of slurs, i.e. of the fact that slurs can be used to refer to the target group. By extending the causal theory to other referring pejoratives, the proposed explanation promises not only a better understanding of slurs, but of pejorative language in general, opening up new ways of investigating evaluative terms. |
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20. April 22 | Mathias Frisch (Universität Hannover) |
Uses and Misuses of Scientific Models in Pandemic Policy Advice |
Abstract Some philosophers have criticized government decisions early in the pandemic to implement lockdown measures to control the spread of COVID-19 by arguing that these decisions were made on the basis of deeply uncertain evidence, even though restrictions of personal liberty would have required especially strong justification. In this talk I offer a two-pronged defense of these decisions: (1) In circumstances of extreme urgency, when there is an imminent risk of harm, the high evidentiary bar we might normally require to justify policies involving restrictions of liberties needs to be relaxed. And (2) When close attention is paid to the fact that models can be put to a wide variety of context-dependent purposes the case can be made that epidemiological models provided sufficiently good evidence to clear the lowered evidentiary bar. |
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4. Mai 22 | Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen) |
Varieties of Competition 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Competition as a principle of social organization is seen very differently in different academic disciplines: While economists often praise its efficiency-enhancing features, philosophers tend to worry about negative effects on solidarity, fairness, and the equal moral standing of all human beings. But are they actually talking about the same thing? In this paper, I suggest thinking about competition from a functional perspective and distinguishing different purposes of competition. I show that they have different implications for the institutional requirements of competition (such as starting conditions, competence of evaluators, or openness of entry) and that they lead to different notions of what can be counted as a failure of competition. Distinguishing different types of competition matters for several reasons. First, it allows a more nuanced discussion about what kinds of competitions are normative desirable and for what reasons. Second, it helps us better understand potential unintended side-effects of competition (which might be intended for one purpose but end up achieving a different purpose, e.g. because the institutional requirement were not in place). Third, it helps us diagnose cases in which arguments about competition are misapplied, often for ideological purposes: these are often cases in which it is claimed that one type of competition is given, while this is in fact not what the institutional requirements suggest and how participants experience the situation. By taking the varieties of competition seriously, we can better understand what forms of competition (if any) are worth having, while rejecting overarching claims that assume that competition will always be beneficial without acknowledging its harmful forms. |
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18. Mai 22 |
Luise Müller |
Democratic Equality, Social Asymmetries, and Algorithmic Decisionmaking 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract One fundamental puzzle in the philosophical study of authority is to explain why one person may make a decision over another even though persons are moral equals to one another in democratic societies. If it is the case that as citizens, we are all free and equal, how is it possible that others can make decisions over us that deeply influence, and often stifle, our autonomy, wellbeing and life plans? Why are we – as moral equals – dependent on other people’s decisions and control when it comes to, for example, school and university admission, grades, job applications, pay rises, criminal sentencing, or academic funding decisions? Many of those relations of authority are constituted by social asymmetries: between teacher and student, employer and employee, judge and defendant, administrator and petitioner, and so on. On the face of it, these social asymmetries – in power, status, or knowledge – seem incompatible with our equal moral status, because they enable some to control, or dominate, others. In the paper, I first explore what, if anything, makes these asymmetric relations morally problematic. I argue that we should be fundamentally concerned about the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within these relationships, instead of others metrics like contestability, accountability, transparency, or consent. Second, I ask whether substituting human judgement and decisionmaking with algorithmic decision-making – ‚rule by automation‘ (Sparks & Jayaram) – can alleviate the normatively problematic nature of some of these social asymmetries. Can algorithms free us from morally problematic relationships of control and authority? I argue that merely substituting human decisionmaking with algorithmic decisionmaking cannot free us, as long as it reproduces the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. Instead, we need to think about in which contexts deploying algorithmic decisionmaking can equalize the distribution of benefits and burdens (or advantages and disadvantages) within socially asymmetric relations. As an example, I discuss the relationship between physician and patient, which is traditionally characterised by an asymmetry of knowledge between both parties that potentially translates into a morally problematic asymmetry: physicians are able to influence, manipulate, and effectively control patients in virtue of their expert knowledge. Importantly, while consent is an important precondition of physician intervention, its capacity to ameliorate what is morally problematic about the asymmetry is limited. In such cases, algorithms can potentially free us if (and only if) they are deployed with the aim of balancing the distribution of burdens and benefits to the advantage of the patient. However, where this is not the case, algorithmic decisionmaking is no improvement on the status quo – in fact, it often leaves those disadvantaged in social asymmetries worse off. |
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1. Juni 22 | Hilkje C. Hänel (Universität Potsdam) |
Vulnerable Epistemic Identities |
Abstract Building on the idea of epistemic subjects as “individuals-in-communities” (Grasswick 2004) and knowledge as relational (cf. Pohlhaus 2012), the paper develops a theory of vulnerability as well as agency of fragile epistemic subjects. Feminist epistemologists have convincingly argued that the atomistic and self-sufficient view of knowers of much of classical epistemology is inadequate and have instead argued for knowers as being relationally situated within communities and social structures. Furthermore, standpoint epistemologists have found that an argument can be made for the epistemic privilege of marginalized knowers; yet, such privilege is not given necessarily qua social position or social identity but has to be acquired as a critical standpoint in communities. This paper takes these cues and argues for a theory of fragile epistemic subjects, showing that fragile epistemic subjects are positioned both advantageously as well as disadvantageously in epistemically charged situations. The paper aims to show the dialectical relationship between vulnerability and agency by drawing on examples from philosophy of disability, philosophy of children, and philosophy of migration. Finally, the paper argues that the dialectical relationship which fragile epistemic subjects have to navigate can be best explained by lessons from recognition theory. |
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15. Juni 22 | Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin) |
The Epistemology of Agentive Modality 18:15 - 19:45 Uhr |
Abstract Agentive modality is the modality that is directly relevant for our actions, and expressed with what is sometimes called “agentive modals”: abilities, options, affordances, and so on. Our knowledge of agentive modality provides a plausible starting point for a naturalized modal epistemology, but there has been little discussion of it. I argue that agentive modality is not accounted for by extant approaches in modal epistemology, and provide the beginnings of a more promising approach based in the experience of our own agency. |
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29. Juni 22 | Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford) |
Mere Permutations of Individuals |
Abstract Anti-haecceitism is the thesis that every truth is necessitated by the qualitative truths, and haecceitism is its denial. I shall present a new framework for theorising about the many forms of haecceitism. This framework, I shall argue, allows one to identify key commitments of haecceitists which are obscured by viewing them as mere common deniers of a single supervenience thesis. I will then use these observations to advance a novel argument about the connection between haecceitism and supervenience. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommeremester 2022 wird organisiert von Stefan Rinner
Email: stefan.rinner(at)uni-hamburg.de(stefan.rinner"AT"uni-hamburg.de)
Wintersemester 2021/22
Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 21-22
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Jasper Lohmar.
Das Institutskolloquium findet i. d. R. 14-tägig mittwochs um 17 Uhr c. t. digital per Zoom statt.
Wichtig: Wer den Zoom-Link erhalten möchte, schickt bitte eine Mail an: Jasper Lohmar : jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de)
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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13.10.21 | Elizabeth Barnes (University of Virginia) |
Ameliorative Skepticism and the Nature of Health 17-19 Uhr Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt! Für den Zoom-Link wenden Sie sich bitte an Jasper Lohmar: jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de) |
Abstract NN |
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27.10.21 | Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (Universität Bern) |
Interventionist Causal Exclusion: Taking Stock of the Debate |
Abstract Proponents of interventionism typically try to avoid this problem by arguing that variables standing in supervenience relations to the cause variable under consideration need not be kept fixed when intervening on the cause variable. It is controversial, however, whether this exemption should apply to all possible variables standing in a supervenience relation to the cause variable or only to variables contained in the same causal model as the cause variable. I argue that the former option has problematic consequences. However, assuming that the exemption applies only to variables contained in the same model as the cause variable renders the notion of causation model relative – a consequence that many interventionists find unpalatable. I conclude by showing that this consequence |
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10.11.21 | Julian Müller (Universität Hamburg) |
Equal Moral Standing and Noxious Markets 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract In "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale", Debra Satz (2012) develops a framework for morally assessing market exchanges. The core idea is that a market exchange is a social practice that generates externalities that extend well beyond the immediate vicinity of the exchange itself. Satz’s key claim is that market exchanges generate social externalities that affect the social fabric of democratic society itself. In Satz’s view, unregulated markets permit particular kinds of exchanges that do not cohere well – if at all – with a fundamental democratic ideal, that of equal social standing. This paper pursues four goals: First, I will reconstruct the normative principle, the principle of equal social status (PESS), underlying Satz's noxious markets framework. Secondly, I will demonstrate that PESS is seriously defective. Thirdly, I will reveal the reasons why it is defective – it rests on an erroneous analogy between social and economic externalities. Finally, I will present a revised version of the PESS that does not seem to generate counter-intuitive moral judgements and can thus better support the concept of noxious markets. |
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24.11.21 | Annina Loets (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) |
Intersectional Disadvantage 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract |
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08.12.21 | Jakob Huber (Freie Universität Berlin) |
In Defense of Despair Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt! |
Abstract Despair has a bad reputation among philosophers: in contrast to its antidote hope, which is deemed to motivate and strengthen our resolve, despair is considered unproductive, impotent or even nihilistic. Against this narrative, in this talk I argue that in scenarios where we are highly invested in an unlikely end, despair can be justified both intrinsically and instrumentally. On the one hand, despair can be fitting as an expression of an agent’s reluctance to give up on an end even though they may not currently be able to see how it may come about. On the other hand, in disposing us to critically reflect on our goals and ways to realize them, despair can protect us from fixation and thus helps us to hope well. To play this productive role in our practical lives, however, despair has to be transient (rather than permanent) and specific (rather than fundamental). |
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05.01.22 | Rob Trueman (University of York) |
A fictionalist theory of universals Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt! |
Abstract Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do. |
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19.01.22 | Kristina Lepold (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) |
Non-Ideal Theory and Critical Theory: What They Are About and Why Neither is (Completely) Right Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt! |
Abstract |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 21-22 wird organisiert von Jasper Lohmar
Email: jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de)
Sommersemester 2021
Das Institutskolloquium Sommersemester 21
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von der Emmy-Noether Gruppe "Relevanz"
Aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie finden die Termine mittwochs von 17-19 Uhr nur digital statt!
Wer den Zoom-Link erhalten möchte, schickt bitte eine Mail an:
Dr. Stephan Krämer : stephan.kraemer@uni-hamburg.de
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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7.04.21 | Christine Straehle (Universität Hamburg) |
Vulnerability, Autonomy and the Limits of Epistemology 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract
Vulnerability has often been described as an inherently human characteristic. In this ontological sense, humans are vulnerable due to the embodied nature of human lives. A second way of conceptualizing vulnerability has proposed it as a constraint to individual autonomy. The argument then is that those who are vulnerable are not able to take decisions about the course of their lives since their decision-making capacity is hampered by dependency on the acts of another. Accordingly, morally problematic vulnerability arises in interaction with another. In this paper, I explore the concept of vulnerability with these two uses in mind. I suggest that a neglected aspect of individual vulnerability is the limits it may pose for epistemological capacity. In particular, I am interested in how specific circumstances of individual vulnerability may challenge the role individual introspection can play in leading autonomous lives. I want to argue that individual vulnerability can jeopardize the role introspection is usually assumed to play in deciding what course we hope to give our lives. In some cases of vulnerability, individuals may not be able to endorse and take responsibility for choices they make due to the fact that they don’t trust their introspective knowledge. In this way, vulnerable individuals loose the authoritative grip on their introspective self-knowledge. Yet self-knowledge is a vital condition of individual autonomy: without self-knowledge, individuals lack the internal requirements of personal autonomy. |
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21.04.21 | Gabriel Gottlieb (Xavier University) |
Fichte on Rape |
Abstract In this essay, I examine Fichte's brief remarks on rape in his Foundations of Natural Right. My aim is to assess his conception of the harm of rape and to situate his discussion within the context of his theory of sexual politics generally and his theory of marriage in particular. I employ the work of the feminist philosopher Rae Langton to assess the extent to which his remarks on rape and marriage are compatible with his egalitarianism and theory of mutual recognition, both of which are central to his theory of right. |
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5.05.21 | Ben Colburn (University of Glasgow) |
Intergenerational Moral Blackmail 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract Moral blackmail is a phenomenon whereby one agent forces some other agent to act in a particular way by making it morally impermissible for them to act otherwise. In this paper I explain this phenomenon, and argue that in the arena of intergenerational justice moral blackmail is an under-recognised but ubiquitous problem. Understanding that helps us see who should bear the costs of environmental risk and reparative justice, and thereby lays the foundations of a theory which deals adequately with diachronic as well as synchronic injustice. |
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19.05.21 | Martin Glazier (Universität Hamburg) |
Buridan’s Mereology of Stuff 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract |
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02.06.21 | Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) |
Fundamentality Without Favour 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract According to a widely endorsed conception of fundamentality, the metaphysically fundamental is characterized in terms of a certain privileged metaphysical dependence relation or set of relations: something is fundamental just in case it does depend on anything else, relative to the privileged relation or set of relations. Let us say that such a conception of fundamentality is ‘favouritist’, for it favours a unique property as the mark of the fundamental. First, I argue that a single fundamentality property cannot do all the work we need fundamentality to do. Second, I show that a single fundamentality property—fundamentality simpliciter—characterized in terms of a single metaphysical dependence relation or set of relations is either objectionably arbitrary or incoherent, and so cannot be privileged as the mark of the fundamental. I then use these two claims to motivate the need for an ecumenical conception of fundamentality that embraces multiple fundamentality properties. On this conception, there is no one privileged relation or set of relations that can determine what is fundamental simpliciter. Instead, an entity qualifies as fundamental relative to a given metaphysical dependence relation just in case it does not depend on anything else, relative to that relation. |
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16.06.21 | Maegan Fairchild (University of Michigan) |
Fuzzy Plenitude 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract TBA |
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30.06.21 | Nils-Henner Stear (University of Auburn) |
Intimate Relations: On the Ethical Question and the 'Qua Problem' 17-19 Uhr |
Abstract TBA |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 21 wird organisiert von der Emmy-Noether Gruppe "Relevanz"
stephan.kraemer@uni-hamburg.de
Wintersemester 2020/21
Das Institutskolloquium Wintersemester 20/21 Poster
Leider fällt der Vortrag von Shyane Siriwardena am 20.1.21 aus.
Wir bitten um Ihr Verständnis
Diese Daten können sich aufgrund neuer Umstände ändern. Bitte lesen Sie regelmäßig unsere aktuellen Meldungen für eventuelle Änderungen. Allgemeine Corona-Updates der Universität Hamburg finden Sie hier: https://www.uni-hamburg.de/newsroom/intern/2020/0131-corona-faq.html.
Das Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Esther Neuhann.
Aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie finden die Termine mittwochs um 18 Uhr nur digital statt!
Wer den Zoom-Link erhalten möchte, schickt bitte eine Mail an:
esther.neuhann"AT"uni-hamburg.de
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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4.11.20 | Moritz Schulz (Universität Hamburg) |
Not knowing what to do — epistemicism about parity 18-20 Uhr |
Abstract NN | ||
2.12.20 | Tim Crane (Central European University, Wien) |
How to explain Intentionality |
Abstract Philosophical theories of intentionality typically assume that explaining intentionality or mental representation must answer what I call the ‘question of aboutness’: what makes it the case that one thing is about or represents another? Moreover, this is supposed to be a general requirement on theories of intentionality, regardless of one’s metaphysical position (materialism, dualism etc). In this talk I argue that there is no such general requirement, and that explaining intentionality does not require answering the question of aboutness. |
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16.12. | Berislav Marušić (University of Edinburgh) |
Endless Love 18-20 Uhr |
Abstract
It is not an empirical question, for me, how long I will love my children or my spouse. Indeed, this is not a question for me at all: The question of how long I will love them is not separate from the question of whether I love them. Love, in its self-consciousness, is endless. |
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6.1.21 | Christine Bratu (Universität Göttingen) |
Wrongs to Do with Thoughts? How to Understand Doxastic Wronging. 18-20 Uhr |
Abstract Can we wrong each other just by entertaining certain beliefs about each other? For instance, does another person wrong me if she believes that my talk will be boring because I am woman? So far, authors who are interested in the possibility of so called doxastic wronging have tried to answer such questions by focusing on issues of control and coordination. In this talk, I raise a different point by discussing whether the idea of doxastic wronging is compatible with a liberal normative commitment. To do so, I first show that there are two ways to interpret the phenomenon of doxastic wronging, a harm-based one and an obligation-based one. Then I argue that only the harm-based interpretation is compatible with the so called liberal principle and, more specifically, freedom of thought. Engaging with this moral issue reveals that the wrong-making feature of doxastic wronging lies in the harm it constitutes for its targets and not, as an obligation-based interpretation would have it, in the violation of a morally grounded epistemic obligation. |
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20.1.21 | Shyane Siriwardena (Leeds) |
Counterfactuals and Learning 18-20 Uhr |
Abstract he uses of counterfactuals are many and varied. In ordinary language, we appear to use counterfactuals when expressing regret or relief: e.g. “If I had studied more, I would have passed the test” or “If I had left any later, I would have missed the train.” In general, we can understand the purpose of these sorts of counterfactuals as tools for learning. To demonstrate, we will explain how counterfactuals can serve this purpose on two different semantics of counterfactuals: Lewisian possible-world semantics, and Edgington’s conditional chances account. Following this, we will consider two recalcitrant cases where this story seems to breakdown: Morgenbesser cases, and backtracking counterfactuals. We will diagnose the problem by arguing that the conflict arises from the structural similarities these cases share with those from which we can learn; in short, these cases look like ordinary learning opportunities, but have peculiarities that make them ill-suited for this. We will then argue that this nevertheless does not undermine the initial claim that counterfactuals are at times used for the purpose of learning. Indeed, in seeking to explicate, rather than analyse, counterfactuals, we are better able to accommodate the heterogenous uses to which these conditionals are put. (This paper is jointly written with Prof. John Divers.) |
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3.2.21 | Costanza Porro (Universität Hamburg) |
Moral Equality and Vulnerability: Towards a Relational Approach 18-20 Uhr |
Abstract Moral equality is often grounded in the possession of some value-conferring intrinsic property of individuals, typically identified in psychological capacities related to the ability to be autonomous agents (Rawls 1971; Carter 2011). While these theories have already been the object of criticism (McMahan 2007), in this paper I argue that the concept of vulnerability can be used to formulate a further objection to them. Like many other parts of moral and political philosophy, such as social contract theory, this debate is also vitiated by a conception of the person centred around self-sufficiency and independence as these theories disregard the fact that the possession of moral autonomy, far from being a natural datum, depends on the existence of certain social arrangements and relationships. I argue that a better approach to the basis of moral equality is to look at human vulnerability. Unlike other recent proposals, I do not opt for a negative conception of equality, which starts from the wrongness of inequality and conceive of vulnerability exclusively in connection with potential attacks to one’s sense of self (Sangiovanni 2017). Instead, I focus on the fact that vulnerability is also constitutive of very many valuable moral and political relationships, such as those of love, care, mutual recognition and respect. I argue that our commitment to moral equality is justified by the value of these relationships, together with the wrongness and harms of inequality, because only when and if and we treat each other as moral equals we can be part of relationships of love, care, mutual recognition and respect. My aim is to develop a relational account of the basis of moral equality, which fully captures the significance of vulnerability and is immune to the objections moved against traditional accounts (McMahan 2007) and the criticisms of Sangiovanni’s relational proposal (Floris 2019). Abstract NN |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 20/21 wird organisiert von Esther Neuhann
Wintersemester 2019/20
Programm WiSe 2019/20 (Poster)
Bitte beachten: Im WiSe 2019/20 findet das Institutskolloquium im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäude der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Allee 1 statt (Lagebeschreibung des AS-Saals).
ACHTUNG PEP-Weihnachtsvorlesung, Hörsaal A, ESA 1
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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16.10.19 | BIRGIT RECKI (Universität Hamburg) |
Hans Blumenbergs ungeschriebene Ästhetik AS-Saal 18-22 Uhr |
„Von nichts wimmelt unsere Zeit so sehr als von Ästhetikern.“ Jean Pauls maliziöse Notiz von 1804, gerade zwei Generationen nach der Initiation der neuen philosophischen Disziplin durch Baumgarten und Meier geäußert, könnte auch von Hans Blumenberg stammen. In der Zeit seiner reifen Philosophie, in den Jahren seines Wirkens (Münster 1970-1985), hat sich Blumenberg – in Vorlesungen wie in veröffentlichten Texten – immer wieder einmal missmutig, auch abfällig gegen die Konjunktur der philosophischen Ästhetik ausgesprochen. Was denn falsch (gewesen) sein könnte am Auftrieb der Ästhetik, ist nicht leicht zu sehen. Denn dem Leser Blumenbergs muss das ablehnende Urteil als performativer Selbstwiderspruch erscheinen: Allzu auffällig ist die ästhetische Appetenz, die aus seinen Texten spricht. Der Vortrag sammelt die membra disiecta der ungeschriebenen Ästhetik Hans Blumenbergs ein und gibt eine Antwort auf die Frage, wieso diese Ästhetik nicht geschrieben wurde. |
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30.10.19 | NICK JONES (University of Birmingham) |
Type Neutrality AS-Saal 18-20 Uhr |
What kind of language should we use for metaphysical theorising? One prominent programme employs primitive higher-order quantifiers in the language of metaphysics. This programme faces two related objections: 1. There is an expressibility deficit: many important claims about the hierarchy of higher-order entities cannot be expressed in the language. 2. Higher-order theories can always be converted into first-order theories by translating into a first-order language containing predicates for each level of the hierarchy. This appears to both increase expressivity, and to make the complex syntax of higher-order languages unnecessary and metaphysically insignificant. I will respond to both problems. I will first present six attractive properties one might naturally want from a language of metaphysics, and show that no language can have all six properties. I then show how a standard kind of higher-order language arises naturally from failure of one of these properties, which I call Type Neutrality. After distinguishing two ways to lack Type Neutrality, I argue that only one of these ways resolves the incompatibility between the initial six properties. I close by defending languages that lack Type Neutrality in this way against problems (1) and (2). Against (1), I argue that the apparent expressive deficit is merely illusory. Against (2), I argue for two claims. Firstly, first-orderisation changes the subject, rather than delivering a different syntactic means of theorising about the same subject. Secondly, nobody motivated by expressibility concerns should adopt a first-order language; for analogous expressive limitations afflict all first-order languages. If there is time, I will also present two problems for languages not subject to those expressive limitations. Firstly, they treat as meaningful many questions that are not really so. Secondly, they suffer expressive limitations of their own, because they require unattractive restrictions on quantification. |
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13.11.19 | MILJANA MILOJEVIC (University of Belgrade) |
Persons, minds and bodies AS-Saal 18-20 Uhr |
In this talk I will present one novel account of personhood and personal persistence conditions. The account I will be defending is inspired by unsatisfactory state of the current debate about the nature of persons, and it strives to unite different aspects of biological and psychological accounts of personhood. It starts from the basic assumptions of neo-Lockean, Parfitian psychological accounts of personhood, but it also adopts several insights from a number of novel approaches to mind and cognition, in particular the assumption that cognition is deeply embodied, embedded and sometimes extended. By expanding the physical base of the mental and the cognitive, the offered account attempts to re-marry the mind and the body in a new way. Thus, my primary focus will be on the reconciliation of the two views about persons – that persons are thinking narrative selves and that persons are animals – but this time not through psychologization of biology, as it was done in Ancient times, but through biologization of psychology. The proposed account will be able to solve many of the problems that other accounts face, or so I will argue, such as the problem of spatial coincidence of objects, “too-many thinkers problem”, contingency of identity, etc. On the other hand, this view will adopt and defend several seemingly radical claims, such as the claim that persons are properties and not individuals, and the claim that persons can be partially constituted of parts of the environement. | ||
27.11.19 | TAMARA JUGOV (Freie Universität Berlin) |
Strukturelle Beherrschung AS-Saal 18-20 Uhr |
Viele Menschen teilen den Eindruck, dass sie nicht mehr durch konkrete Andere – etwa ihre Ehemänner, Chefs oder Vermieter – beherrscht werden. Stattdessen fühlen sie sich in einem diffuseren Sinne durch „den“ Sexismus, Kapitalismus oder den Wohnungsmarkt beherrscht. Wie können wir das verstehen und konzeptualisieren? Diesbezüglich mache ich zwei Vorschläge: Erstens, so argumentiere ich, verleihen sexistische oder kapitalistische soziale Praktiken und Regeln den Mitgliedern mancher sozialer Gruppen – etwa Ehemännern oder Chefs – willkürliche soziale Macht über andere. Ich argumentiere, dass diese soziale Macht strukturell konstituiert und robust ist: Personen „haben“ diese, auch wenn sie keine intentionalen Zustände in Bezug auf die Ausübung solcher willkürlicher robuster Macht haben. Zweitens müssen wir danach fragen, wer für diejenigen sozialen Praktiken und Regeln verantwortlich gemacht werden kann, die soziale Macht willkürlich verteilen. | ||
11.12.19 | KAUSHIK BASU (Cornell University, New York) |
PEP-WEIHNACHTSVORLESUNG |
Kaushik Basu is an Indian economist who was Chief Economist of the World Bank from 2012 to 2016. He is the Carl Marks Professor of International Studies and Professor of Economics at Cornell University, and began a three-year term as President of the International Economic Association in June 2017. From 2009 to 2012, during the United Progressive Alliance's second term, Basu served as the Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India. Basu is a columnist for BBC News Online, the Hindustan Times, Business Standard and is the author of several books on economics and a play, “Crossings at Benaras Junction”(published in The Little Magazine, 2005). His book, Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics, was published in 2011 by Princeton University Press and Penguin, India, and has been translated into Italian, Chinese, Russian, Spanish and Japanese. His most recent book is The Republic of Beliefs (Princeton, 2018) proposes a fresh way of thinking that will enable more effective laws and a fairer society. Basu believes that good moral qualities are essential for growth and development within the economy. Honesty, trustworthiness and integrity are important qualities that need to be inculcated in an individual for personal development as well as within the society for development. Basu also feels the need to promote quality thinking in government and public debate. |
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08.01.20 |
HAMID TAIEB |
Meinong on Varieties of Concepts |
Meinong was not only interested in developing a theory of objects, but he also wanted to have a satisfying account of our representations of them, including of our general representations, or concepts. He was identifying in a fined-grained manner various kinds of concepts, namely those based on abstraction, those based on imprecision, and those based on association of ideas; while the first and second seem to gather together things which have relations of identity, the third kind of concepts have in their extension more or less similar items organized around a so-called “type”. Thanks to these distinctions, Meinong thought to adequately map our various sorts of general representations and the different ways we acquire them. In my paper, I will, first, carefully reconstruct his account and, second, compare it to contemporary views on concept structure, more precisely the definitional account and the prototype theory, in order to evaluate the originality and philosophical relevance of Meinong’s position. | ||
22.01.20 | ALEX STEINBERG (Universität Bielefeld) |
Fregean that-clause semantics |
Frege famously argued for the view that expressions do not only have a denotation (Bedeutung) but also a sense (Sinn) that determines that denotation. For reasons of compositionality he also claimed that within that-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions and speech act reports expressions do not denote their ordinary denotations but their ordinary senses (he called the former their gerade Bedeutung the latter their ungerade Bedeutung). Frege did not present a systematic semantics of that-clauses that would bear out this denotation shift thesis. Indeed, some have argued that any such semantics would have to incorrectly predict the validity of certain inferences (e.g., ‘Ann believes that Hesperus is a star. Therefore, there is a sense that Ann believes to be a star.’) while failing to predict the validity of others (e.g., ‘Ann believes that Hesperus is a star. Hesperus is a planet. Therefore, there is a planet that Ann believes to be a star.’). In this talk I show that this suggestion is based on a naïve view of the semantics of variables (or traces or pronouns) within that-clauses. In effect, there are at least three Frege-friendly ways for accounting for the behaviour of variables within that-clauses that get inferential relations right. In a second part I will sketch and contrast these three alternatives. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 2019/20 wird organisiert von Julia Zakkou
Sommersemester 2019
Programm SoSe 2019
Bitte beachten: Im SoSe 2019 findet das Institutskolloquium im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäude der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Allee 1 statt und am 8.5., 5.6., 10.7. im Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097.
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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03.04.19 | Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt University Berlin) |
Zur Theorie und Ethik des Lügens AS-Saal |
Was ist eine Lüge? Wie unterscheiden sich Lügen von Irreführungen? In der philosophischen Debatte zum Lügen ist ein Ansatz populär, der beide Fragen mithilfe des Begriffs des Gesagten beantwortet: Um zu lügen, muss man etwas sagen, das man für falsch hält. Und der Hauptunterschied zwischen Lügen und Irreführungen liegt eben im Gesagten. Ich werde diesen Ansatz kritisieren und dafür argumentieren, dass es stattdessen darauf ankommt, worauf man sich mit einer Äußerung festlegt. Mit einer Lüge, nicht aber mit einer irreführenden Äußerung, legt man sich auf etwas fest, das man für falsch hält. Ich werde zeigen, dass dieser Ansatz der Vielfalt des Lügens besser gerecht wird. Und ich werde auf die Auswirkungen für die ethische Debatte zum Lügen eingehen, etwa für die Frage, ob es moralisch relevante Unterschiede zwischen Lügen und Irreführungen gibt | ||
17.04.19 | Norbert Paulo (University of Salzburg) |
Intuition-driven Romanticism? X-Phi’s Unreliable Intuitions Objection Against Reflective Equilibrium AS-Saal |
Reflective equilibrium (RE) has been criticized for various reasons ever since the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Recent empirical research into moral decision-making poses new challenges to RE because it questions the reliability of moral intuitions. This research might discredit moral intuitionism in general and RE in particular insofar as it ascribes epistemic value to moral intuitions. If it could be shown that all or certain kinds of moral intuitions are unreliable, this would diminish the plausibility of the claim that they provide good reasons to believe in the truth of their content, especially given the growing evidence that professional philosophers are just as biased and susceptible to distorting factors as lay people. In this paper I discuss, and ultimately reject, recent defenses of RE against the unreliable intuitions objection. I conclude with a discussion of the broader philosophical implications of this objection, specifically whether or not accepting it would warrant skepticism regarding moral knowledge. | ||
08.05.19 | Andrew Brenner (Gothenburg) |
Conditional Probabilities and Symmetric Grounding Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097 |
Some facts obtain in virtue of other facts. In these cases we might say that the former fact(s) is grounded in the latter fact(s). In recent metaphysics grounding has received a great deal of attention. One dispute regarding grounding concerns grounding's logical properties. While grounding is generally characterized as being transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric, each of these alleged properties of grounding has come under attack. In this paper I will present what I take to be a new counterexample to the asymmetry of grounding. The basic idea is that there are at least some cases in which the conditional probability of some proposition (i.e., P(A/B)) is partially grounded in the inverse conditional probability (i.e., P(B/A)), while the inverse conditional probability is in turn partially grounded in the original conditional probability. | ||
22.05.19 | Joshua Preiss (Mankato) |
Equality and Opportunity in Winner-Take-All Societies AS-Saal |
This paper considers alternative understandings of equality and opportunity: fair race and honest good work. In addition to their political salience, these principles capture the normative core of much contemporary theorizing on economic justice. Rather than providing an abstract, de-contextualized argument for one them, this paper proceeds by reference to changes in contemporary political economy. In a Smithian Well-Ordered Society (SWO) of rapid, broad-based gains from economic growth, it makes sense for both political actors and political philosophers to give normative and policy priority to fair race, including anti-discrimination and educational policies aimed at providing a more level playing field. As we move toward a Winner-Take-All Society (WTA) of slower growth and declining absolute mobility, where the fruits of that growth are increasingly concentrated among a relatively small number of “winners” in the economy, the concerns reflected in honest good work become more pressing, while the idea of a fair race increasingly fails to capture what most matters to citizens. In addition, when we take seriously the politics of WTA, rather than bracketing politics to focus on normative or economic analysis, it becomes clear that even those who believe that the fairness of competition is all that matters for justice need to address trends toward WTA. While separable in theory, the politics and policy of fair race cannot be maintained in a political economy where the promise of honest good work regularly goes unfulfilled. | ||
05.06.19 | Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (University of Reykjavik) |
Can the Reality of Money be Doubted? |
The focus of this talk is to consider what kind of answer can be given to the question “What is money?” from a metaphysical perspective. Relevant questions are: “What does it take for something to qualify as money?” and “In what does monetary value consist?”. When money is considered from this point of view, it becomes clear that it is very much defined by its value and also that it is a social object or a social kind. For various reasons, people often wonder whether social objects should be considered real and there may be further reasons to doubt the reality of monetary value. At least it is often said that the value of money is not “real” as opposed to other kinds of value that is then considered more “real”. On the other hand, this stance may appear strange, given that people strive hard to earn money, and striving for something that is not real might seem puzzling. I introduce some theories that have been held about money and monetary value and connect them to a discussion of whether and in what sense the reality of money or monetary value could plausibly be doubted. Among other things, I discuss different senses of ‘real’ and argue that money is the type of social kind that is sensitive to the so-called ‘looping effect’. |
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26.06.19 |
Lee Walters |
The Linguistic Approach to Meta-Ontology |
The Fregean thinks that all serious true discourse consisting of subject-predicate sentences commits us to objects corresponding to the discourse’s singular terms. Similarly, serious first order quantification commits us to a domain of objects. Thomas Hofweber rejects these two elements of Fregeanism by focusing on the various roles that singular terms and quantifiers play. Regardless of whether Hofweber is correct, we should reject the Fregean picture by focussing on the various roles predicates can play. This in turn has implications for second-order ontology. | ||
10.07.19 | Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (University of Aarhus) |
Epistemic Akrasia and Doxastic Resilience Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097 |
Could it be rational to at once believe that p, and believe that believing p is irrational? That is, could epistemic akrasia ever be rational? Common sense speaks against this possibility. But several authors have argued that some cases of misleading higher-order evidence in fact require one to be akratic. If I have sufficient evidence that p, and sufficient albeit misleading higher-order evidence that my evidence does not support believing p, it seems that I would believe against my evidence if I didn’t both believe that p, and believe that believing p is irrational. Yet, a feeling of irrationality remains. In this talk, I explore an explanation of such cases in terms of doxastic resilience. I have recently argued that higher-order evidence can undermine the resilience of a credence, without undermining its level. Since categorical belief involves not only a high level of credence, but also high resilience, this means that higher-order evidence can undermine belief without undermining a high level of credence. This offers a way of respecting both one’s first- and higher-order evidence, without being akratic. The first-order evidence should be reflected in a high credence, while the higher-order evidence should be reflected in a low resilience, and hence the absence of categorical belief. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2019 wird organisiert von Julian Müller
Wintersemester 2018/19
Programm WiSe 2018/19 (Poster)
Bitte beachten: Im WiSe 20182/019 findet das Institutskolloquium im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäudes der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Alle 1 statt (Lagebeschreibung des AS-Saals) und am 21.11.2018 im Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03080.
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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17.10.2018 | Karolina Krzyżanowska (Amsterdam) | True clauses, false connections, and indicative conditionals: What Grice got wrong |
True clauses, false connections, and indicative conditionals: What Grice got wrong Abstract: The majority of theories of indicative conditionals validate the Principle of Conjunctive Sufficiency. That is, on those accounts, whenever the antecedent, P, and the consequent, Q, are true, the conditional, “If P then Q," is acceptable, whether or not there is a meaningful connection between P and Q. At the same time, almost everyone seems to agree that conditionals without a connection are odd. Gricean explanation of the oddity of missing-link conditionals rests on an observation that such conditionals are rendered highly acceptable only in situations in which a stronger assertion, for instance, that of a conjunction of P and Q, is warranted. Asserting a weaker, less informative conditional is odd because it is a violation of the Maxim of Quantity. In my talk, I will present empirical data that challenge Gricean explanation of why missing-link conditionals are odd. Furthermore, I will argue that these findings can be reconciled with general principles of Gricean pragmatics, but at the cost of giving up Conjunctive Sufficiency. |
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14.11.2018 | Franziska Poprawe (...) | Reasoning without Reasons |
The current debate on reasoning centres on two major questions: I) What is reasoning (or inference)? II) What is correct reasoning? Reasoning is here understood as the mental activity through which we derivatively form beliefs and intentions on the basis of some premises. A dominant view in the debate is the so-called Reasons View, according to which (I) the nature and (II) the correctness of reasoning can be explained in terms of normative reasons. Put roughly, the view is that reasoning is a way of responding to reasons and you reason correctly only if the premises are (good) reasons for the conclusion. I first argue that the Reasons View is underdeveloped. Though many authors assume a close relation between reasoning and normative reasons, few defend it in detail. I then argue that recently proposed accounts are untenable. The prospects of the Reasons View look dim. Reasoning is not essentially responding to reasons, and the standard of correctness of reasoning does not derive from normative reasons for belief and action. The arguments suggest that we can explain the nature and correctness of reasoning in more fundamental normative terms. I end my exploring this path towards a novel theory of reasoning. | ||
21.11.2018 | Patricia Rich (Hamburg) | Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03080 Rational Choice of Research Paradigms |
It is a familiar empirical fact that different scientists with the same broad goal may employ different methods, pursue different theories, and even work within different paradigms. We generally agree, moreover, that we are more likely to achieve research goals as a result of this diversity. For example, developing and testing multiple theories makes it more likely that we ultimately identify the "right" one. That we evaluate the status quo positively does not mean that we have explained it or that we can evaluate the individual scientists positively, though; basic questions remain. First, if each scientist rationally assesses the relevant evidence and rationally chooses which method / theory / paradigm to pursue, how can different scientists make such different choices? It is an open question whether the individual choices that we see are indeed rational. The second question is then how best to explain the current diversity of research. To put it provocatively, do we owe the healthy diversity of science to the irrationality of the scientists? In this talk, I pursue a new hypothesis, namely that scientific diversity arises from rational strategic choices by the individual scientists; that is, the scientists choose rationally given that the consequences to each individual depend not only on their choice, but also on how the other scientists choose. To investigate this hypothesis, I construct a simple model in which two scientists independently choose which of two projects to pursue. Their payoffs depend on whether at least one of them works on the correct project, as well as which of them has done the work. The model shows that for some ways of valuing research success, it is rational for each scientist to sometimes pursue the less promising option (for example because they are less likely to share the credit if successful). I discuss how we should intepret the model, the advantages of this modeling approach, and how to extrapolate from the model to actual scientific practice. I conclude that diversity in research can be rationalized in an important sense and that strategic considerations are an important part of the story. | ||
28.11.2018 | Insa Lawler (Bochum) | Knowing why and gradability |
We not only want to know whether things are the case but also why they are the case. Like other forms of so-called knowledge-wh, knowing why p is commonly analyzed in terms of knowledge-that: One knows why p iff one knows that p because q, for some q. One knows why a particular chemical reaction occurred iff one knows that it occurred because, say, oxygen was introduced. However, in contrast to knowing that p, knowing why p varies in depth and quality. Intuitively, one cannot know better than someone else that the chemical reaction occurred, but one can clearly know better why it occurred. Prima facie, knowing why is gradable. Can knowing why p nonetheless be analyzed in terms of p because q knowledge? And what is the nature of the apparent gradability? In my talk, I tackle these questions, drawing on insights from linguistics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. | ||
12.12.2018 | Katerina Deligiorgi (Sussex) | Morality and nature: A contemporary challenge to Kantian ethics |
My talk examines a proposal for naturalising moral norms inspired by Aristotle, defended originally by Philippa Foot (2001) and subsequently by Michael Thompson (2003, 2004, 2008). This strand of neo-Aristotelianism is of special interest from a Kantian perspective for a number of reasons. First, like Kantian ethics, Aristotelian ethics within this tradition is objectivist. However, and this is considered to be an advantage, it is also resolutely naturalist, unlike some -perhaps most- versions of Kantianism. Secondly, neo-Aristotelean ethics is based on a conception of humanity rather than of rationality. This is considered an advantage for dealing with substantive ethical questions, because Aristotelean ethics is better equipped to deal with the complexity and variety of human life, but also importantly, from a meta-ethical perspective because it has a more plausible account of practical reasoning, one that is more integrated to how human beings actually reason, than the Kantian one. Finally, because legislation is not the core notion of such an ethics, the problem of the authority of the moral law, a problem originally identified by Elisabeth Anscombe (1958) as being particularly tricky for Kant’s moral philosophy, simply does not arise. In summary then, Aristotelian ethics has the resources to address a range of first and second order ethical questions in a way that offers comparative advantages to Kantian ethics. My talk examines some of these questions, narrowing my remit to second-order questions about the nature of the good and the authority of norms. My aim is to motivate a Kantian non-naturalist response to this important neo-Aristotelian challenge. | ||
09.01.2019 | Mirela Fuš (Oslo) (St. Andrews) | The Unity and Scope of Conceptual Engineering |
A growing group of philosophers has recently taken up and extended Carnap's project of explication, which “consists in transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the second” (Carnap 1950: 3). In contemporary philosophical methodology, these projects go by different names, one of the most prominent being called Conceptual Engineering (see Blackburn (1999), Brandom (2001), Chalmers (2011), Scharp (2013), Eklund (2014, 2015), Cappelen (2018)). In this talk, I’m interested in answering the Nature Question of Conceptual Engineering or what engineering projects in philosophy are. The talk has a negative part and a positive part. In the negative part, I claim that anybody who wants to answer the Nature Question faces two problems: (i) the Unity Challenge — the field is highly disunited, and (ii) the Scope Challenge — we haven’t even reached a consensus about what its scope is. In the positive part, I then indirectly answer the Nature Question by, firstly, looking at issues concerning Unity, and, secondly, issues concerning Scope of Conceptual Engineering. Finally, as part of an answer to the aforementioned challenges, I propose the introduction of Philosophical Engineering. | ||
16.01.2019 | Corine Besson (Sussex) | Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the A Priori |
It is widely held that logic is a priori. It is also widely held that so-called “anti-exceptionalism” about logic, according to which the methods of logic are continuous with that of the sciences, is incompatible with its apriority. This talk explores the nature of this alleged incompatibility and finds that there is room for the a priori within the anti-exceptionalist programme. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 2018/2019 wird organisiert von Sergiu Spatan
Sommersemester 2018
Programm SoSe 2018 (Poster)
Bitte beachten: Im SoSe 2018 findet das Institutskolloquium im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäudes der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Alle 1 statt (Lagebeschreibung des AS-Saals ).
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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04.04.2018 | Ralf Bader (Oxford) | Incompleteness and Dynamic Consistency |
When dealing with incomplete preference or betterness orderings, expansion consistency condition beta is violated. As a result, incompleteness can give rise to dynamic inconsistency. This paper develops global choice principles that ensure dynamic consistency. | ||
25.04.2018 | Anna Maria Eder (Köln) | No Commitment to the Truth |
tbd | ||
09.05.2018 | Katharina Felka (Uppsala) | Slurs as Asides |
In this talk I develop a variant of a conventional implicature view, which combines Bach's thesis that the derogative contribution of a slur is comparable to the contribution of a side remark with Pott's linguistic analysis of side remarks. In doing so, I firstly point out the difficulties for (genuinely) semantic and pragmatic views about slurs. Secondly, I develop a conventional implicature view and show how this view can avoid the difficulties. Finally, I defend the developed view against objections. | ||
06.06.2018 | Pär Sundström (Umeå) | Thinking about Things via their Properties |
I can think about many spatiotemporal individuals, including Barack Obama, the head of state of Namibia, Alpha Centauri, and Tutankhamun. How am able to do this? I shall argue that, with a few exceptions, we can think about spatiotemporal individuals only “indirectly”, via their properties. This kind of “descriptivist” view has been influential historically, and it has some contemporary proponents, but it is widely regarded to be false in contemporary philosophy. I will defend the view against some influential objections deriving from Donnellan and Kripke. I shall also present what I believe to be novel considerations in favour of the view, drawing on some largely neglected cases where we lack abilities to think about things. Reflection on these cases suggests that (aside from the mentioned exceptions), there is no sufficient condition for being able to think about a spatiotemporal individual other than the “via properties condition” that I shall articulate. | ||
20.6.2018 | Delphine Bellis (Montpellier) | The Ontological and Epistemological Status of Mathematical Objects in Gassendi's Philosophy |
At least since Koyré, many scholars have emphasized that Pierre Gassendi's relationship to the so-called Scientific Revolution was problematic because, among other things, Gassendi had a poor understanding of the mathematics of his time and deemed mathematics inapplicable to physical reality. In the Disquisitio metaphysica in which he fiercely attacked Descartes' Meditations, Gassendi indeed sustained the view that mathematical objects were no more than mental abstractions from the sensible. I will first show what kind of problem his position might have raised regarding the applicability of mathematics to physics as it emerged in the posthumous Syntagma philosophicum (1655). I will then analyze a little studied text, Gassendi's inaugural lecture as Professor of mathematics at the Royal College in Paris (1645). Surprisingly enough, in that text, Gassendi appears as the proponent of some kind of Platonism on the ontological status of mathematics and the mathematical dimension of nature. I will attempt to make sense of what appears as a contradiction by distinguishing, in Gassendi, two kinds of geometries: one divine, perfect, geometry that shapes the natural world, and one human, limited, geometry which can be used as an instrument for knowledge. | ||
04.07.2018 | Thomas Krödel (Hamburg) | Was darf ich glauben? |
Die Antrittsvorlesung von Prof. Dr. Thomas Krödel findet im Warburghaus, Heilwigstr. 116, 20249 Hamburg statt |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2018 wird organisiert von Ariane Schneck und Daniel Dragicevic.
Wintersemester 2017/18
Programm WiSe 2017/18 (Poster)
Bitte beachten: Im WiSe 17/18 findet die Ringvorlesung im Sitzungssaal des Akademischen Senats (AS-Saal) im Hauptgebäudes der Universität Hamburg in der Edmund Siemers Alle 1 statt (eine Lagebeschreibung des AS-Saals finden Sie hier).
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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18.10.2017 | Bianca Cepollaro (Pisa) | Three accounts for appropriated slurs |
In this talk, I will discuss three possible ways to account for appropriated uses of slurs. We talk about ‘appropriation’ when the members of a group use the slur targeting their own group in a non-offensive and possibly positive way. A satisfactory account of slurs needs to explain how appropriation is possible and the relation between standard derogatory uses of slurs and appropriated ones. I will discuss three possible accounts: (i) lexical skepticism (proposed by Väyrynen 2013 for thick terms, but extendable to slurs, as he himself suggested in Väyrynen 2016), (ii) the ambiguity account (see Hom 2008: 428, 438, Richard 2008: 16, Saka 2007: 146-147, Jeshion 2013: 250-253, Whiting 2013: 370) and (iii) the echoic account (Bianchi 2014, Cepollaro 2017). I will raise objections to the three of them including my own proposal and conclude that a hybrid explanation is possibly the best solution on the market. | ||
01.11.2017 | Joachim Horvath (Köln) | Thought Experiments as Modal Evidence |
Recent reconstructions of philosophical thought experiments largely focus on the paradigmatic Gettier thought experiments. These thought experiments help us to acknowledge a non-obvious possibility: the possibility of justified true belief without knowledge. When it comes to claims about something that is non-obvious, we typically need evidence to be justified in making them. It therefore seems like a natural idea that performing Gettier thought experiments provides us with evidence for a non-obvious possibility. Yet this is not how such thought experiments have been understood in the recent metaphilosophical debate. This debate proceeds from two basic assumptions: first, that our thought experimental reasoning is best reconstructed in terms of a deductively valid argument, and second, that our intuitive verdicts about the thought experiment cases in question should be understood as modal judgments of some sort. I will argue that both assumptions are problematic. Without these assumptions, the way is cleared for an alternative understanding of Gettier thought experiments (and other philosophical thought experiments) as sources of evidence for non-obvious possibilities. In a nutshell, (Gettier) thought experiments are exercises of suppositional thinking that are guided by an implicit aim to suppose a coherent scenario. These suppositions, in turn, provide us with evidence for the relevant possibilities. | ||
15.11.2017 | Errol Lord (Pennsylvania) | Non-Foundational Direct Access: What it is and Why it Matters for the Epistemology of Ethics and Aesthetics |
This paper is a defense of the epistemic significance of cognitively penetrated perceptions of high-level properties. While some are motivated by epistemic considerations to accept the existence of cognitively penetrated perceptions of high-level properties, it has been recently argued that such perceptions cannot play a significant epistemic role. This is because such perceptions are ill-suited to provide foundational justification. They are ill-suited because it is plausible that their epistemic standing is held hostage to the background cognitive states that do the penetrating. I argue that such perceptions are epistemically significant even if they don't provide foundational justification. I do this by showing that the sort of non-foundational direct access such perceptions afford is crucial to the epistemologies of morality and aesthetics. This is because such non-foundational direct access plays an important role explaining both how we have direct access to some moral and aesthetic facts and how the descriptive facts that the normative facts depend upon are relevant to justifying our perceptual moral and aesthetic beliefs. | ||
29.11.2017 | Louise Hanson (Cambridge) | Blame and Blameworthiness |
In contemporary work on blame and blameworthiness, it has become common to do two things: First, to analyse blameworthiness in terms of blame (e.g. to be blameworthy is to deserve or warrant blame). Call accounts that do this blame-first accounts. Second, to analyse blame in noncognitive terms (e.g. as an emotion, desire, practice). Call accounts that do this noncognitive accounts of blame. These two are often, but not always, held in conjunction. I argue that both blame-first accounts and noncognitive accounts of blame are mistaken: blameworthiness cannot be analysed in terms of blame; and blaming someone is not a matter of having an emotion or desire, or engaging in some kind of practice, it is something cognitive. I suggest and defend an alternative, blameworthiness first account that is also cognitivist about blame. Blame is the attribution of blameworthiness: to blame someone is to take them to be blameworthy. And blameworthiness is a kind of moral responsibility. |
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13.12.2017 | Jason Brennan (Georgetown) | Why Politics Makes Us Mean and Dumb |
John Stuart Mill hypothesized that entering politics would enlighten and ennoble us. Joseph Schumpeter thought it would stultify and corrupt us. Unfortunately, the evidence favors Scumpeter. Politics is a realm where we can afford to be misinformed and indulge our anger, hate, self-righteousness, and prejudice. For the overwhelming majority of citizens, politics is not about policy. Any democratic theory that pretends otherwise is pure fantasy. | ||
10.01.2018 | Guido Löhrer (Erfurt) | Moral relativism and local validity |
Abstrakt: According to the relativist, moral norms possess local validity, relative to a culture, but do not hold absolutely or across cultures. Based on two papers, co-authored with Scott Sehon, I argue that anyone who affirms a relativist view is thereby forced into contradicting herself even in her own cultural framework or language. Considering various ways of replying to the argument, including a reply stemming from the relativist view espoused by David Velleman, I conclude that Velleman’s view, if interpreted so as to avoid the anti-relativism argument, actually abandons relativism and effectively gives up the idea of moral obligation altogether. | ||
24.01.2018 | Rebecca Hufendiek (Basel) | The Science of the Evolution of Morality and the Concept of Human Nature |
Abstrakt: The evolution of morality has been the topic of several publications in recent years, both in philosophy and in the cognitive and behavioral sciences (Tomasello 2016, Churchland 2011, Kitcher 2011, Prinz 2007). These approaches treat morality as a product of biological and cultural evolution. They tell the story of an evolutionary process relying on empirical data from various disciplines, ranging from paleoanthropology and primatology to neuroscience. I will argue that, prominent references to empirical data notwithstanding, these approaches to the origin of morality are more akin to classical state-of-nature scenarios than first appears. Moreover, these state-of-nature scenarios entail claims about human nature which, while they do not follow from the presented data, do carry substantive normative implications. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 2017/18 wird organisiert von Prof. Dr. Matthew Braham.
Sommersemester 2017
Programm SoSe 2017 (Poster)
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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05.04.2017 | Delia Belleri (Hamburg/Wien) | Overcoming Epistemicism about Ontological Disputes |
Abstrakt: Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too little grounds to believe any of the competing theories – Nihilism, Universalism and intermediate positions. Although an epistemic critique of this debate deserves serious consideration, I wish to resist epistemicism by countering it with a form of epistemic relativism. I will argue that each party to the debate is justified relative to the ranking of theoretical features and virtues that is “internal” to each position. The main problem with epistemicism is that it assumes an “external” perspective on the debate that can arguably be disregarded as excessively uncharitable. | ||
19.04.2017 | Jonathan Way (Southampton) | Absence and Reasons Against |
Abstrakt: Reasons for a response count in favour of that response, and can make it that case that you ought to respond in that way. For example, evidence for p counts in favour of believing p and can make it the case that you ought to believe that p; the fact that φing would have good consequences counts in favour of intending to φ and can make it the case that you ought to intend to φ. Other considerations seem to play a similar but opposing role. Evidence against p counts against believing p, and can make it the case that you ought not believe p. The fact that φing would have terrible consequences counts against intending to φ and can make it the case that you ought not intend to φ. These considerations thus look like reasons too - not reasons for a response, but reasons against it. This paper investigates reasons against and their role in determining what you ought to do. We begin by considering the natural idea that reasons against a response are reasons for not responding in that way. We argue that this idea is in tension with the plausible idea that reasons must be potential premises of good reasoning. We then explore some alternative approaches and show that they also face problems. We conclude that there may be no significant unified category of reasons against. | ||
17.05.2017 | Alexander Paseau (Oxford) | Capturing Consequence |
Abstrakt: The ability to capture implicational structure is a significant virtue in a logic. First-order formalisations are for example often preferred to propositional ones because they are thought to underwrite the validity of more natural-language arguments than the latter. My talk will compare and contrast the ability of some well-known logics---propositional and first-order in particular---to capture the implicational structure of natural language. I shall show that there is a precise and important sense in which first-order logic does not improve on propositional logic as far as respecting natural-language validity is concerned. I shall also mention some generalisations and related results, and investigate these results' philosophical significance. A first moral is that the correct way to state the oft-cited superiority of first-order logic vis-à-vis propositional logic is more nuanced than often thought. The second moral concerns semantic theory, and the third the use of logic as a tool for discovery. A fourth and final moral is that second-order logic's transcendence of first-order logic is greater than first-order logic's transcendence of propositional logic. |
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31.05.2017 | Jörg Winter (Hamburg) | Der übersehene Akteur |
Abstrakt: John Lockes Politische Philosophie ist zweifellos eine der einflussreichsten Bestrebungen, bestimmte fundamentale Rechte aus einem Naturzustand abzuleiten. Anders als beispielsweise Hobbes kommt Locke zu dem Schluss, dass Menschen auch vor der Einsetzung einer Regierung über unverbrüchliche Rechte verfügen. Die Rezeption der Lockeschen Philosophie ist allerdings weniger gründlich, als es dem Autor gerecht wird. Sowohl Rawls als auch Nozick beziehen sich explizit auf Locke, ohne dabei zu beachten, dass ihre Bezugnahmen auf die wünschenswerten Konklusionen Lockes für sich genommen keine Argumente darstellen. Hier setzt der Vortrag an. |
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21.06.2017 | Moritz Schulz (Hamburg) | Moral Decisions under Moral Uncertainty |
Many important moral decisions have to be made under moral uncertainty, that is uncertainty about whether some or all of the available options are morally permissible. Moral uncertainty may include uncertainty about whether to go to war, have an abortion or to eat meat. An influential rule for decisions under moral uncertainty recommends to maximize the expected moral value. In this talk, I am going to take a closer look at this proposal drawing on a recent critique of it by Elizabeth Harman. | ||
05.07.2017 | Angela Breitenbach (Cambridge) | The Unity of Science and the Unity of Nature Reconsidered |
Philosophical notions of the unity of science have a long and varied history. They have often been accompanied by visions of order and harmony, and of the lawfulness and unity of nature. In the recent philosophy of science literature, however, claims to the unity of science have come under severe criticism, especially by those who have pointed out the pluralism of the sciences and declared the 21st century as the century of disunity. In this paper, I reconsider Kant’s views in the context of this more recent debate. I argue that Kant’s conception of the unity of science as a necessary regulative ideal is distinct from the more recent 20th century accounts that grew out of the logical positivist movement. I suggest that, because of its non-reductionist implications, the Kantian conception has important advantages over more recent notions. |
Das Institutskolloquium im Sommersemester 2017 wird organisiert von Dr. Robert Schwartzkopff und Dr. Lukas Sikba.
Wintersemester 2016/17
Programm WiSe 16/17 (Poster)
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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26.10.2016 | Benjamin Kiesewetter (Berlin/Hamburg) | The Normativity of Rationality |
09.11.2016 | Robert Schwartzkopff (Hamburg) | Nominalism Despite Nominalization? |
23.11.2016 | Antje Rumberg (Konstanz) | Transitions towards a Semantics for Real Possibility |
07.12.2016 | Joey Pollock (Edinburgh) | Testimony and Linguistic Understanding |
18.01.2017 |
Programmänderung |
Semantic explanations of retrospective overrruling |
01.02.2017 | Jonathan Shaheen (Ghent) | How General Do Theories of "Why" and "Because" Need To Be? |
Das Institutskolloquium im Wintersemester 2016/17 wird organisiert von Dr. Stefan Roski.
Sommersemester 2016
Programm
Datum | Sprecher | Thema |
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13.04.2016 | Giovanni Merlo (Hamburg) | Irrelevant Disjuncts |
27.04.2016 | Julia Zakkou (Hamburg) | The Utility of the Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicatures |
11.05.2016 | Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) | Into the Frying Pan: Moral Ignorance as an Excuse |
01.06.2016 | Emanuela Ceva (Pavia) John-Stuart-Mill Chair 2016 |
The Relational Injustice of Political Corruption |
15.06.2016 | Giuliano Torrengo (Mailand) | On What the Flow of Time could be |
29.06.2016 | Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow) | The Consistency of Non-reductive Supervenience Theses |
Die Termine sind i.d.R. mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Phil 1009 (Philosophenturm Von-Melle-Park 6).
Dieses Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Sonja Schierbaum und Dr. Michael Clark.
Wintersemester 2015/16
Institutskolloquium des Philosophischen Seminars
Die Termine sind i.d.R. mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Phil 1009 (Philosophenturm Von-Melle-Park 6).
Dieses Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Stephan Krämer.
Programm Mittwochs, 18-20 Uhr, Phil 1009 (Von-Melle-Park 6)
- 21.10.2015, Martin Sticker (University of St. Andrews):
Disagreement about Restaurant Bills and Abortion - A Conciliationist Response to Peer Disagreement does not lead to Skepticism in Ethics
In the last decade a controversial debate has emerged concerning the question as to whether it is rational for me to lower my credence in a belief I hold if an epistemic peer disagrees with me concerning the truth of this belief. An epistemic peer is someone who is as likely as I am to get it right concerning the issue in question. The standard response to disagreement with epistemic peers is /Conciliationism/, the notion that we indeed should reduce credence when faced with peer disagreement.
In my talk I defend Conciliationism against a commonobjection, namely, that if in cases of peer-disagreement we have to move our credence towards those of our dissenting peers, then we have to adopt scepticism in fields where disagreement between peers abounds. For this objection, I will argue, the case of ethics is particularly worrisome. I will then show that the objection from scepticism is based on a highly idealised notion of an epistemic peer. In cases of disagreement about /ethical/issues, it is often unknown to us what another person counts as her evidence, since our notions of what counts as evidence and what weight to attach to different forms of evidence is influenced by the /global outlook/of a person. Knowing what an agent considers as evidence requires familiarity with that agent’s global outlook.
This introduces two constraints on epistemic peerhood in cases of disagreement about ethics: an /epistemic constraint/(I might not know what someone counts as evidence, and hence not consider that person a peer), and a /factual constraint/(we might disregard each other’s evidence, and hence not consider each other peers). Apart from showing a way to defend Conciliationism and flashing out the peer-relation, my talk also discusses what makes ethical questions special and how this should be reflected in philosophical and public discourse
- 04.11.2015, Christine Straehle (University of Ottawa, Universität Hamburg - John-Stuart-Mill Gastprofessur):
Falling into the Justice Gap - between duties of social and global justice.
The literature on cosmopolitan justice has yet to address what principles to adopt when duties of global justice and duties of social justice are in conflict. In this paper, I address David Miller's contention that some may fall into the justice gap since we need to prioritize duties of social justice. I argue that Miller's analysis depends on three stipulations: the incommensurability of the values underlying duties of social justice and those of global justice; the need to justify duties of justice to their holders; and the need to consider the necessary institutions to realize and implement justice obligations.
I argue against the incommensurability clause by showing that both conceptions of justice pursue moral equality as the underlying and commensurate value. Instead, I propose that the currencies of justice we employ in the two contexts of justice are different.
Discussing the justifiability clause I agree with the stipulation that we have to justify decisions that affect the realization of justice to those who have to carry the burden of realizing them. This implies, however, that we may have to accept that some prioritize duties of global justice over duties of social justice. If this is the case, it seems as though the state has little recourse to prioritize duties of social justice.
Finally discussing Miller's institutional clause I ask why the justice relevant institutions can only be those of the state. It is plausible to say that in our current world, institutions of humanitarian aid are effective means to satisfy duties of global justice.
- 18.11.2015, Alexander Dinges (Universität Hamburg):
The beauty of relativism
One of the main advantages of aesthetic relativism over aesthetic contextualism is that, even if, in the end, both theories can cope will all relevant data, relativism does so with an impressive unity. Our varying tendencies to judge things as tasty as well as disagreement data immediately fall out of this theory. Contextualism, on the other hand, immediately predicts the former but requires add-on theories to tackle the latter. In the present paper, I will argue that the relativistic unity extends even further, namely, to the much-debated asymmetry between aesthetic and non-aesthetic testimony. While contextualists must add yet another twist to their theory to deal with these data, relativism offers a smooth account all by itself. This simplicity should compensate for the unorthodox semantics that relativism entails making it overall the preferable view.
- 02.12.2015, Amanda Cawston (Universität Hamburg):
Looking the Other Way: Locating the Wrongs of Pornography
In the first half of the talk, I offer a critical review of the existing debate on pornography. I argue that the anti-pornography debate has been critically hampered by its attempt to understand the wrongs of pornography in terms of what pornography is, the harms it causes, or the rights it violates. While each of these threads might pick up on an important point, they fail to identify the core wrong of pornography. Moreover, these attempts have prompted responses that illustrate the ability to modify, re-describe or reinterpret pornography, or the conceptual framework that permits and legitimises it, in ways that fail to represent genuine solutions to the problem that pornography poses.
Building on this, in the second half of the talk I argue for an attitudinal conception of what pornography is, and the nature of its wrongs. Doing so allows us to focus on the attitudes of consumers rather than the content or function of pornographic objects/materials, leaving us better equipped to respond to superficial changes in content or theoretical justifications.
- 16.12.2015, Hanjo Glock (Universität Zürich):
Determinacy of Content—the hard problem about animal thinking ENTFÄLLT
The discoveries of cognitive ethology over the past 50 years have lent succour to an ‘ assimilationist’position that credits non-linguistic yet intelligent animals with ‘thinking’, here understood in the blanket sense of intentional states (believing, desiring, intending, knowing). At the same time ‘differentialist’philosophers have continued to question that conclusion on a priori grounds. Few of their arguments have stood the test of time. But one objection associated with Stich and Davidson has never been rebutted adequately. In general outline it runs
The argument against animal belief
P(1) We are only justified in ascribing beliefs to animals,
if we can ascribe specific beliefs to animals.
P(2) We can ́t ascribe specific beliefs to animals.
C(1): We are not justified in ascribing beliefs to animals.
My presentation tries to meet the objection by challenging P(2). It does so by drawing on the idea that there are non-linguistic equivalents of ‘modes of presentation’, and that these can be determined within acceptable limits on the basis of attributing to animals specific needs and behavioural capacities. In making my case I shall be discussing, among other things, Gibson’s idea of affordances, Quinean considerations about indeterminacy of meaning and content and Wittgensteinian ideas about the constitutive ‘indeterminacy of the mental’.
- 13.01.2016, Benedikt Löwe (Universität Hamburg, Universiteit van Amsterdam):
Multiverses of set theory: their role in the foundations of mathematics and the study of their logic.
Set theory has been described as a "parmenidean subject" (Schindler): a subdiscipline of mathematical logic that aims to describe a unified foundations of the mathematical universe. In the philosophy of mathematics, this is reflected by Maddy's maxim UNIFY in her naturalistic set-up of the foundations of mathematics.
This philosophical desire to provide a unified foundations for all of mathematics is in stark contrast to the actual set theoretic practice that could be described as the study of relationships between different universes of mathematics and how new universes can be constructed from others.
In recent years, several mathematicians interested in the philosophy of mathematics have decided to use their insight in actual set theoretic practice to provide a novel approach to the foundational content of set theory. This approach is called the "multiverse view" by Hamkins.
We shall give an overview of the multiverse view, its relation to other philosophies of mathematics, and explain how the multiverse view reveals a whole new family of foundational mathematical questions that can be asked and answered. Among them are questions about the global structure of the multiverse (or of multiverses), some of which have been answered by Hamkins and the speaker.
- 27.01.2016, Holm Tetens (Freie Universität Berlin):
Wie ernst ist der Gottesgedanke in der Philosophie noch zu nehmen?
Die Gottesfrage war in der Philosophie bis Hegel und darüber hinaus omnipräsent. Heutzutage hat sich der Gottesgedanke für die meisten Philosophen erledigt. Das scheint der Attraktivität des Naturalismus in der Philosophie geschuldet zu sein. Aber hat der Naturalismus nicht erhebliche Probleme? Lassen die Schwierigkeiten des Naturalismus den Gottesgedanken wieder attraktiv werden?
Sommersemester 2015
Institutskolloquium des Philosophischen Seminars
Die Termine sind i.d.R. mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Phil 1009 (Philosophenturm Von-Melle-Park 6).
Dieses Institutskolloquium wurde organisiert von Dr. Stephan Krämer und Jörg Winter.
Programm Mittwochs, 18-20 Uhr, Phil 1009 (Von-Melle-Park 6)
- 15.04. Arvid Bave - "The Syntactic-Function Conception of Concepts"
- 29.04. Tobias Rosefeldt - "Looking for things that don't exist"
- 13.05. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - "Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?"
- 03.06. Naomi Thompson - "Grounding Truth in Fiction"
- 17.06. Dirk Kindermann - "Context, Conversation, and Mental Fragmentation"
- 01.07. Michael Moehler - "Orthodox Rational Choice Contractarianism: Before and After Gauthier"
Wintersemester 2014/15
Institutskolloquium des Philosophischen Seminars
Die Termine sind mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Phil 1009 (Philosophenturm Von-Melle-Park 6).
Dieses Institutskolloquium wird organisiert von Dr. Stephan Krämer.
Programm Mittwochs, 18-20 Uhr, Hörsaal D (Von-Melle-Park 6)
- 29. Oktober 2014
Prof. Dr. Dominik Perler (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Gibt es Individuen? Überlegungen zu Spinozas Monismus
- 12. November 2014
Prof. Dr. James Ingram (McMaster University)
Human Rights and Revolution
- 26. November 2014
Dr. Michael Clark (Universität Hamburg)
Partial without Full Grounding
- 10. Dezember 2014
Prof. Dr. Charlotte Werndl (The London School of Economics and Political Science)
Bestätigung und Schätzung in der Klimawissenschaft
- 7. Januar 2015
Dr. Steve G. Lofts (Western University Canada)
Cassirer and Heidegger: The Cultural-Event — The Auseinandersetzung of Thinking and Being
- 21. Januar 2015
Dr. Marianne Schark (Universität Hamburg)
Die mechanistische Erklärung des Mentalen und die These der Identität von Geist und Gehirn