Archive

07.11.2023

Maximilian Kiener

(Technische Universität Hamburg)

Strict Moral Answerability

Abstract
Bernard Williams described the case of a lorry driver who runs over a child through no fault of his own. In this paper, I pursue two aims. First, I want to motivate a puzzle about Williams’s case, which I call the Lorry Driver Paradox and which consists of three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. Second, I want to offer a solution to this paradox based on a novel approach to so-called strict moral answerability. I conclude by responding to the objection that strict answerability is a contradiction in terms. 

Marie Wuth

(Universität Hamburg)

Prisms of Power. Spinoza and the Question of the Political

Abstract
Examining the political landscape, one discerns that rational arguments, or perhaps, arguments solely guided by reason, do not stand as the primary or exclusive impetus for steering the actions of political agents. Often, it is power interests and affects that are the driving forces for words and deeds, whether in support or rejection of political processes and governance. Based on this observation, I will develop an understanding of ‘the political’ from an affective and power-theoretical perspective using Spinoza's philosophy. My objective is to shed light upon the underlying dynamics that mold the contours of political existence, the orchestration of organizational structures, the facilitation of agency, and the dynamics of participation. This endeavor seeks to highlight the eminent role of affects in political existence and politics and to re-evaluate the conditions and possibilities of political participation, community formation, and governance. In this vein, I shall demonstrate how power can be expressed, consolidated, or undermined among individuals and in collectives, and the implications this holds for our understanding of the political sphere.

David Plunkett

(Dartmouth College)

Abstract
TBA

Leda Berio

(Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

How Our Norms Guide Our Actions: On the Relationship between Social Norms, Affordances, and Implicit Cognition (joint work with Kristina Musholt)

Ilaria Cozzaglio

(Universität Hamburg)

Trust and the Justifiability of Hope: The Case of Climate Activism (joint work with Lukas Sparenborg)

Abstract
While the literature on climate justice has associated climate activists’ practices with hope or despair, we argue that this picture is incomplete, as for hope to be justified in the case of climate activism, it must be supported by some form of trust. We then propose and assess several options activists have at their disposal to ground hopeful attitudes, including procedural and moral trust in institutions, and moral trust in fellow citizens or activists. Relatedly, we argue that activists need at least to trust their fellows to retain hope justifiably. As we believe that both trust and hope are relational attitudes when it comes to climate activism, we then look at the relationship between trust and hope from the institutions’ standpoint, as the main addressee of activists’ critique, and argue that institutions have both moral and instrumental reasons to be perceived as trustworthy by activists and provide them with the institutional basis for hope. We finally argue that mistrust represents a democratic equilibrium between the activists’ duty to exercise vigilance and critique towards institutions, and the need for institutions to be perceived as trustworthy by activists and citizens more broadly.

Mirjam Müller

(Humboldt Universität Berlin)

Justin Vlasits

(University of Illinois, Chicago)

A New Fragment of Aristotle’s On Ideas

Interventionist Causal Exclusion: Taking Stock of the Debate
17-19Uhr

Abstract
NN

Abstract

In "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale", Debra Satz (2012) develops a framework for morally assessing market exchanges. The core idea is that a market exchange is a social practice that generates externalities that extend well beyond the immediate vicinity of the exchange itself. Satz’s key claim is that market exchanges generate social externalities that affect the social fabric of democratic society itself. In Satz’s view, unregulated markets permit particular kinds of exchanges that do not cohere well – if at all – with a fundamental democratic ideal, that of equal social standing. This paper pursues four goals: First, I will reconstruct the normative principle, the principle of equal social status (PESS), underlying Satz's noxious markets framework. Secondly, I will demonstrate that PESS is seriously defective. Thirdly, I will reveal the reasons why it is defective – it rests on an erroneous analogy between social and economic externalities. Finally, I will present a revised version of the PESS that does not seem to generate counter-intuitive moral judgements and can thus better support the concept of noxious markets.

Abstract
NN

Abstract

Despair has a bad reputation among philosophers: in contrast to its antidote hope, which is deemed to motivate and strengthen our resolve, despair is considered unproductive, impotent or even nihilistic. Against this narrative, in this talk I argue that in scenarios where we are highly invested in an unlikely end, despair can be justified both intrinsically and instrumentally. On the one hand, despair can be fitting as an expression of an agent’s reluctance to give up on an end even though they may not currently be able to see how it may come about. On the other hand, in disposing us to critically reflect on our goals and ways to realize them, despair can protect us from fixation and thus helps us to hope well. To play this productive role in our practical lives, however, despair has to be transient (rather than permanent) and specific (rather than fundamental).

Abstract

Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

Abstract
NN

Everyday Language and Theoretical Terms: Reflective Abstraction in the Long-term History of the Exact Sciences

Achtung Zeit:18:00 - 19:30 Uhr

Criticising Language – Discursive Resistance in a Non-Ideal World
17:15 - 18:45 Uhr

Abstract
Social movements keep reminding us of the importance of language for their struggles. It is thus worth asking what political language critique is and should be. I critically examine strategies of criticising language based on two assumptions. First, words get their meaning through social practices. If we want to understand their meaning and explore possible ways of criticising their use, we must examine what function they have in these practices. Second, simply turning to politically relevant linguistic issues without theorising their political aspects is futile. In order to engage in what has been called non-ideal theorising, we need to pay attention to how power relations and categories shape the morally and politically relevant discursive practices as well as the possibilities of critique thereof. Sensible political language critique, so I shall argue, requires us to attentively choose between different strategies in each situation, often combine them, and, consequently, neither under- nor overestimate the linguistic dimension of our social practices.

Esther Neuhann
(Universität Hamburg)

Fichte on Human Rights
17:15 - 18:45 Uhr

 Achtung Ort: Mittelweg 177, Raum N0008

Anger Gaslighting and Affective Injustice
17:15 - 18:45 Uhr

Abstract
If gaslighting makes its target doubt herself, anger gaslighting makes its target doubt herself about the aptness of her anger. In this paper, I analyze the case of anger gaslighting, demonstrating what’s unjust about it and why it matters. Scholarship on gaslighting in feminist philosophy has tended to analyze gaslighting as an epistemic injustice (an injustice that concerns knowledge and credibility). Focusing on anger gaslighting as a paradigm case, I argue that gaslighting can be an affective injustice (an injustice that concerns emotions and affective influence). But my study of anger gaslighting also produces concepts for studying affective injustices beyond gaslighting, that concern emotions beyond anger. I’ll apply these Kate Manne’s notion of “himpathy” and a few other examples as proof of concept, creating conceptual tools to enable discussion of this important and under-theorized uniquely affective dimension of injustice.

Die Rolle der Monaden oder 'Êtres simples' bei Leibniz und Émilie Du Châtelet im Vergleich
17:15 - 18:45 Uhr

The Causal Theory of Slurs

18:15 - 19:45 Uhr

Language can be used in highly destructive ways. One such way is the usage of slurs. These are expressions that are used to refer to the members of a given group, the target group, in a derogatory, pejorative or otherwise insulting way because of their race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation etc. As a consequence, slurs primarily have two functions. First, they can be used to offend or psychologically harm the members of the target group. Second, slurs can be used to create or reinforce negative attitudes towards them. For example, most uses of slurs for Jewish people in Nazi propaganda had mainly the purpose to create and reinforce anti-Semitic attitudes that would lead to increasing discrimination and violence against Jews, to their expulsion or incarceration in concentration camps, and, ultimately, to genocide. Similarly, Tirrell argues that the massive use of the slur ''Iyenzi'' (cockroaches) for Tutsis in broadcasts from a Hutu radio station played a crucial role in inciting the genocide of Tutsis. As Tirrell points out, slurs ''regularly enact power, incite crimes, and rationalize cruelty'' (Tirrell 2012, 192).

In the philosophy of language, the question then arises how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished. A satisfactory answer to this question should explain both the offensiveness of slurs and the fact that slurs can be used to create and reinforce negative attitudes. As Caroline West and others point out, answering the question how derogation by means of slurs is accomplished may have implications for the legal question of whether there should be restrictions on hate speech involving slurs. Furthermore, the question is also of particular interest for philosophy of language in general, since it puts our existing tools of understanding language to the test.

In this talk, I put forward and systematically develop a new explanation of the derogatory force of slurs, taking as a starting point a causal account of their referential properties. On the view on offer, slurs are derogatory because, unlike their neutral counterparts, they have been grounded in the target group by speakers who have negative attitudes towards its members. I will argue that such a causal theory of slurs does better than virtually any of its competitors and that, for the first time, it offers a complete account of the referential properties of slurs, i.e. of the fact that slurs can be used to refer to the target group. By extending the causal theory to other referring pejoratives, the proposed explanation promises not only a better understanding of slurs, but of pejorative language in general, opening up new ways of investigating evaluative terms.

Uses and Misuses of Scientific Models in Pandemic Policy Advice
18:15 - 19:45 Uhr

Luise Müller
(Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)

Abstract

One fundamental puzzle in the philosophical study of authority is to explain why one person may make a decision over another even though persons are moral equals to one another in democratic societies. If it is the case that as citizens, we are all free and equal, how is it possible that others can make decisions over us that deeply influence, and often stifle, our autonomy, wellbeing and life plans? Why are we – as moral equals – dependent on other people’s decisions and control when it comes to, for example, school and university admission, grades, job applications, pay rises, criminal sentencing, or academic funding decisions?

Many of those relations of authority are constituted by social asymmetries: between teacher and student, employer and employee, judge and defendant, administrator and petitioner, and so on. On the face of it, these social asymmetries – in power, status, or knowledge – seem incompatible with our equal moral status, because they enable some to control, or dominate, others. In the paper, I first explore what, if anything, makes these asymmetric relations morally problematic. I argue that we should be fundamentally concerned about the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within these relationships, instead of others metrics like contestability, accountability, transparency, or consent.

Second, I ask whether substituting human judgement and decisionmaking with algorithmic decision-making – ‚rule by automation‘ (Sparks & Jayaram) – can alleviate the normatively problematic nature of some of these social asymmetries. Can algorithms free us from morally problematic relationships of control and authority? I argue that merely substituting human decisionmaking with algorithmic decisionmaking cannot free us, as long as it reproduces the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. Instead, we need to think about in which contexts deploying algorithmic decisionmaking can equalize the distribution of benefits and burdens (or advantages and disadvantages) within socially asymmetric relations.

As an example, I discuss the relationship between physician and patient, which is traditionally characterised by an asymmetry of knowledge between both parties that potentially translates into a morally problematic asymmetry: physicians are able to influence, manipulate, and effectively control patients in virtue of their expert knowledge. Importantly, while consent is an important precondition of physician intervention, its capacity to ameliorate what is morally problematic about the asymmetry is limited. In such cases, algorithms can potentially free us if (and only if) they are deployed with the aim of balancing the distribution of burdens and benefits to the advantage of the patient. However, where this is not the case, algorithmic decisionmaking is no improvement on the status quo – in fact, it often leaves those disadvantaged in social asymmetries worse off.

Vulnerable Epistemic Identities
18:15 - 19:45 Uhr

Mere Permutations of Individuals
18:15 - 19:45 Uhr

Interventionist Causal Exclusion: Taking Stock of the Debate
17-19h

Abstract
Many philosophers think that Woodward’s interventionist account of causation is well suited to describe higher-level causal relations, in particular, causal relations involving mental properties. It has turned out, however, that interventionism cannot easily be applied to classical causal exclusion scenarios where a mental cause competes for causal relevance with the physical causes upon which it supervenes. The reason is that according to interventionist causation, interventions on a putative cause variable have to keep the values of all other possible confounding variables fixed. However, if mental causes and physical causes stand in supervenience relations to each other, such interventions are impossible.

Proponents of interventionism typically try to avoid this problem by arguing that variables standing in supervenience relations to the cause variable under consideration need not be kept fixed when intervening on the cause variable. It is controversial, however, whether this exemption should apply to all possible variables standing in a supervenience relation to the cause variable or only to variables contained in the same causal model as the cause variable. I argue that the former option has problematic consequences. However, assuming that the exemption applies only to variables contained in the same model as the cause variable renders the notion of causation model relative – a consequence that many interventionists find unpalatable. I conclude by showing that this consequence

Abstract

In "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale", Debra Satz (2012) develops a framework for morally assessing market exchanges. The core idea is that a market exchange is a social practice that generates externalities that extend well beyond the immediate vicinity of the exchange itself. Satz’s key claim is that market exchanges generate social externalities that affect the social fabric of democratic society itself. In Satz’s view, unregulated markets permit particular kinds of exchanges that do not cohere well – if at all – with a fundamental democratic ideal, that of equal social standing. This paper pursues four goals: First, I will reconstruct the normative principle, the principle of equal social status (PESS), underlying Satz's noxious markets framework. Secondly, I will demonstrate that PESS is seriously defective. Thirdly, I will reveal the reasons why it is defective – it rests on an erroneous analogy between social and economic externalities. Finally, I will present a revised version of the PESS that does not seem to generate counter-intuitive moral judgements and can thus better support the concept of noxious markets.

Abstract
In this talk I present a theory of intersectional disadvantage, i.e. the specific disadvantage experienced by those simultaneously occupying several social identities. Two dimensions of intersectional disadvantage, its source and its content, are distinguished, and it is shown how central theses of the literature can be precisely stated and defended on this theory without committing to irreducible intersectional identities. Moreover, the theory affords a consistent account of the relation between intersectional disadvantage and privilege and affords natural responses to prominent objections to intersectionality theory.

In Defense of Despair
17-19h

Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt!
Für den Zoom-Link wenden Sie sich bitte an Jasper Lohmar: jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de)

Abstract

Despair has a bad reputation among philosophers: in contrast to its antidote hope, which is deemed to motivate and strengthen our resolve, despair is considered unproductive, impotent or even nihilistic. Against this narrative, in this talk I argue that in scenarios where we are highly invested in an unlikely end, despair can be justified both intrinsically and instrumentally. On the one hand, despair can be fitting as an expression of an agent’s reluctance to give up on an end even though they may not currently be able to see how it may come about. On the other hand, in disposing us to critically reflect on our goals and ways to realize them, despair can protect us from fixation and thus helps us to hope well. To play this productive role in our practical lives, however, despair has to be transient (rather than permanent) and specific (rather than fundamental).

A fictionalist theory of universals
co-authored with Tim Button (UCL)
17-19h

Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt!
Für den Zoom-Link wenden Sie sich bitte an Jasper Lohmar: jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de)

Abstract

Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

Non-Ideal Theory and Critical Theory: What They Are About and Why Neither is (Completely) Right
17-19h

Wichtig: Diese Sitzung des Institutskolloquiums findet digital per Zoom statt!
Für den Zoom-Link wenden Sie sich bitte an Jasper Lohmar: jasper.lohmar(at)uni-hamburg.de(jasper.lohmar"AT"uni-hamburg.de)

Abstract
Political philosophy should guide action. At least, this is what many people working in political philosophy think. Over the past 15 years, there has been a concern that political philosophy may fail to live up to this task because it focuses too much on ideal theory, i.e. on thinking about what full justice requires. This is why a considerable number of political philosophers advocates work in nonideal theory. The latter is supposed to offer normative resources that can guide action in the current unjust world. Interestingly and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this echoes a concern about ideal theory from a very different tradition of social and political thought, namely Frankfurt School critical theory. Like nonideal theorists, representatives of critical theory are skeptical about whether ideal theory is able to guide action in the here and now. In my talk, I would like to explore the following questions: first, are nonideal theory and critical theory actually about the same thing? Second, if not, which of the two is the more convincing one?

Vulnerability has often been described as an inherently human characteristic. In this ontological sense, humans are vulnerable due to the embodied nature of human lives. A second way of conceptualizing vulnerability has proposed it as a constraint to individual autonomy. The argument then is that those who are vulnerable are not able to take decisions about the course of their lives since their decision-making capacity is hampered by dependency on the acts of another. Accordingly, morally problematic vulnerability arises in interaction with another.

In this paper, I explore the concept of vulnerability with these two uses in mind. I suggest that a neglected aspect of individual vulnerability is the limits it may pose for epistemological capacity. In particular, I am interested in how specific circumstances of individual vulnerability may challenge the role individual introspection can play in leading autonomous lives. I want to argue that individual vulnerability can jeopardize the role introspection is usually assumed to play in deciding what course we hope to give our lives. In some cases of vulnerability, individuals may not be able to endorse and take responsibility for choices they make due to the fact that they don’t trust their introspective knowledge. In this way, vulnerable individuals loose the authoritative grip on their introspective self-knowledge. Yet self-knowledge is a vital condition of individual autonomy: without self-knowledge, individuals lack the internal requirements of personal autonomy.

Fichte on Rape
17-19h

Abstract

In this essay, I examine Fichte's brief remarks on rape in his Foundations of Natural Right. My aim is to assess his conception of the harm of rape and to situate his discussion within the context of his theory of sexual politics generally and his theory of marriage in particular. I employ the work of the feminist philosopher Rae Langton to assess the extent to which his remarks on rape and marriage are compatible with his egalitarianism and theory of mutual recognition, both of which are central to his theory of right.

Abstract

Moral blackmail is a phenomenon whereby one agent forces some other agent to act in a particular way by making it morally impermissible for them to act otherwise. In this paper I explain this phenomenon, and argue that in the arena of intergenerational justice moral blackmail is an under-recognised but ubiquitous problem. Understanding that helps us see who should bear the costs of environmental risk and reparative justice, and thereby lays the foundations of a theory which deals adequately with diachronic as well as synchronic injustice.

Abstract

The world is full of many things, like shoes and ships and cabbages and kings. But the world is also full of lots of stuff, like sealing wax. And while the mereology of things has received much attention from contemporary philosophers, the mereology of stuff has been comparatively neglected. I’ll argue that an account of the mereology of stuff can be extracted from John Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica. Buridan's mereology is unusual by contemporary standards in two ways: it is pluralist, and it underwrites a deep analogy between stuff and predication. This mereology, I’ll argue, makes possible a novel solution to the problem of mereological change. Although it is not a solution that Buridan himself endorses or even discusses, I will suggest that it deserves our serious consideration.

Abstract

According to a widely endorsed conception of fundamentality, the metaphysically fundamental is characterized in terms of a certain privileged metaphysical dependence relation or set of relations: something is fundamental just in case it does depend on anything else, relative to the privileged relation or set of relations. Let us say that such a conception of fundamentality is ‘favouritist’, for it favours a unique property as the mark of the fundamental. First, I argue that a single fundamentality property cannot do all the work we need fundamentality to do. Second, I show that a single fundamentality property—fundamentality simpliciter—characterized in terms of a single metaphysical dependence relation or set of relations is either objectionably arbitrary or incoherent, and so cannot be privileged as the mark of the fundamental. I then use these two claims to motivate the need for an ecumenical conception of fundamentality that embraces multiple fundamentality properties. On this conception, there is no one privileged relation or set of relations that can determine what is fundamental simpliciter. Instead, an entity qualifies as fundamental relative to a given metaphysical dependence relation just in case it does not depend on anything else, relative to that relation.

Abstract

TBA

Abstract

TBA

How to explain Intentionality
18-20 Uhr

Abstract

Philosophical theories of intentionality typically assume that explaining intentionality or mental representation must answer what I call the ‘question of aboutness’: what makes it the case that one thing is about or represents another? Moreover, this is supposed to be a general requirement on theories of intentionality, regardless of one’s metaphysical position (materialism, dualism etc). In this talk I argue that there is no such general requirement, and that explaining intentionality does not require answering the question of aboutness.

It is not an empirical question, for me, how long I will love my children or my spouse. Indeed, this is not a question for me at all: The question of how long I will love them is not separate from the question of whether I love them. Love, in its self-consciousness, is endless.
Yet how are we to square this with the empirical observation that often love does appear to end? How are we to make sense of broken hearts, betrayal, or just plain falling out of love? And can we reconcile the self-consciousness of love as endless with empirical reflection on its possible end?

Abstract

Can we wrong each other just by entertaining certain beliefs about each other? For instance, does another person wrong me if she believes that my talk will be boring because I am woman? So far, authors who are interested in the possibility of so called doxastic wronging have tried to answer such questions by focusing on issues of control and coordination. In this talk, I raise a different point by discussing whether the idea of doxastic wronging is compatible with a liberal normative commitment. To do so, I first show that there are two ways to interpret the phenomenon of doxastic wronging, a harm-based one and an obligation-based one. Then I argue that only the harm-based interpretation is compatible with the so called liberal principle and, more specifically, freedom of thought. Engaging with this moral issue reveals that the wrong-making feature of doxastic wronging lies in the harm it constitutes for its targets and not, as an obligation-based interpretation would have it, in the violation of a morally grounded epistemic obligation.

Moral equality is often grounded in the possession of some value-conferring intrinsic property of individuals, typically identified in psychological capacities related to the ability to be autonomous agents (Rawls 1971; Carter 2011). While these theories have already been the object of criticism (McMahan 2007), in this paper I argue that the concept of vulnerability can be used to formulate a further objection to them. Like many other parts of moral and political philosophy, such as social contract theory, this debate is also vitiated by a conception of the person centred around self-sufficiency and independence as these theories disregard the fact that the possession of moral autonomy, far from being a natural datum, depends on the existence of certain social arrangements and relationships.

I argue that a better approach to the basis of moral equality is to look at human vulnerability. Unlike other recent proposals, I do not opt for a negative conception of equality, which starts from the wrongness of inequality and conceive of vulnerability exclusively in connection with potential attacks to one’s sense of self (Sangiovanni 2017). Instead, I focus on the fact that vulnerability is also constitutive of very many valuable moral and political relationships, such as those of love, care, mutual recognition and respect. I argue that our commitment to moral equality is justified by the value of these relationships, together with the wrongness and harms of inequality, because only when and if and we treat each other as moral equals we can be part of relationships of love, care, mutual recognition and respect. My aim is to develop a relational account of the basis of moral equality, which fully captures the significance of vulnerability and is immune to the objections moved against traditional accounts (McMahan 2007) and the criticisms of Sangiovanni’s relational proposal (Floris 2019). Abstract NN

PEP-WEIHNACHTSVORLESUNG
ACHTUNG:
Hörsaal A, ESA 1

HAMID TAIEB
(Universität Hamburg)

Meinong on Varieties of Concepts
AS-Saal 18-20 Uhr

Fregean that-clause semantics
AS-Saal 18-20 Uhr

The focus of this talk is to consider what kind of answer can be given to the question “What is money?” from a metaphysical perspective. Relevant questions are: “What does it take for something to qualify as money?” and “In what does monetary value consist?”. When money is considered from this point of view, it becomes clear that it is very much defined by its value and also that it is a social object or a social kind.

For various reasons, people often wonder whether social objects should be considered real and there may be further reasons to doubt the reality of monetary value. At least it is often said that the value of money is not “real” as opposed to other kinds of value that is then considered more “real”. On the other hand, this stance may appear strange, given that people strive hard to earn money, and striving for something that is not real might seem puzzling.

I introduce some theories that have been held about money and monetary value and connect them to a discussion of whether and in what sense the reality of money or monetary value could plausibly be doubted. Among other things, I discuss different senses of ‘real’ and argue that money is the type of social kind that is sensitive to the so-called ‘looping effect’.

Lee Walters
(University of Southampton)

Epistemic Akrasia and Doxastic Resilience
Überseering 35, 22297 Hamburg, Raum 03097

Abstrakt: John Lockes Politische Philosophie ist zweifellos eine der einflussreichsten Bestrebungen, bestimmte fundamentale Rechte aus einem Naturzustand abzuleiten. Anders als beispielsweise Hobbes kommt Locke zu dem Schluss, dass Menschen auch vor der Einsetzung einer Regierung über unverbrüchliche Rechte verfügen. Die Rezeption der Lockeschen Philosophie ist allerdings weniger gründlich, als es dem Autor gerecht wird. Sowohl Rawls als auch Nozick beziehen sich explizit auf Locke, ohne dabei zu beachten, dass ihre Bezugnahmen auf die wünschenswerten Konklusionen Lockes für sich genommen keine Argumente darstellen. Hier setzt der Vortrag an.
Wir gehen der Quelle der substantiellen normativen Implikationen des Lockeschen Naturrechts auf die Spur. Nach dem die Sachlage herausgearbeitet ist, biete ich eine handlungstheoretisch fundierte Erklärung des Lockeschen Naturrechts an.

Programmänderung 
Giulia Pravato (Bologna)