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12.04.23
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Madhulika Banerjee
(Universität Dehli)
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Understanding the Epistemology of 'Other' Knowledges: Preliminary Explorations
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About the Lecture
TBA
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26.04.23
online |
Charlotte Werndl
(Universität Salzburg)
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ONLINE
On Defining Climate and Climate Change
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About the Lecture
The aim of the is talk is to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically applicable; it should correctly classify different climates; it should not depend on our knowledge; it should be applicable to the past, present, and future; and it should be mathematically well-defined. Then several definitions are discussed: in particular, two classes of definitions, namely climate as distribution over time and climate as an ensemble distribution providing likelihoods fur the future values of climate variables. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems and that the definition of climate as the distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions seems most promising.
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10.05.23
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Paul Silva
(Universität zu Köln)
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The Structure of Factive States
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About the Lecture
Natural languages contain a range of epistemic factive verbs. Verbs like ‘knows that’, ‘realizes that’, ‘recognizes that’, ‘notices that’, ‘understands that’, ‘sees that’, and ‘remembers that’ are but some of these verbs. Unger (1972) argued that this class of factive verbs is knowledge-entailing. Decades later, Williamson (2000) argued that these factive terms are knowledge-entailing and that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. However, natural language also contains factive adjectives. These include ‘is aware of the fact that’, ‘is conscious of the fact that’, ‘is obvious that’, and ‘is clear that’. Interestingly, the states referred to by factive adjectives cannot quickly and easily be identified with or reduced to the states referred to by factive verbs. In part, this is because the factive adjectives refer to states that can come in degrees while the factive verbs do not seem to refer to states that can come in degrees. This paper makes two new contributions to the state of the art on factives. First, it provides new and previously unexplored motivation for thinking that we should understand knowledge in terms of awareness by reflecting on the degreed/comparative character of 'is aware of the fact that'. The second contribution is an exploration of how we can gradually exit states of ignorance, by becoming gradually increasingly aware of facts. It will be suggested that knowledge of general scientific hypotheses is sometimes best understood as reaching an endpoint on a graded scale of awareness.
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31.05.23
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Dana Jalobeanu
(Universität Bukarest)
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What are the experiments for? Cartesian Baconians and the construction of hypotheses in mid-seventeenth century
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About the Lecture
TBA
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| 14.06.23 |
Lara Keuck
(Universität Bielefeld)
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Was ist die Alzheimer-Krankheit? Historische und philosophische Reflexionen auf eine ungelöste Frage
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About the Lecture
TBA
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28.06.23
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Alexander Dinges
(FAU Erlangen)
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Über die epistemischen Einstellungen von Gruppen |
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About the Lecture
Wir schreiben Gruppen, Institutionen, Unternehmen und ähnlichen sozialen Gebilden häufig Überzeugungen zu und viele Philosoph:innen fragen nach der Natur solcher Überzeugungen. In der Debatte werden unterschiedliche Definitionen diskutiert, doch herrscht weitgehende Einigkeit, dass Gruppenüberzeugungen durch die Einstellungen und das Verhalten der Gruppenmitglieder analysiert werden sollten. In diesem Sinne sind die vorherrschenden Definitionsvorschläge individualistisch. In meinem Vortrag erhebe ich prinzipielle Bedenken gegen derart individualistische Definitionen von Gruppenüberzeugungen. Dazu zeige ich, dass sich diese Definitionen nicht mit bestehenden Theorien zur Natur von Überzeugungen vereinbaren lassen. Diese Theorien umfassen z. B. den Dispositionalismus und den Funktionalismus, wie sie aus der Philosophie des Geistes bekannt sind. Ich konzentriere mich in meinem Vortrag auf Gruppenüberzeugungen, aber wie sich zeigen wird, können analoge Bedenken auch gegen individualistische Theorien von z. B. Gruppenwissen und Gruppenbehauptungen vorgebracht werden.
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| 12.07.23 |
Rodolfo Garau
(Universität Hamburg)
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From Science to Pseudoscience: Gassendi, Morin, and the Marginalization of Astrology
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About the Lecture
In contemporary times, astrology is generally considered to be the paragon of pseudoscience or (more benevolently) a product of popular superstition or fad. However, during the Middle Ages and the early modern period, astrology was an integral aspect of the astronomical and medical curricula of most European universities. Despite being a subject of debate, astrology was widely acknowledged as a scholarly discipline. Sometime between the 16th and the end of the 17th century, however, astrology lost its position as a recognized scholarly pursuit. How, and why, did this happen? Scholars of early modern science have put forth various explanations to account for this phenomenon. Some argue that astrology was incompatible with the new science, while others propose that the introduction of heliocentric cosmology undermined the foundational framework of astrology; others assert that the increasing restrictions on astrological prognostication brought about by religious reformations contributed to the marginalization of astrology. Despite the compelling nature of these claims, each presents relevant counterexamples and exceptions that make it difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation for the decline of astrology. In this presentation, I draw on a case study of early modern science and philosophy, namely the clash between the philosophers Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Jean-Baptiste Morin (1583-1656), to offer insights into the historical marginalization of astrology. I suggest that the emphasis on the method of knowing, which was a central tenet of early modern philosophy, played a crucial role in the demise of astrology and its relegation to the status of pseudoscience. Simultaneously, I underscore the importance of social structures and patronage relations in determining the continuing relevance of astrology throughout mid-17th century France—and, conversely, its demise. I conclude by claiming that the intersection of these two aspects—theoretical and socio-political—can provide a fertile scheme to account for such an intricate historical phenomenon.
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