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Fachbereich Philosophie


Institutskolloquium des Philosophischen Seminars im Sommersemester 2014

Die Termine sind mittwochs um 18 Uhr c. t. in Phil 1009 (Philosophenturm Von-Melle-Park 6).


  • 16. April 2014
    Dr. Jan Willem Wieland (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    We Should Know Better

    We are largely unaware that many products we consume are produced in slavery-like conditions. Given that more and more information is available about these things, one is tempted to think that we should know better. But what does that mean? Why do we have a duty to inform ourselves, and when are we to be blamed for not doing it? In this paper, I will review the options, and defend the most promising view from the objections from luck and guidance.
  • 14. Mai 2014
    Dr. Maike Albertzart (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
    Moral Indeterminacy: A Taxonomy

    How much indeterminacy is there in morality, and is it something the existence of which we should regret or welcome? The first step in answering this question is to acknowledge that indeterminacy comes not only in different degrees, but also in different forms. I distinguish between four forms of indeterminacy central to morality: vagueness, open-texture, comparison indeterminacy and indeterminacy in implementation. I argue that, contrary to the impression given by many moral philosophers, none of these four forms of indeterminacy is entailed by the others. It is, therefore, impossible to fully understand the phenomenon of moral indeterminacy by focusing on just one of them. With regard to each form of indeterminacy I then ask whether it constitutes a problem for moral theory and practice. In doing so, I focus on three prominent concerns widely associated with moral indeterminacy: about scepticism, fairness and action-guidance, respectively. I argue that moral indeterminacy should be considered a virtue, rather than a vice, for moral theory and practice.
  • 2. Juli 2014
    Prof. Dr. Dale E. Miller (DAAD-Gastprofessur / John-Stuart-Mill Chair)
    Was "Strawson's Point" Really Strawson's Point?

    In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the "wrong kind of reason" to justify "practices of punishment and moral responsibility." Darwall names this thesis "Strawson's Point." I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he does not in fact hold this thesis and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson's account of the reactive attitudes can potentially be a useful resource for consequentialists.


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